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Despite tackling theological anthropology in one of his earliest works, this 
remains a minor theme in the writings of Thomas. F. Torrance. Yet his writings are 
replete with references to the nature of the human person from the perspective of the 
doctrine of God, creation and the person and work of Christ. This accent upon 
theology rather than anthropology is intentional in securing a strongly theological and 
Christological understanding of the person, largely in opposition to more 
anthropocentric approaches to the knowledge of God. The thesis explores the ways in 
which his handling of key Christian doctrines shapes his account of the human person 
as created and redeemed, relational and rational, dependent yet responsible. In 
particular, his early response to the Barth-Brunner controversy, via the interpretation 
of Calvin, is analysed before proceeding to his account of the anthropological 
significance of the vicarious humanity of Christ, the persons of the Trinity and the 
creation of the world through the divine Logos. To draw Torrance’s anthropological 
conclusions into clearer perspective, a series of comparison with other 20
th
 century 
writers is drawn – Bultmann, Macmurray and Moltmann. What emerges is an 
appreciative reading of Torrance’s theological anthropology as an important resource 
in terms of its methodology and strong theological orientation, but one which 
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1.1 The Theme of the Research 
 
Anthropology is an important subject within Christian theology, but also a subject of 
particular controversy in modern Protestant thought. Theologians agree that humanity 
should be understood as made in God’s image (i.e. the imago Dei), but without much 
agreement on how to interpret it. A leading theologian of the 20
th
 century, Thomas F. 
Torrance tackled theological anthropology in one of his earliest works.
1
 Although this 
was a minor theme in his subsequent writings, these are replete with references to the 
nature of the human person from the perspective of the doctrine of God, creation and 
the person and work of Christ. His accent upon theology, rather than anthropology, is 
intentional in securing a strongly theological and Christological understanding of the 
person. It approaches anthropology by taking full account of the priority of our 
knowledge of God. Within this anthropology, humankind “is only an image” in 
relation to God, and human life “is absolutely reflexive of the action of God, and can 
be lived only in a motion of continued reflection.”
2
 To know what the image of God is, 
we have first to arrive at a proper knowledge of God. For Torrance, humanity as the 
imago Dei is not a state of being in the likeness of God but a movement and process in 
which we can mirror God. Human nature rests upon a dynamic reflection of God as 
                                                 
1
 That is Calvin’s Doctrine of Man (London: Lutterworth, 1949). 
2
 Thomas F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction (London: SCM, 1965), 102. 
 2 
we come to relate to God, rather than the static possession of God’s likeness in our 
being. Moreover, in this relationship God is the ontological source of being and 
motion while we are merely the reflection of that source. Our identity and situation are 
fundamentally determined by who God is and how God acts towards us. “Of supreme 
importance here is the interwovenness of the knowledge of God and the knowledge of 
self, for therein consists man’s life.”
3
  
For this reason, Torrance’s anthropology intrinsically mingles with the 
doctrines of God, Christ, salvation and creation. To understand his approach to the 
human person, we need to take his whole theology into consideration. Research on this 
topic has usually focused on one particular facet, for instance, the redemption of 
humanity in Torrance’s soteriology.
4
 A comprehensive study of his anthropology in 
the context of his whole theological oeuvre has not yet been attempted. This thesis 
attempts to make the first step in this direction. It will explore Torrance’s Christology 
and soteriology as well as his teachings on the Trinity and creation to understand the 
ways in which his handling of key Christian doctrines shapes his account of the human 
person as created and redeemed, relational and rational, dependent yet responsible. In 
particular, his early response to the Barth-Brunner controversy, via the interpretation 
of Calvin, will be analysed before proceeding to his account of the anthropological 
significance of the vicarious humanity of Christ, the persons of the Trinity and the 
                                                 
3
 Thomas F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction (London: SCM, 1965), 101. 
4
 For example, Christian D. Kettler, The Vicarious Humanity of Christ and the Reality of 
Salvation (Lanham: University Press of America, 1991); Kye Won Lee, Living in Union with 
Christ: The Practical Theology of Thomas F. Torrance (New York: Peter Lang, 2003); Peter 
Cass, Christ Condemned Sin in the Flesh: Thomas F. Torrance’s Doctrine of Soteriology and 
Its Ecumenical Significance (Saarbrücken: VDM, 2009). 
 3 
creation of the world through the divine Logos. In order to make his perspective 
clearer, a series of comparisons with other 20
th
 century writers – Bultmann, 
Macmurray and Moltmann – will be drawn in the discussion. The thesis intends to 
present an appreciative reading of Torrance’s theological anthropology in terms of its 
methodology and strong theological orientation, while also pointing more critically to 
some important lacunae on the particularity of the human creature in his work.   
 
1.2 Torrance’s Epistemological Realism 
 
Before entering into his treatment of Christian doctrine, it is necessary to introduce the 
epistemological realism which informs Torrance’s theological thinking. Torrance 
regards theology as a science demanding a scientific approach.
5
 His epistemological 
realism for theological science emphasizes objectivity, revelation and the logic of 
Christ. 
Torrance insists that objectivity is the fundamental principle for all scientific 
studies. It means that we must know a subject from within itself according to its own 
nature and “let the nature of what we know determine for us the content and form of 
our knowledge.”
6
 Theology as the science of knowing God has to be in accordance 
with the nature of God, i.e. the objective truth of who God is in Himself. This requires 
our reason to make no subjective presupposition but to let the truth prescribe for itself 
                                                 
5
 This scientific approach to theology led to the award of the distinguished Templeton Prize for 
Progress in Religion in 1978, the same year that his Theological Science was published. 
6
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Ground and Grammar of Theology (Belfast: Christian Journals, 
1980), 8. 
 4 
“both the limits within which it may be known and the mode of rationality that is to be 
adopted toward it.”
7
 Since God transcends all creaturely beings, we cannot truly 
discover God through studying anything of the world. Unless God reveals Himself, 
there is no objective knowledge of God. Revelation is “an objective unveiling” of God 
in which we are brought to a knowledge of God.
8
 It is also a personal communication 
of God addressing to us the Word in person rather than “in abstraction from a 
Message.”
9
 Incarnation embodies such a personal communication uniquely and Christ 
alone is “the self-giving of God to men.”
10
 Therefore, the logical shape of theology is 
in the person of Christ as the self-revelation of God. Theology is “systematic only 
                                                 
7
 Thomas F. Torrance, “Introduction” to Karl Barth, Theology and Church, Shorter Writings 
1920-1928. (London: SCM, 1962), 43.  
8
 Torrance first expounded this approach to revelation in the Auburn Lectures (1938-9), 
unpublished. See Alister McGrath’s Thomas F. Torrance: an Intellectual Biography 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 134–136. Torrance specifies the “Christian Doctrine of 
Revelation” in the lectures and affirms that alongside an objective unveiling of God there is 
also “a making of that unveiling real to our vision by taking away of the scales of our eyes 
which hitherto were too dimmed and diseased to behold the light.” See Auburn Lectures, 5. 
9
 Thomas F. Torrance, The School of Faith: the Catechisms of the Reformed Church (London: 
James Clarke, 1959), xxxii. Torrance underlines that revelation “is God speaking in person – 
Deus loquentis persona.” (Auburn Lectures 1938-9, “Christian Doctrine of Revelation”, 
unpublished manuscript, 52) While the Bible is certainly the Word of God, it is in the manner 
of the incarnation that God’s Word is conveyed in person. For Torrance, the incarnation is the 
divine revelation as a personal communication of God; the Bible is a witness to revelation – a 
witness to the incarnate Word, Christ. See again Alister McGrath’s Thomas F. Torrance: an 
Intellectual Biography (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 135. 
10
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 
1996), 21. Torrance stresses that in Jesus Christ “the Word has become a physical event in 
space-time” and “the objective reality of God is intelligibly linked with creaturely and 
physical forms of thought.” God and Rationality, (Oxford: Oxford University, 1971), 142; 
Space, Time and Incarnation, (Oxford: Oxford University, 1969), 17. 
 5 
through correspondence to the nature of Christ himself, and through a doctrinal 
coherence that grew out of correspondence with the central doctrine of Christ.”
11
 
Holding to this epistemological realism, Torrance clearly resists tendencies 
towards an anthropocentric theology and an independent natural theology. He points 
out that Protestant theology has a constant temptation “toward subjectivity and 
inwardness, toward religious experience and self-consciousness,” in which attention is 
turned inward upon the human self.
12
 He criticizes anthropocentric approaches based 
on human reason and experience – these lack objective foundation for the knowledge 
of God no matter how appealing they seem.
13
 For the same reason, he rejects natural 
theology. He asserts, “All indirect revelation – as it is called – or all general revelation 
is confuted by the fact of revelation [i.e. God’s imparting Himself].”
14
 Natural 
                                                 
11
 Thomas F. Torrance, The School of Faith: the Catechisms of the Reformed Church (London: 
James Clarke, 1959), lx.  
12
 Thomas F. Torrance, The School of Faith: the Catechisms of the Reformed Church (London: 
James Clarke, 1959), xlviii. Torrance offers his observation on the subjectivism of much 
Protestant theology in the “Introduction” of this book. For example, he sees in the Westminster 
Catechisms that “man’s glorification of God…occupies most of the picture.” But he also 
points out, “On the other hand, Protestant theology has always kept returning to the basic 
principle of the subordination of all tradition to the Word of God and of all its life and thought 
to God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ, so that it is constantly being called back out of its 
subjectivism, out of its monologue with itself, to dialogue with the Word of God.” See xlviii-
xlix. 
13
 For example, he claims that the whole conception of Schleiermacher’s theology is wrong 
because its fundamental presuppositions do not match up to the nature of the Christian Gospel 
and its propositional structure lacks any realist scientific objectivity. See Thomas F. Torrance, 
Karl Barth, Biblical and Evangelical Theologian (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990), 121. 
14
 Thomas F. Torrance, the Auburn Lectures (1938-9), “Christian Doctrine of Revelation”, 
unpublished manuscript, 11. McGrath has observed that “Torrance’s Auburn Lectures of 1938-
9…illustrate well the criticisms which Torrance directed against the notion of natural theology 
at this early stage in his thinking. Torrance here argues that the term ‘revelation’ is to be 
understood as an affirmation that ‘God does not keep Himself hidden to Himself, wrapped up 
in His eternal and awful Majesty, but turns towards us in grace and imparts Himself to us in 
saving revelation’. … Torrance insists that creation, while being an act of God, is not to be 
 6 
theology reflects the unthankful and self-willed ambition which does not respect the 
uniqueness of God’s self-giving to us in Christ but thinks that we can know God 
through our own rational reflection upon nature. “It is clear that the point at issue is 
that of the impossibility of an independent source of revelation within the natural order, 
which Torrance regards as quite unacceptable.”
15
 
In Torrance’s eyes, theology has strayed for too long from its scientific nature 
on account of a dualistic epistemology.
16
 As dualism posits a chasm between God and 
the world, it consequently divides God from His self-revelation in Jesus. He points out, 
“Dogmatic thinking arises from the fact that God has acted in human history in a final 
and saving way, and that what He has given us in His revelation is Himself, His own 
divine being: His Being in His Act; His Act in His Being.”
17
 This fundamental unitary 
nature of divine being and action is integral to the Nicene concept of the 
                                                                                                                                            
thought of as an act of God in which God imparts himself as a Person. For Torrance, the 
notion of revelation is specifically linked to an act ‘in which God confronts us with His 
person’, in which he ‘imparts Himself’. (Thomas F. Torrance: an Intellectual Biography, 
Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999, 188.) 
15
 Alister McGrath, Thomas F. Torrance: an Intellectual Biography (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1999), 188. 
16
 Torrance discerns the roots of western theological dualism in Augustine. The recurrence of 
dualism is apparent in the writings of many later theologians including Aquinas, Kant, and 
more recently Hans Küng. He also identifies dualism as the common error in many theological 
trends and heresies, such as Gnosticism, Arianism, nominalism, Hellenism, the Latin heresy, 
Jewish agnosticism, existentialism, phenomenalism, and relativism. His criticism of 
theological dualism is found in many of his works. See Paul Molnar, Thomas F. Torrance: 
Theologian of the Trinity (Burlington: Ashgate, 2009), 39-43, and Alister McGrath, Thomas F. 
Torrance: an Intellectual Biography (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 142-145. 
17




 Without Jesus’ homoousion with God, the integrity of divine revelation 
is destroyed. Theological dualism cannot truly understand Jesus Christ as God and 
human in the same person, and finally finds the idea of the incarnation of God within 
space and time an absurdity. Torrance sees this dualistic epistemology particularly in 
mediaeval theology. Although he finds that Calvin was able to break free from it, he 
criticizes some of his followers for relapsing into similarly dualistic modes of thought. 
It is also manifested in patterns of natural theology, until Barth offered his robust 
criticism of it on Biblical and scientific grounds.
19
 Through his epistemological 
realism, Torrance opposes such dualistic thinking and affirms the unitary nature of 
relationship between God and the world/humankind. Its cornerstone is the incarnation. 
 
1.3 Torrance’s Theological Resources 
 
To understand more clearly Torrance’s brand of theological realism, we need further 
to consider the resources that have proved vital to the expression of his dogmatic 
theology. 
The primary soil for Torrance’s theology is found in the writings of the Greek 
fathers.
20
 His interest in their thought since his early years is reflected in his doctoral 
                                                 
18
 This point is developed in Torrance’s essay “The Logic and Analogic of Biblical and 
Theological Statements in the Greek Fathers”, in Theology in Reconstruction (London: SCM, 
1965), 30-45, especially 34-37. 
19
 Refer to Alister E. McGrath, Thomas F. Torrance: an Intellectual Biography (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1999), 144. Also cf. The School of Faith: the Catechisms of the Reformed Church 
(London: James Clarke, 1959), xliii-xlix.  
20
 It should be stressed that Origen is not among those Greek fathers whose theology Torrance 
embraces. Torrance also does not show much inclination towards the Latin fathers, such as 
 8 
research on “The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers”.
21
 In his writings, he 
frequently appeals to Irenaeus, Athanasius, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory of 
Nazianzus to support his arguments.
22
 In particular, Torrance is profoundly indebted to 
Nicene Christology. He is convinced that theology must be built upon a classical 
Christological foundation, i.e. Christ’s identity as homoousion with God. This 
Christological concept is proclaimed clearly by the Nicene fathers, especially 
Athanasius, and safeguards the objective foundation of theology. Its rich connotations 
and implications make discussion of other theological issues both possible and reliable. 
As a Reformed theologian, Torrance also owes allegiance to Calvin. He 
coedited with his brother Calvin’s Commentaries for almost a decade.
23
 In his eyes, 
the Reformation revived the central relation of Christ to the Scriptures, and Calvin’s 
theology showed that “the foundation of true reliance upon God is to know Him in 
                                                                                                                                            
Tertullian and Augustine. As McGrath notes, “Torrance tends to stress his indebtedness to 
Greek patristic theology, rather than the more customary tendency to stress his Augustinian 
roots.” Thomas F. Torrance: an Intellectual Biography, 143-144. 
21
 The thesis has been published with the same title in 1996. See Thomas F. Torrance, The 
Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1948). 
22
 For example, in the doctrine of the Trinity, Torrance advocates Athanasius’ idea – “It would 
be more pious and more accurate to signify God from the Son and call Him Father, than to 
name Him from His works and call Him Unoriginate.” (“Four Discourses Against the Arians”, 
1.34, A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, second 
series, vol. 4, ed. Henry Wace and Philip Schaff, Oxford: James Parker and Company, 1891, 
326.) In the doctrine of salvation, Torrance emphasizes Gregory of Nazianzen’s teaching – 
“which He has not assumed He has not healed.” (“To Cledonius the Priest Against 
Apollianrius”, letters 101, A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the 
Christian Church, second series, vol. 7, ed. Henry Wace and Philip Schaff, Oxford: James 
Parker and Company, 1893, 440.) The English translation used by Torrance is slightly 
different from this version as we will see in later chapters. 
23
 Calvin’s Commentaries, translated by multiple translators, edited by Thomas F. Torrance and 





 Many of Calvin’s insights are defended and developed by Torrance. 
This is particularly evident in some anthropological topics, for instance, the radical 
nature of sin, the reflection of God’s glory, the saving and sanctifying union of 
humanity with Christ. In fact, the only book of Torrance which explicitly focuses on 
anthropology is Calvin’s Doctrine of Man. As an interpretation of Calvin, this book 
reveals how Calvin influenced Torrance’s understanding of humankind.
25
 
Among modern theologians, Barth is the one who has most influenced 
Torrance in his approach to epistemology and method in theology. Torrance was 
particularly exhilarated by Barth’s insights of dogmatics as a science, the objectivity 
of God’s self-revelation and the Trinitarian account of doctrine.
26
 He acknowledges 
that as he read the first volume of Church Dogmatics while still a university student, 
he was impressed by “the doctrine of the consubstantial communion between the three 
divine persons in the Holy Trinity” which helped him to “discern something of the 
‘inner logic’ or ‘scientific structure’ of dogmatic theology, and to develop its 
regulative place in my own thinking.”
27
 It is no secret that later Torrance undertook his 
doctoral study with Barth and became the key figure in introducing Barth’s works to 
                                                 
24
 Thomas F. Torrance, The School of Faith: the Catechisms of the Reformed Church (London: 
James Clarke, 1959), xxi. The quote is from “Calvin’s Geneva Catechism”, question 14. See 
The School of Faith, 7. It is also important to note that “Torrance chooses to place the 
emphasis upon Calvin’s positive relationship with Greek patristic Christianity” but avoids 
“representing the Reformation as a recovery of Augustinianism.” (Alister E. McGrath, Thomas 
F. Torrance: an Intellectual Biography, 153.) 
25
 This will be developed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
26
 Refer to Thomas F. Torrance’s “My Interaction with Karl Barth” in Karl Barth, Biblical and 
Evangelical Theologian (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990), 121. 
27
 Thomas F. Torrance, “Itinerarium Mentis in Deum: My Theological Development”, 




 Barth’s theology particularly inspired and convinced 
Torrance to structure his dogmatic system with a single focus on Christ’s revelation. 
In Torrance’s view, this not only developed and sustained the central themes of 
orthodox Christianity but enabled a recovery of the unitary foundation of theology. He 
identifies a group of theologians, including Athanasius, Calvin and Barth as the main 
figures, who developed “a unitary [anti-dualist] approach to the Christian faith”, so 
that there emerged in Torrance’s reading of the history of theology “a direct continuity 
(both verbal and substantial) between Athanasius, Calvin and Barth, which is of 
central importance to the interaction of theology and the natural sciences.”
29
 For 
Torrance, Barth is the one who recovered the epistemological significance of the 
homoousion in Athanasius and rescued the Reformed heritage of Calvin by adhering 
to God’s Word alone.
30
  
                                                 
28
 He coedited the English translation of Church Dogmatics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1956, 
1957, 1958, 1961, 1969). And he also published several articles and books on Barth. For 
instance, “Karl Barth”, Expository Times 66 (1955); Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early 
Theology, 1910-1931 (London: SCM, 1962); “Karl Barth and Patristic Theology”, Theology 
beyond Christendom: Essays on the Centenary of the Birth of Karl Barth, (ed.), John Thomson 
(Allison Park: Pickwick, 1986). 
29
 Alister McGrath, Thomas F. Torrance: an Intellectual Biography (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1999), 143, 145. 
30
 It is clear that Torrance appreciates Barth not in isolation but within a long tradition of 
theological writing. Although Barth’s impact cannot be contested, as McGrath comments, he 
is by no means “an uncritical disciple of Barth”. His published writings up to about 1955 do 
not obviously reflect a devotion to Barth, though he applies Barth’s ideas and cites his work 
frequently in his Auburn Lectures (1938-9). Having the highest regard for Barth, he 
nevertheless differs from Barth on some key issues, for example Barth’s alleged failure to deal 
adequately with “the doctrine of a living union with Jesus Christ” (“Karl Barth”, Expository 
Times 66, 1955, 209). For a later formulation of this and other criticisms, see Karl Barth: 
Biblical and Evangelical Theologian, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990), 131-133. See also Paul 
D. Molnar, Thomas F. Torrance: Theologian of the Trinity (Surrey: Ashgate, 2009), 7-8, and 
Alister E. McGrath, Thomas F. Torrance: an Intellectual Biography (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1999), 136-138. 
 11 
In addition to the Greek fathers, Calvin and Barth, the influence of Scottish 
theology should also be noted.
31
 Torrance recalled that since his early years as a 
student he had been “impressed with the Scottish realist tradition.”
32
 It alerted him to 
the error of dualism, which in his eyes “seemed to eat away the edges of thought,” and 
also enabled him to start practicing his “decisive epistemological and scientific 
thinking” to criticize the naturalistic fallacy.
33
 When he was a student at the University 
of Edinburgh, a few teachers exercised a strong effect upon the development of his 
theology. The best known are Hugh Ross Mackintosh and Daniel Lamont. Mackintosh 
emphasized “the union of the believer with Christ” and used it to overcome “the harsh 
effects of exclusively forensic approaches to the work of Christ.”
34
 In his theology, 
“all Christianity comes down to two companion truths – God in Christ for us, and we 
in Christ for God.”
35
 Such an opinion apparently projected a deep imprint on 
Torrance’s mind and prompted a close attention to the theme of “union with Christ” in 
his own theology. Mackintosh also highly valued the unique revelation of Christ 
which rests upon the exclusive mutual knowing between the Father and the Son as 
well as the full reality of deity in Christ. This is also echoed in Torrance’s theology. 
                                                 
31
 David Fergusson points out that, “Tom Torrance was a Scottish theologian. … Nevertheless, 
in most of what has been written about Torrance too little has been made of his Scottish 
context.” See “Torrance as a Scottish Theologian”, Participatio: Journal of the Thomas F. 
Torrance Theological Fellowship, vol. 2 (2010), 77, 78. 
32
 Thomas F. Torrance, “Itinerarium Mentis in Deum: My Theological Development”, 
unpublished manuscript, 6. 
33
 Thomas F. Torrance, “Itinerarium Mentis in Deum: My Theological Development”, 
unpublished manuscript, 6. 
34
 David Fergusson, “Torrance as a Scottish Theologian”, Participatio: Journal of the Thomas 
F. Torrance Theological Fellowship, vol. 2 (2010), 81. 
35
 David Fergusson, “Torrance as a Scottish Theologian”, Participatio: Journal of the Thomas 
F. Torrance Theological Fellowship, vol. 2 (2010), 82. 
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Lamont, by contrast, was the one who “helped to generate Torrance’s interest in 
science and in applying the scientific method to theology in the sense that knowledge 
was perceived to take place when thinking was conformed to the unique nature of the 
object being investigated.”
36
 Lamont himself engaged in scientific reflection on the 
truths of the Christian faith and rejected the dualist Newtonian and Kantian notions of 
time. He believed that “there was important apologetic work to be done in showing the 
consistency of Christian faith with the best insights of other disciplines.”
37
 He also 
believed that scientific work on theology must take place from within faith and 
proceed from the revelation in Christ, so that the subjectivity and initiative of God are 
respected. In some ways, his thought adumbrates Torrance’s later work. Moreover, 
Torrance is also influenced by John Macmurray, a Scottish philosopher who became 
Torrance’s colleague in Edinburgh from 1960. Macmurray advocated understanding 
“the self as agent” and “persons in relation”.
38
 His relational thinking of personhood is 
sharply different from more individualist and Cartesian approaches to the self. 
Torrance commends Macmurray’s thought enthusiastically in Theological Science
39
 
and applies it with good effect in his theology.
40
 It seems that Torrance’s theology is 
“reinforced by epistemological arguments that drew from Macmurray.”
41
 
                                                 
36
 Paul D. Molnar, Thomas F. Torrance: Theologian of the Trinity (Surrey: Ashgate, 2009), 5. 
37
 David Fergusson, “Torrance as a Scottish Theologian”, Participatio: Journal of the Thomas 
F. Torrance Theological Fellowship, vol. 2 (2010), 84. 
38
 See John Macmurray, The Self as Agent (London: Faber and Faber, 1957),  Persons in 
Relation  (London: Faber and Faber, 1961). 
39
 Thomas F. Torrance, Theological Science (Oxford: Oxford University, 1969), 3-4. 
40
 In the doctrine of the Trinity, Torrance has the Trinitarian Persons very well illustrated by 
the notion of “persons in relation”.  His anthropology also depends on it. Actually relational 
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In sum, Torrance’s scientific theology based on a realist epistemology has its 
background and context in his own education and career. Although people tend to 
associate him primarily with Barth, there are in fact a large number of theologians and 
philosophers, in both ancient and modern times, whose work constitutes a grand 
matrix that generated and shaped Torrance’s theology. “It is this configuration of 
influences that enabled Torrance to move beyond Karl Barth in some important 
respects.”
42
 When we examine his anthropology through his systematic theology, we 
need to keep in mind its sources and background, so that we can gain a comprehensive 
understanding of him. So also, when we assess Torrance’s anthropology, we need to 
position him in the broad context of these aforementioned theologies to recognise its 
strengths and weaknesses. 
 
1.4 The Structure of the Thesis 
 
The body of this thesis contains four chapters followed by a conclusion. We will first 
approach the subject from a detailed study of Calvin’s Doctrine of Man (1949). As 
Torrance’s only book on the doctrine of humanity and one of his earliest publications, 
this book provides us with a starting point from which to approach his anthropology. 
In this chapter (Chapter Two) on Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, we will describe the basic 
                                                                                                                                            
thinking shines through his theology. We will observe this character in the whole thesis, 
particularly in Chapter 4. 
41
 David Fergusson, “Torrance as a Scottish Theologian”, Participatio: Journal of the Thomas 
F. Torrance Theological Fellowship, vol. 2 (2010), 85. 
42
 David Fergusson, “Torrance as a Scottish Theologian”, Participatio: Journal of the Thomas 
F. Torrance Theological Fellowship, vol. 2 (2010), 82.  
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orientation of Torrance’s anthropology via his interpretation of Calvin and his 
response to the Barth-Brunner controversy. The following chapter (Chapter Three) 
will explore Torrance’s Christology and soteriology in which his most insightful 
arguments about humanity can be discerned in his illustration of the person and work 
of Christ. To a significant degree, the substance of his anthropology emerges from his 
Christology and soteriology. Thereafter, in Chapter Four we will look at Torrance’s 
doctrine of the Trinity. Known as a Trinitarian theologian, Torrance takes the 
Trinitarian Persons as the archetype for interpreting human persons in relation. This 
chapter will unfold the transcendent foundation of his anthropology. Thereafter, 
Chapter Five will examine Torrance’s doctrine of creation. It gives another axis, 
subordinate to the soteriological axis, to locate the knowledge of humankind on his 
theological map. It will be argued that the intrinsic and unresolved tension of his 
anthropology is generated by these two different axes. The structure of this thesis itself 
reflects the presentation of Torrance’s anthropology: his anthropology starts not from 
creation but from the salvific revelation of Jesus Christ as he unfolds in his person the 
true character of the human being. It is the knowledge of God in Christ that enables 




Torrance’s Calvin’s Doctrine of Man 
 
 
Calvin’s Doctrine of Man (CDOM) is among Torrance’s earliest publications. It is his 
only book on the doctrine of humanity as such. It is also one of the few full-length 
studies of Calvin’s anthropology that have been published
1
 and is a good starting point 
from which to approach Torrance’s position on theological anthropology in the 
Reformed tradition. 
CDOM was composed in 1947 and published in 1949. It referred to the 
memorable controversy between Brunner and Barth during the 1930s and 1940s. As is 
generally known, the controversy arose from the debate on the validity of natural 
theology. The landmark publication was Brunner’s Nature and Grace which was 
responded to by Barth’s No! in 1934. Their disagreement centred on the revelation of 
God and the rationality of human beings. The debate illustrated a major concern of 
20
th
 century theology in its wrestling against the anthropocentricism prevalent in 19
th
 
century liberal theology. It also highlighted a grave challenge that modern theological 
anthropology needs to answer, how to undertstand humanity from the standpoint of a 
theocentric theology. CDOM was Torrance’s response to the Brunner-Barth 
                                                 
1
 Mary Potter Engel, John Calvin’s Perspectival Anthropology (Atlanta: Scholars, 1988). In 
the “Introduction” Engel introduces Torrance’s CDOM as “the only full-length study” 
published in this area at the time of her writing. Cf. the endnote 2 of “Introduction”, iv and xii-
xiii.  
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controversy and represented his first effort to answer the challenge posed to 
theocentric theology.  
In this chapter we will first look at the anthropological issues raised by the 
Brunner-Barth controversy and consider CDOM as Torrance’s response to them. Then 
we will examine CDOM in terms of how Torrance interpreted Calvin. From these two 
sections, we will then proceed to examine Torrance’s interpretation of Calvin through 
the lens of Barth. 
 
2.1 Torrance’s Response to the Brunner-Barth Controversy 
 
2.1.1 The Controversy 
 
The controversy can be sketched out as follows: Brunner believes that God reveals His 
preserving grace in nature and that humankind is capable of recognizing His revelation 
using human rationality. For Brunner we can gain some knowledge of God through 
studying the natural world and therefore natural theology has a certain validity. Barth 
responds with an absolute “No!” to this idea. He believes that God’s revelation only 
becomes knowable as salvation in Christ and through the Spirit. After the Fall 
humankind has no means by which to apprehend it with their corrupted rationality. 
Natural theology has no legitimacy because it is incapable of leading sinners to the 
divine salvation in Christ. 
Anthropologically, the controversy raised a key issue about humanity as the 
imago Dei, whether there is the remnant of an image, a “remnant image” in fallen 
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humankind. This corresponds to another important question, what does salvation mean 
in terms of restoring God’s image in humanity?  
Brunner recognizes a formal “remnant” of God’s image in sinners due to their 
retaining a capacity for reason. He explains that humankind is singled out by God to 
respond to Him, namely to image Him. Their rational capacity is “the presupposition 
of responsibility”
2
 and something they have in common with God. Sinners have lost 
God’s image in the material sense, but in the formal sense they retain a rationality and 
hence the possibility of being addressed by God’s word and of responding to it. 
Conscience is “the consciousness of responsibility”, and even a sinner has “a 
conscience, in which the law of God is indelibly and irremovably implanted”.
3
 
Humankind after the Fall still has “an inclination towards truth and a capacity for 
recognizing truth”.
4
 In this formal sense, therefore, the remnant image of God in them 
should be affirmed. This also affirms that salvation is the restoration of the imago Dei 
in which humankind was originally created. In other words for Brunner, the new 
creation cannot be regarded simply as Barth does as one that “is in no wise a 
perfection of the old, but comes into being exclusively through destruction of the old 
and is a replacement of the old man by the new.”
5
 For Brunner it is the restoration of 
the original creation. 
                                                 
2
 Emil Brunner, Natural Theology, consists of “Nature and Grace” by Emil Brunner and “No!” 
by Karl Barth, (London: Centenary, 1946), 31. 
3
 Emil Brunner, Natural Theology (London: Centenary, 1946), 42. 
4
 Emil Brunner, Natural Theology (London: Centenary, 1946), 42. 
5
 Emil Brunner, Natural Theology (London: Centenary, 1946), 21. 
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Barth firmly rejects the concept of the remnant image. His protest stands on the 
ground of salvation in Christ alone.  He argues that the so-called formal image, the 
capacity for reason, has no relevance for salvation and to presume that human reason 
is the basis for salvation is as absurd as proclaiming that one can be saved from 
drowning because one is a man and not a lump of lead.
6
 After the Fall, the right use of 
reason should lead us only to “despair” of finding God’s image in humanity. If a 
sinner can respond to God, it is because of the mysterious work of the Spirit. The fact 
that God can make His Word known to humankind is “due to something other than the 
formal possibility”,
7
 that is, the rational possibility of being addressed by God. This 
further demonstrates that the new creation of humanity “can be no question of a 
capacity for repair on the part of man” but rather “a miracle performed upon man”.
8
 
Such a miracle presupposes nothing from the human side and brings into being “a new 
creature” in place of the old. 
9
 It is in this whole new sense that humanity is restored to 
be the imago Dei. 
In the debate, Brunner and Barth both appealed to Calvin and claimed to be in 
agreement with his teaching.
10
 Their divergence actually reflects two different 
directions in Calvin’s theology regarding the extent of human knowledge.
11
  
                                                 
6
 Emil Brunner, Natural Theology (London: Centenary, 1946), 79. 
7
 Emil Brunner, Natural Theology (London: Centenary, 1946), 89. 
8
 Emil Brunner, Natural Theology (London: Centenary, 1946), 93. 
9
 Emil Brunner, Natural Theology (London: Centenary, 1946), 93-94. 
10
 Barth and Brunner were both Reformed theologians in the general sense, but not Calvinist in 
the particular sense. 
11
 We will look at Calvin’s “inconsistent” argument on anthropology in the next section. 
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Brunner agrees with Calvin in affirming human rationality and conscience and 
arguing that they distinguish humans from other creatures and confer unique status on 
humanity as the bearer of God’s image in both creation and salvation. Possessing 
reason and conscience also means that humans are held culpable for sin and need to 
repent from it. This line of thinking calls our attention to the distinctiveness and 
subjectivity or subjecthood of human nature.
12
  
Barth echoes Calvin in underlining the radical depravity of human nature and 
justification solely by Christ’s atonement. To attribute any credit to the human side is 
to deny God’s sheer grace and sufficient salvation in Christ. This direction of thought 
makes us see our powerlessness and hopelessness for self-justification and so means 
that we are urged to humble ourselves and turn to faith in Christ. 
The two directions are both found in the Bible. They represent the high view 
and the low view of humanity, its nobility and its humility, both of which we actually 
experience in real life. The fierce disagreement between Brunner and Barth, 
nevertheless involves more than the issue of how to explain the biblical views of 
humanity. As John Hart points out, this famous debate is “neither a careful exegesis 
nor a dogmatic discussion” but the confrontation between several issues determinative 
for theology, such as “the understanding of dialectic and revelation, the relationship 
of theology and philosophy, the place of anthropology in theology and the task of 
                                                 
12
 Distinctiveness implies possession and subjectivity activity. In other words, the uniqueness 
of human nature has both static and dynamic elements. In a certain sense, the controversy is 
about the question of “what human being is, and by what its uniqueness is constituted”. (Joan 
E. O’Donovan, “Man in the Image of God: the Disagreement between Barth and Brunner 




 That is to say, the controversy involves differing methodological 
concerns behind the various doctrinal inclinations and positions.
14
  
2.1.2 The Methodical Difference  
 
Brunner and Barth have a quite different understanding of theology and hence a 
different method of constructing it. Briefly speaking, Brunner’s thinking is concerned 
with the mutual relation between God and humanity, Barth’s with the central focus of 
theology in Christ. 
Brunner regards theology as inherently relational, concerned with “the divine-
human encounter” and disclosing “the relation of God to men and of men to God”.
15
 
He points out that what happens in the relation is that God reveals Himself and 
humankind receives His revelation through an act of response. This does not mean that 
humankind has autonomy independent from God, but that God places humankind as 
“a creature face to face with Himself, a creature who in having the power of knowing 
and acknowledging has a share in the essential nature of God, namely, in being a 
subject.”
16
 Therefore humankind has a ‘subjectivity’ or ‘subjecthood’ which reflects 
that of God like a mirror. Such reflecting subjectivity is endowed on human beings 
according to God’s will in creation, and is also demanded by God from humankind in 
                                                 
13
 John W. Hart, Karl Barth Vs. Emil Brunner: The Formation and Dissolution of a 
Theological Alliance, 1916-1936 (New York: Peter Lang, 2001), 167. 
14
 As widely known, the eruption of the controversy was closely related to the German Church 
struggle with Nazism in the first half of the 20
th
 century. Therefore it also involves involved 
some of the political concerns of that historical context. This chapter only provides a brief 
introduction to their different ways of viewing and constructing theology. 
15
 Emil Brunner The Divine-Human Encounter (London: S.C.M., 1944), 31. 
16
 Emil Brunner The Divine-Human Encounter (London: S.C.M., 1944), 39. 
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salvation in that we need to voluntarily respond to God’s love revealed in Christ. 
Based on such a relational way of thinking, Brunner finds it necessary to affirm human 
subjecthood within God’s initiative of creation and salvation. In so doing, Brunner 
intentionally eliminates the subject-object antithesis between God and humankind in 
theology, replacing it with the Subject-subject relation. 
 Barth does not begin by thinking from the relational perspective. For him, 
theology should focus on the mystery of God who reveals Himself in Christ alone. 
Christ’s revelation and salvation give the definitive answer to all theological questions. 
On the one hand, Christ is God, that is, he is himself the reality of what he reveals. On 
the other hand, Christ is solely elected by God to have partnership with Him as a 
human and therefore he is the only human being in real relation to God. As true God 
and true human, Christ discloses all knowledge about God, humanity and the God-
human relationship. Christ the incarnate God must be recognized as the only subject 
who both reveals as well as receives God’s revelation. We human beings can in no 
way be true subjects even when we receive the divine revelation through faith. This is 
because even our faith “does not rest on itself…but on what is quite other than itself 
[i.e. Christ’s faith], by which its own emptiness is filled.”
17
 In Barth’s eyes, Christ 
should exclusively occupy the central position from where the whole content of 
theology radiates. Such theology is commonly known as Christocentrism and it is by 
promoting Christocentrism that Barth intends to make a thorough revision of 
anthropocentric theology. 
                                                 
17
 Alasdair I. Heron, A Century of Protestant Theology (Guildford: Lutterworth, 1980), 87. 
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It is important to clarify that Brunner and Barth both disapprove of liberal 
theology. Behind their differences therefore, there should also be recognized their 
common effort to correct its anthropocentric error. As is widely known, they were two 
of the leading lights in the movement of dialectical theology based on God’s 
revelation rather than on human reason.
18
 They shared the common aim of restoring 
the orthodox teaching of the Church fathers and Calvin through their “re-stating of the 
main classical Christian doctrines, especially of Christology, in which they believed 
the meaning and content of the revelation was explicated.”
19
 There was no problem for 
them to agree on God as Subject and on Christ’s centrality in the general picture of 
theology. Their disagreement centres mainly on the subjectivity of humankind, on 
whether humanity should also be affirmed as a subject in theocentric and Christ-based 
theology. McGrath has aptly summarised their divergence from liberal theology as 
follows: 
Liberal Theology: God as object, humanity as subject. 
Brunner: God as subject, humanity as subject. 




In summary, the controversy distinguishes Barth and Brunner sharply on the 
doctrine of humankind but not on the doctrine of God and it is reasonable to believe 
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 Dialectical theology emerged in the early 20
th
 century as a vital movement against the 
liberal theology of the 19
th
 century which had elevated human reason over revelation.  
19
 Alasdair I. Heron, A Century of Protestant Theology (Guildford: Lutterworth, 1980), 81. 
20
 Alister E. McGrath, The Making of Modern German Christology: From the Enlightenment 
to Pannenberg (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 105. Barth would no doubt wish to qualify 
the way his theology is characterised by McGrath here. See further footnote 22 below. 
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that this helped motivate Torrance to respond to the controversy with Calvin’s 
Doctrine of Man.  
2.1.3 Torrance’s Response 
 
Before we examine CDOM as Torrance’s interpretation of Calvin, let us first look at it 
as his response to the Brunner-Barth controversy. The book has twelve chapters. The 
chart below gives a summary of the main motifs.
21
 
1 Man’s Knowledge of 
Himself 
The self-knowledge is reflexive of divine knowledge and gained 
through responding to the Word. 
2 Man’s Place in Creation Humankind is created endowed with intelligence to be the 
distinctive creature in God’s image. 
3 The Image of God (1) The imago Dei indicates that humankind reflects God’s glory 
particularly by their intelligible response to the Word. 
4 The Image of God (2) A more precise knowledge of the imago Dei comes from Christ’s 
salvation which reveals the image as a spiritual reflection of God 
in knowledge and response.  
5 The Image of God (3) The imago Dei means a dynamic and continuous relationship in 
which human beings actively obey God. 
                                                 
21
 At the beginning of each chapter, Torrance has provided a summary account of its contents, 
making it easier and more accurate to summarise his thought. These are condensed for the 
sake of clarity and brevity, In order to make the thesis shorter and its focus clearer, here we 
condense Torrance’s account and select those points that present only Torrance’s own 
conclusive opinion rather than his explanatory argument about Calvin. It is to be noted that a 
number of the quotations referenced below are from Torrance’s summary accounts rather than 
from the body of his text. 
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6 The Image of God (4) The imago Dei fundamentally refers to God’s beholding 
humankind with a fatherly eye and hence is not to be regarded as 
something innate in human natural being. 
7 Total Perversity (1) Humanity’s total depravity is inferred from Christ’s total 
salvation. Calvin has a problem with the concept of the complete 
defacement of the imago Dei in fallen humanity. 
8 Total Perversity (2) The complete defacement of the imago Dei is due to the total 
perversion of the human relationship to God. 
9 The Sin of Mind After the Fall, the human mind only functions over against God’s 
will by self-will. 
10 The Mind’s 
Knowledge of God 
How humankind knows God is a mystery of the Spirit which is 
ungrounded on any natural capacity of the mind. 
11 Natural Theology (1) Natural theology is invalid because the order of creation has been 
perverted and the human mind is blind after the Fall. 
12 Natural Theology (2) The Word is necessary for knowing God even before the Fall. 
There is no knowledge of God apart from Christ’s atonement. 
 
It is not difficult to discern that in CDOM Torrance echoed both Brunner and 
Barth. Judging by the vocabulary, chapters 1~3 are quite Brunner-like while chapters 
7~12 are Barth-like and chapters 4~6 are in the middle. On going deeper into the 
content, we can see more clearly just what Torrance has taken from both Brunner’s 
and Barth’s teachings.  
 25 
In a manner similar to Brunner, Torrance puts forward a relational way of 
thinking about theological anthropology.
22
 He unfolds the doctrine of humanity under 
the God-human relationship. A concept running throughout the book is that humanity 
does not stand by itself but only by its reflecting of God. Agreeing with Brunner, 
Torrance explains the reflection as one involving the intellect, as humanity’s 
intelligent response to God. Humanity as the imago Dei is defined by a conscious 
relationship of response. This clearly presupposes the endowment of intelligence and 
the capacity to be subjects which distinguishes humankind from other creatures. By 
underlining the intelligent response and responsibility of humankind, Torrance 
supports to a certain extent Brunner’s affirmation of a rational capacity which marks 
the existence of the imago Dei at least in a formal sense.  
Yet on the other hand, Torrance agrees firmly with Barth about humanity’s 
total loss of the imago Dei after the Fall. He explains that from the God-human 
relational perspective fallen human beings have lost the image because their 
intelligence willfully perverts the imago-relation rather than fulfils it. Instead of 
responding to God, their intelligent ability only alienates them from God. Without 
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 A clarification that must be made here is that in this thesis, Brunner’s ‘relational’ thinking is 
understood as indicating a relevantly stricter use and meaning of ‘relational’ in speaking about 
the connection between God and human beings, namely a mutual interaction of the God-
humanward movement and the human-Godward movement where both are necessary as well 
as active. (Please refer to the preceeding section of this chapter that explains Brunner’s 
theological system as being characterized by the subject-subject type of God-human 
encounter.) Barth also thinks of humanity in terms of the relation between God and humankind 
and therefore also has a kind of relational thinking. Clearly however, his ‘relational’ thinking 
is different from (if not opposite to) Brunner’s. What Barth emphasizes is the dominant 
character of God’s initiative with and over humankind rather than the mutual character of 
interaction between God and human beings. In order to distinguish the two types of 
‘relational’ thinking and keep the expression simple, this thesis uses the phrases relational 
thinking or relational framework exclusively in the Brunnerian sense.  
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denying the significant role of intelligence in the God-human relationship, Torrance 
clarifies Barth’s opinion and strengthens it by pointing out that their intelligent ability 
actually worsens humanity’s relation to God and causes the defacement of the image. 
The formal sense of the imago Dei that Brunner ascribes to human rationality is thus 
undermined. This also justifies Barth’s assertion that knowing God is a mystery of the 
Spirit. In other words, there is no involvement of any power of intelligence from the 
human side and it is only by the secret and wondrous power of the Spirit that we 
receive and understand the knowledge of God. 
Torrance also sides with Barth in acknowledging the imago Dei in Christ alone. 
He asserts Christ’s salvation as “the reparation of man’s corrupt nature” and hence as 
“a more precise knowledge of the imago Dei”.
23
 Through his atonement Christ 
restored the God-human relationship and revealed the truth of imago-relation to be one 
of spiritual reflection in action rather than a natural property of the human soul. 
Taking a further step, Torrance then asserts that Christ’s salvation is the only 
revelation of God, stating that “there never was since the beginning any 
communication between God and man, except through Christ.”
24
 Torrance here not 
only rejects natural theology but also affirms Christocentrism for anthropology.   
2.1.4 Critique of Torrance’s Response 
 
Generally viewed, Torrance seems to have made a Brunnerian start but a Barthian 
conclusion in CDOM. Regarding human nature as the imago Dei, he started with 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man (London: Lutterworth , 1949), 52. 
24
 Thomas F. Torrance, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man (London: Lutterworth, 1949), 169.  
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emphasizing the intelligent distinctiveness and reflective subjectivity or subjecthood 
of humankind, but concluded with rejecting any intelligent participation and subjective 
involvement from the human side. This is criticized by Barth as “a happy 
inconsistency” which he thinks many Protestant theologians have made in their 
theological methods.
25
 The rich implications of Barth’s critique are not the focus of 
this thesis. Nevertheless, Barth calls our attention to the important fact that Torrance 
faces a methodological tension in his theological anthropology between relational and 
Christocentric ways of thinking. The former examines humanity through a bifocal lens 
which views humankind as being relatively independent from God;
26
 the latter 
examines humanity through a single-focal lens concentrating on Christ in whom 
humanity and God are one. As a consequence, the former gives anthropology a 
relatively independent position in the whole picture, while the latter subsumes it 
completely under Christology.  
In terms of basic Christian belief, these two ways of thinking do not contradict 
one another as the orthodox versus the heretical, but in terms of theological 
methodology do contrast each other as the old versus the new. This is acknowledged 
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 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics (Edinburgh: T & T. Clark, 1956), IV.1, 367. In Barth’s eyes, 
Torrance’s relational interpretation of humanity is still trapped by the “methodical weakness” 
of the “older Protestant orthodoxy” which failed to concentrate on Christ radically. Barth 
points to the issue of sin in particular. Regarding Torrance’s analysis of Calvin on “Total 
Perversity”, Barth takes issue with Torrance that he talks about “Total Perversity” first in the 
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T. F. Torrance in his fine book, Calvin's Doctrine of Man, 1949, p. 83 f. …that with Calvin the 
doctrine of the corruption of man is a corollary of the doctrine of grace.” See the same page.  
26
 This does not mean a parallel equality of humankind to God in terms of autonomy. To allow 
at least some room for relative human independence is to make the God-human interaction 
discernible. 
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by Barth when he criticizes the “methodical weakness” of the “old Protestant 
orthodoxy” stemming from Calvin.
27
 As Barth points out,  
Reformation theology did not allow for any radical consideration of the 
meaning, importance and function of Christology in relation to all Christian 
knowledge. For that reason this theology was in many spheres – with 
illuminating exceptions – able to think and argue from Christology only very 
indirectly and implicitly, or not at all.
28
 
There is simply a general antithesis: God on the one hand and man on the other. 
It is simply maintained that this antithesis breaks through man’s self-deception 
and gives a genuine self-knowledge. …he [Calvin] seems to have regarded it 
as self-evident that for the moment we cannot and ought not to speak of man in 
his confrontation with Jesus Christ. For this reason, his account of the 
encounter with God and its effect is not altogether dissimilar to…the 





Actually this “methodical weakness” as it was described by Barth had 
appeared even earlier in patristic theology. The Church fathers did not regard 
anthropology as only a bye product of Christology, or always treat the doctrine of sin 
as a corollary of the doctrine of grace. While they maintained the orthodox 
understanding of God’s revelation in Christ, they had not yet developed a radical 
understanding of Christology as the single focus for all other doctrines. 
Christocentrism is Barth’s further development in theological methodology from the 
tradition of the Church fathers and Calvin and to a certain degree it defines the neo-
orthodox trend initiated by Barth himself. The contrast between the two ways of 
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thinking, the relational and the Christocentric, ultimately manifests the tension 
between the old orthodoxy and new orthodoxy which are far from being identical.  
Influenced by both as he is, Torrance has to inevitably negotiate the tension 
between them. His starting with Brunner and concluding with Barth in CDOM reflects 
his struggle to hold the old and the new together. This brings us to observe a critical 
character of his book Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, that Torrance interprets Calvin 
through the lens of Barth.  
 
2.2 Torrance’s Interpretation of Calvin 
 
In order to examine Torrance’s interpretation of Calvin, we need first to look briefly at 
Calvin’s theology as a whole.  
2.2.1 Calvin’s Theology 
 
It is well known that Calvin regards our knowledge of self as dependent on our 
knowledge of God, our own self-knowing dependent on our knowing God. This is 
often misunderstood as meaning that Calvin only focuses on knowledge of God.
30
 In 
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 For example, Charles Partee once talked about Calvin’s Institutes like this: “Doubtless, in a 
general way, Calvin discusses (1) our created nature in Book I, (2) our fallen nature in Book II, 
and (3) our redeemed nature in Book III, However, the main subject in each case is God, not 
man. … The point is that Calvin is expounding theology, not anthropology.” (The Theology of 
John Calvin, London: Westminster John Knox, 2008, 82.) Obviously, theology here indicates 
“the knowledge of God” since it is used in contrast to anthropology. Such a statement rightly 
affirms God as the supreme ‘Subject’ in all human knowledge of him, but it could mislead 
readers into a bias that Calvin’s theology only focuses on God and is ultimately only about 
God. As Mary Potter Engel has cogently pointed out, “In fact, most of the references to the 
intimate connection Calvin draws between God-knowledge and self-knowledge in the opening 
sentences of the Institutes are made somewhat hastily on the way to discussions of the more 
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fact, Calvin also maintains that, “we cannot have a clear and complete knowledge of 
God unless it is accompanied by a corresponding knowledge of ourselves.”
31
 A better 
way to understand Calvin’s theology would therefore be that it expounds knowledge 
of God in the light of knowledge of humankind and knowledge of humankind in the 
light of God.  Focusing on the co-relation of the two, Calvin’s theology is not 
ontological speculation about God apart from ourselves as creaturely human beings, 
but a relational examination of God in real relation to us, in short, as “God with us”.  
Regarding the realist connection between God and humankind, “Calvin’s 
thought has its whole existence within the realm of God as revealer and man as 
knower.”
32
 One of the principal concepts employed by Calvin to illustrate the 
revealing-knowing connection is “accommodation”. Calvin points out in Institutes 
1.13.1 that God must “accommodate the knowledge of him to our slight capacity”.
33
 
                                                                                                                                            
substantive and important ‘theological’ doctrines such as Christology, Soteriology, or 
Pneumatology. For this reason the significance of Calvin’s pairing of God-knowledge and self-
knowledge has not been properly understood or appreciated.” (John Calvin’s Perspectival 
Anthropology, Atlanta: Scholars, 1988, iv.) 
31
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such statements as follows, “By this he [Calvin] does not mean that anthropology of itself can 
contribute to or condition our knowledge of God, but that unless there arises within our 
knowledge of God a real knowledge of man our knowledge of God itself is not real.” (CDOM, 
13, italics added.)  
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that God, as often as he appeared of old to the holy patriarchs, descended in some way 
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comments, “As therefore our capacity cannot endure the fullness of the infinite glory which 
belongs to the essence of God, it is necessary whenever he appears to us that he put on a form 
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This means that in order to make Himself knowable to us, God reveals Himself in a 
manner adapted to our ability to comprehend Him. Otherwise we could not possibly 
know God who infinitely transcends us. Calvin considers accomodation as a 
prerequisite for the revealing-knowing connection in which God-knowledge and self-
knowledge are both conveyed. The wide-ranging importance of the concept of 
accommodation is well recognised by Calvin scholars: “accommodation [has been] 
discussed in relation to a wide range of divine activities. It was, from early on, used to 
delineate the character of divine revelation generally”;
34
 “The ‘knowledge of God’ is 
therefore always man’s knowledge of God’s revelation (according to the principle of 
accommodation) and the very revelation of God always in a radical way implies man’s 
self-knowledge (according to the principle of correlation).”
35
 
Another important concept for understanding the connection between God and 
humankind as expounded by Calvin is “duplex cognitio”, the two-fold knowledge of 
God as Creator and Redeemer.
36
 It implies a corresponding twofold knowledge of 
                                                                                                                                            
adapted to our capacity. …he continually put on various appearances, according to man’s 
comprehension, to whom he wished to give some signs of his presence.” The connotation of 
accommodation in Calvin’s theology will not be expounded in detail here. For more 
information, refer to Jon Balserak’s Divinity Compromised: A Study of Divine Accommodation 
in the Thought of John Calvin (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 13-21. The same concept is also 
employed by patristic authors (e.g. Augustine and Irenaeus). G.R. Evans’s The Language and 
Logic of the Bible: the Early Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1984), 1-10 
may help with understanding this idea used in an age earlier than Calvin.   
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 Calvin’s systematic theology, according to his Institutes, is often recognized as a picture of 
“duplex cognitio” (two kinds of knowledge). There is some disagreement about the structure 
of the Institutes. The final edition (1559) rearranged the ordering of material and came out as a 
four-book volume. Put briefly, Book I is on Creation, Book II on Redemption, Book III on the 
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humankind as created and redeemed by God. That is to say, Calvin recognized two 
kinds of interaction of God with humankind based on the two narratives of creation 
and redemption in which he unfolds the divine revelation of God-knowledge and self-
knowledge. Anthropologically, the former, knowledge of God and knowledge of self 
in creation, reveals the distinct nobility of a humanity in God’s image; the latter, 
knowledge of God and self in redemption, reveals the complete corruption of a 
humanity which has lost God’s image and is redeemed through Christ. For Calvin, the 
imago Dei therefore consists of the two elements of our being created in and then 
redeemed back into the imago Dei. 
Worthy of notice is that Calvin’s anthropological arguments have some 
ambiguity and inconsistency. As many scholars find, Calvin talks about human reason 
quite differently in creation and salvation. On the one hand, he affirms reason as the 
distinctive reflection of God in humanity; on the other hand, he stresses the willful 
rebellion of human reason against God. In the first situation, reason in the context of 
creation distinguishes humankind as being in God’s image; in the second situation, the 
                                                                                                                                            
Holy Spirit, and Book IV on the Church. The four Books echo the four parts of the Apostle’s 
Creed. The title of Book III does not mention the Spirit, and the doctrine of the Spirit proper is 
divided between Books I and III. According to Edward Dowey, “this division corresponds to 
what Calvin conceived of as the two kinds of revelation: the revelation of God as Creator, and 
as Redeemer. Book I of the 1559 edition represents the former, and the whole remainder of the 
work represents the latter.” For this reason, Dowey alleges that Calvin’s theology is structured 
by the two kinds of knowledge (duplex cognitio domini) of God as Creator and God as 
Redeemer. (The Knowledge of God in Calvin’s Theology, 41ff.) However, some other scholars 
disagree with Dowey. For instance, T. H. L. Parker criticizes Dowey for imposing the duplex 
cognitio Dei upon and destroying the unity of the Institutes. In Parker’s eyes, the real duplex 
cognitio that the Institutes reflects is the knowledge of God and the self. (Calvin’s Doctrine of 
the Knowledge of God, revised edition, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1959, 117-121.) Here, 
without focusing on discussion of the disagreement, the thesis uses Dowey’s opinion to 
facilitate an introduction to the explicit flow of Calvin’s theology in the Institutes. 
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function of reason in the context of salvation has been turned upside-down, but human 
beings must be regarded as the image-bearer nonetheless. These differing if not 
conflicting situations pose the question: what is the significance of reason as it affects 
humanity as the bearer of God’s image? Or, what is the connection between having 
reason and being in God’s image? Calvin does not answer the question fully but leaves 
it in some ambiguity. He also acknowledges the existence of conscience and regards it 
as the light of God sparkling in sinners. This seems to affirm some remnant of the 
positive function of reason after the Fall and clearly increases the ambiguity, 
heightening the controversy over the issue of “the remnant image”.
37
  
2.2.2 Torrance’s Interpretation of Calvin 
 
In Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, Torrance arranges his study around the theme of the 
imago Dei and with the concept of the duplex cognitio in mind. It is clear that he 
approaches the theme from the creation context and then moves to the salvation 
context. The twelve chapters may be broadly summarized as below:
38
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 The disagreement between Barth and Brunner reflects their diverse interpretations of Calvin 
on this issue in particular, but it widely puts some other basic teachings of Reformed theology 
into debate also, for instance, the issues of faith and grace. While Reformed theologians agree 
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38
 Section (b) clearly corresponds with the creation context while (d) and (e) correspond with 
the salvation context. In section (c), Torrance discusses the imago Dei in the context of 
Christ’s salvation as well as in the context of creatio continua (i.e. the continuous creation). 
For the purposes of the thesis, therefore, it is appropriate to single out section (c). It manifests 
the essence of Torrance’s interpretation of the imago Dei according to Calvin, and offers the 
critical key to unfolding his own anthropology. 
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(a) Chapter 1 the basic rationale of Christian anthropology  
(b) Chapters 2-3 the original meaning of the imago Dei in creation 
(c) Chapters 4-6 the meaning of the imago Dei as revealed in Christ 
(d) Chapters 7-9 the loss of the imago Dei in fallen humanity known through Christ’s 
salvation 
(e) Chapters 10-12 the problem of natural theology– as an extended conclusion of (c) 
 
At the very beginning, Torrance calls our attention to Calvin’s twofold purpose 
in Christian anthropology: to discover our “original creation in the image of God” (in 
order to arouse our gratitude) and to examine our “present miserable condition” (in 
order to encourage our humility).
39
 This twofold purpose sets the original state of 
creation above and ahead of the present and distinguishes Calvin’s anthropology from 
humanistic anthropology which is based simply on immediate observations of the 
reality of human existence here and now. 
2.2.2.1 The Creation and Defacement of the Imago Dei 
Regarding the original truth of creation, Torrance supports Calvin’s emphasis on the 
noble distinctiveness of humankind within the order of creation. As he observes, “[the] 
order of creation points to the nobility of man.”
40
 This means that the world is created 
for humankind and humankind is created for God: “the whole order of creation must 
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be regarded as designed to incite man to respond to the Father in love and gratitude, in 
worship and in adoration of His glory.”
41
 But how can humankind alone respond to 
God in such a unique way? Torrance further observes here that “[i]n contrast to all 
other earthly creatures, man has been endowed with intelligence.”
42
 The gift of 
intelligence is significant for humankind. It enables them to “have a special and 
familiar relation to God” in which God may address them through His Word and call 
them to a life of communion with Himself.
43
 In Torrance’s eyes, the concrete meaning 
of humankind’s nobility remains rooted in such a relationship of intelligent 
communication. It is this that defines humanity as the particular imago Dei according 
to God’s creative purpose. As Torrance puts it, “man specially is said to reflect (as in a 
mirror) the glory of God, by an intelligible response to the Word.”
44
  
But Torrance does not leave this idea standing by itself in the context of 
creation. As early as in the first chapter, he has made it clear that the actual knowledge 
of the truth of humanity is “from man’s actual position in the redemption of Christ.”
45
 
After expounding the distinctiveness of humankind in creation, he points out that “A 
more precise knowledge of the imago dei may be gained from the reparation of man’s 
corrupt nature in Christ, i.e., in regeneration through the Spirit.”
46
 This then shifts our 
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attention from the context of creation to the context of salvation, from the original 
truth in the beginning to the present fact after the Fall. 
Regarding the present fact of humanity after the Fall, Torrance’s interpretation 
of Calvin concentrates on the concept of “total perversity” and expounds this concept 
also from the relational perspective. He explains that the total perversity of humans 
means the complete inversion or reversion of our relation to God. We were created to 
respond to God, but are now alienated from Him. The relation has been twisted round 
to its opposite direction and become “against the order of nature as God created it.”
47
 
Torrance ascribes the reversion of direction to the mind in particular. As he explains, 
“Sin is properly of the mind”.
48
 The concept of total perversity also tells us about the 
persistent inclination of our mind. After the Fall it is only and continuously by means 
of our self-will that we can think over against God’s will. While our mind retains 
“natural intelligence and judgment”, these do not and cannot lead humankind “back 
into the positive relation with God”.
49
 It is due to this relational perversion that 
humankind has lost the imago Dei completely.  
However, this is not the primary basis for Torrance to make his case. Before 
illustrating the full relational nature of total perversity, he first asserts that the 
necessity of understanding perversity as total perversity is in accord with the nature of 
Christ’s salvation. He argues that human depravity “must be enunciated in total terms” 
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because Christ’s salvation is spoken of in total terms:
50
 “the doctrine of depravity is 
properly a corollary of the doctrine of grace, an inference from the Gospel of a new 
creation.”
51
 This is because “To think of man as he is within the confines of pollution 
would lead to the contempt of man and to slander against the Creator.”
52
 In other 
words, to think of humankind simply as they are in themselves, as polluted, apart from 
what they are in Christ, is to think less of them than we ought and so to slander the 
Creator for their creation. Corrupted humanity must be thought of and known only in 
the light of Christ’s salvation. 
2.2.2.2 The Exclusive Standpoint in Christ 
For Torrance, the light of Christ’s salvation means that Christ must form the exclusive 
standpoint of interpretation, and this for Torrance is closely related to two key 
concepts, grace and the Word.  
Torrance argues that the right exercise of reason “must be within the confines 
of grace”.
53
 We have mentioned that he emphasizes Calvin’s teaching on the 
distinctive endowment of humanity with reason. Alongside this nonetheless, Torrance 
also points out that “What Calvin would have us note at the outset of a doctrine of man 
is, that the direction and motion of our knowing must correspond to the essential 
direction and motion of grace, for that is the ground of man’s being.”
54
 The theme of 
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grace is repeatedly reinforced by Torrance in his later chapters. For instance, he states, 
“To have been made in the image of God is an act of sheer kindness [by God].”
55
 
“Man’s image rests first of all and fundamentally in that objective act of grace in 
which God condescends as a loving Father to behold us as His workmanship, even 
though we have fallen and sin despite His grace.”
56
 Human reflection of God is finally 
“an operation of grace beyond the natural capacity of the human mind.”
57
 Or put it 
another way, the imago Dei “is really [found]…more therefore in the favour and grace 
of God than in the being of man.”
58
  
 Besides thinking within “the confines of grace”, Torrance also emphasizes 
that we must “keep our minds within the bounds of the Word.”
59
 Early in the opening 
chapters, he observed that “[t]rue knowledge of man must be grounded in the 
acknowledgement of a revelation”, and “the knowledge involved is essentially 
reflexive of a Word of God.”
60
 It is through the Word that God calls humankind into a 
special relationship, and it is “by the constant communication of the Word” that this 
special relationship is maintained.
61
 The imago Dei therefore means to be “reflexive of 
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the glory of God revealed through His Word.”
62
 We can image God only by reflecting 
Him as known through His Word.  
We have to further discern that these limits and boundaries ultimately point to 
one thing – the salvation of Christ. When Torrance emphasizes grace and the Word he 
is specifically pointing to the grace of God in Jesus Christ and the Word made flesh. 
As he explains, “the very heart of Calvin’s doctrine of man” is one which “we can 
formulate truly only from the standpoint of the grace of God in Jesus Christ”
63
 and 
humanity “must be understood exclusively from the Word made flesh.”
64
 This is true 
even for understanding the original imago Dei in humankind before the Fall. Torrance 
writes, 
In the nature of the case, that [a proper doctrine of the imago Dei in man as 
created] is possible only from the standpoint of the man renewed in Jesus 
Christ. If man does not truly know himself until he knows God truly, and until 
in that knowing of God he becomes a true man, then it is only from the 
standpoint of renewed man face to face with God in Christ that we may 




Here a Christocentric voice sounds, expressing Torrance’s sympathy with Barth’s 
methodology when interpreting Calvin. The paragraph is not unique in CDOM as we 
shall observe in a later section.  
2.2.2.3 The Problem of the Remnant Imago Dei 
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To a remarkable degree, Torrance’s relational interpretation of the imago Dei and its 
defacement in Calvin’s theology does accurately integrate and reflect Calvin’s basic 
teaching on the duplex cognitio. But Torrance still has to deal with the thorny problem 
of “the remnant imago Dei” caused by Calvin’s inconsistent arguments. He admits 
there is “a difficult problem” in Calvin’s teaching on the total perversity of humanity 
because “in spite of taking this total view of man’s corruption… Calvin says that there 
is still a portion of the image of God in fallen man.”
66
 As Torrance sees it, the problem 
comes from the distinction that Calvin made between the spiritual gifts and natural 
gifts in humanity.
67
  He points out,  
On the one hand, Calvin admits that the image has been wholly defaced from 
man, and that he is utterly dead in trespasses and sins. In this sense one cannot 
speak about a portion of the image remaining in fallen man. However, Calvin 
makes a distinction between the spiritual and the natural. At the fall, man was 
totally deprived of all spiritual gifts, …[but] that does not mean that his natural 
gifts are polluted or destroyed in themselves, though it is through the natural 
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Torrance does not point out directly how Calvin is wrong to make such a distinction 
and to identify humanity’s remaining natural gifts with the ‘remnant image’. However 
he does describe how Calvin calls our attention to the need to understand the imago 
Dei in the spiritual sense and argues that “it is from our ‘spiritual regeneration’ that 
we see what the imago dei really is and in what it truly consists.”
70
 The regeneration of 
humanity in Christ shows that “the image of God is not any natural property of the 
soul, but is a spiritual reflection in holiness and righteousness.”
71
 Accordingly, total 
depravity indicates “a total corruption” of humanity “in a spiritual sense”, in that 
humankind after the Fall is “totally deprived of all spiritual gifts” and “completely 
despoiled of the spiritual image.”
72
  
In fact, as early as in the second chapter on “Man’s Place in Creation”, 
Torrance has laid just such an emphasis the spiritual significance of human nature. He 
asserts that “there can be no naturalistic understanding of man”
73
 even although “Man 
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is no sense a supernatural being”.
74
 Since human beings are made for God, they “have 
a supernatural destiny”,
75
 a calling from above not from below. That is to say, 
humanity must be understood in its spiritual relation to God – which is supernatural
76
 
– rather than in its natural relation to the world.  
By questioning the distinction between natural gifts and spiritual gifts, 
Torrance makes a strong point of viewing human being as a whole in relation to God 
and this also calls our attention to the God-human relationship being prior to gifts 
within the human self. That is to say, humanity relates to God in the wholeness of its 
being and hence is better defined by its relational nature here rather than by any 
distinctive gifts given to it. This interpretation of Calvin is picked up and recognized 
by some Calvin scholars such as Mary Engel, for example, 
[From a certain perspective,] the image is seen as the right relationship of the 
whole self to God. This integrity of being, in which the whole self is rightly 
ordered to God, may be called true piety and is, as Torrance points out, a 
supernatural gift. Identifying the image as the gratuitous gift of true piety, the 
right ordering of the whole self to God, however, does not, as Torrance 




Nevertheless, Torrance does make a distinction between the natural relation 
and the spiritual or supernatural relation, as we can see from his arguments above. He 
regards the former relation as being to the world and the latter relation as being to God. 
This implies that he views the created order as a natural one which does not and 
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cannot really say anything about the supernatural God-human relationship. For 
Torrance, the supernatural relationship between God and humankind is found in Christ 
alone. The two kinds of relation here correspond to the two stories of creation and 
salvation and by emphasizing the supernatural relation, Torrance has in fact placed the 
salvation story above the creation story for knowledge of humanity in relation to God. 
2.2.2.4 The Imago Dei Defined by the God-human Relationship 
It is clear that Torrance consistently emphasizes the God-human relationship as the 
determinant of the imago Dei. Humankind bears God’s image by responding to God 
and loses the image in rebellion against God. Although rationality of mind gives 
humankind the capability to respond to God intelligently, this capacity in itself does 
not define the relation and hence does not define the imago Dei.  What is key for 
Torrance in the imago Dei is the continuing relation with God, and therefore both what 
he accepts from Calvin in the creation context and what he questions about Calvin in 
the salvation context, he does so in terms of their relational understanding. That is to 
say, Torrance interprets the imago Dei as an imago-relation rather than an imago-gift. 
The definition of human nature comes from what is between God and humankind but 
not what is within the human being.  
As Torrance interprets it, the imago-relation has several essential elements and 
characteristics which can be ordered in the following way. 
(1) The imago-relation is a dynamic reflection demanding human beings’ active 
obedience to God’s Word and will. 
 44 
Torrance points out that in Calvin’s theology “The image of God is in no sense a static 
reflection of the being of God, but a dynamic reflection by way of active obedience to 
the Word and Will of God.”
78
 Such a dynamic reflection “indicates how much [Calvin] 
broke with the traditional habits of the Schoolmen who used to think of the relations 
between God and man in terms of a gradation of being, and so inevitably of the imago 
dei in terms of a static analogy of being.”
79
 As Torrance illustrates,  
[T]he imago dei is seen to be the configuration formed in the person of man by 
the constant will of God to communicate Himself to man through the Word. 
Thus man’s contemplation of God through which the image becomes 
impressed on him is not a “dead contemplation” but an active and continuous 
one in which man is transformed into the image of God from glory to 




(2) The imago-relation is a continuous reflection maintained by God’s grace and 
fulfilled as human destiny.  
Torrance underlines the thought of Calvin that although humankind is created good in 
the imago Dei, “yet we cannot continue unless He has His hand continually stretched 
out over us.”
81
 Inasmuch as the continuing grace of God holds humankind in a 
continuous relation to Him, human reflection of God must indicate a “life-answer to 
God’s grace.”
82
 This means that the imago-relation is a continuous one which cannot 
stop at the point of creation as though it were already fixed or complete. It further 
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implies that the imago Dei “must be understood teleologically and 
eschatologically…[as] man’s destiny in God’s gracious intention.”
83
 This destiny is 
one which has been set since the creation of humankind. Torrance refers to statements 
from Calvin’s commentaries where Adam “is said to be like God who aspires to His 
likeness, however distant from it he may as yet be”
84
 and “the image of God was only 
shadowed forth in him, till he should arrive at perfection”.
85
 This characteristic of 
continuance echoes and enhances the dynamic characteristic of the imago-relation and 
Torrance comments, “There can be no doubt that Calvin lays the stress therefore on 
the dynamic character of the image of God which is maintained in man by continuous 




(3) The imago-relation is a spiritual reflection enabled by God’s Spirit as a 
supernatural matter in human life. 
Torrance states, “All being and motion and life [in humankind], wherever found, are 
due to the immediate action of the Spirit of God.”
87
 Our response to God is hence 
enabled not by any natural means but “by the virtue of the Spirit through the Word.”
88
 
That is to say, the reflection of God in human life “must be regarded as above the 
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common order of nature and as consisting in supernatural gifts.”
89
 It is “not a matter of 
[human] natural being, but is above nature [a matter of the Spirit].”
90
 Therefore the 
imago-relation “does not involve a supernatural heightening of our ordinary nature”
91
 
but indicates the supernatural involvement of human life in God’s action through the 
Spirit. In other words, as we aspire to be the imago Dei, we must live a life depending 
on the Spirit of God without seeking to arrogate anything of our own.  
In short, Torrance emphasizes the imago Dei as a relation in which humankind 
reflects God continuously, actively, and spiritually. It is clear that his intention is to 
expound Calvin’s doctrine of humanity from a thoroughly relational and dynamic 
perspective where the essence of God’s image in humanity is neither a static property 
nor a static status but a living, dynamic movement which corresponds to and answers 
to God’s initiating action through the Spirit. As Torrance puts it, the imago Dei “is not 
a dead but a living image, not a mute expression of the divine glory, but a witness-
bearing image evoked by the wonderful grace of God in calling man into communion 
with Himself, and having its own essential motion contrapuntal to the gracious and 
continual giving of the Father.”
92
 This dynamic-relational interpretation of humanity 
in the imago Dei is the basis for Torrance’s rejection of “the remnant imago Dei” in 
fallen humankind. For once the essential movement of witness-bearing disappears, the 
image of God is certainly and totally lost.  
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This dynamic-relational perspective must be viewed as a specific strategy and 
method that Torrance adopts to solve the problem of interpreting Calvin. He explains: 
“There are times when Calvin appears to say that the imago dei is equivalent to man’s 
reason and understanding, but on examination that never turns out to be the case.”
93
 
“In gathering together Calvin’s thought…we must say that Calvin does not think of 
the imago dei in terms of being, that is, in terms of man’s being this or that in himself, 
but in terms of a spiritual relation to the gracious will of God.”
94
 Actually, in the 
Preface to CDOM, Torrance had already announced his intention of making a 
contribution to the traditional exposition of Calvin. He states, 
One of the calamities of traditional exposition and interpretation of Calvin’s 
theology has been, by means of arid logical forms, to make Calvin’s own 
distinctions too clean and too rigid. This has resulted in an over-simplification 
which has obscured the flexibility as well as the range and profundity of his 
thought.…This is particularly true in regard to Calvin’s teaching about the 




By highlighting the dynamic-relational perspective, Torrance has indeed made some 
difference and progression to the exposition of Calvin and a positive contribution to 
the interpretation of his anthropology. He has downplayed the static view which 
Calvin sometimes employed for examining human nature and which had coloured his 
thought. At the same time, the significance of the God-human relationship which 
Calvin had also stressed in his anthropology, Torrance has heightened in a more 
dynamic sense. In Torrance’s eyes, therefore, Calvin’s teaching about the imago Dei 
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should be understood like this: “The image of God is no sense a static reflection of the 
being of God, but a dynamic reflection by way of active obedience to the Word and 
Will of God. It is man’s intelligent life-answer to God’s grace, and as such is a 




2.3 Critique – Torrance’s Viewing Calvin through the Lens of 
Barth 
 
In his interpretation of “Calvin’s doctrine of man”, Torrance rejects the idea of the 
remnant imago Dei and the validity of natural theology. As a response to the Brunner-
Barth controversy, his conclusion obviously conforms to Barth’s. This calls our 
attention to another issue, namely, whether Torrance has viewed Calvin through the 
lens of Barth. 
2.3.1 Christocentrism and God-one-sidedness  
 
Torrance was one of the key figures in the effort to introduce Barth into English 
language theology
97
 and his use of Barth’s theology is no secret. In CDOM, he takes a 
standpoint similar to Barth’s when interpreting Calvin. He points out, “in Calvin’s 
view the key to the whole doctrine of man in creation and destiny is the idea of 
thankful response to the unbounded grace of God. Nor can we understand the doctrine 
of creation unless we too are evoked to a grateful adoration of the perfections of 
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 But Torrance does not assume a general understanding of the grace of God 
from God’s various works in the world. In a comprehensive examination of CDOM, 
we find that Torrance refers to the grace of God specifically as the grace of God in 
Jesus Christ. He asserts that “the grace of God in Christ” and “the Word made flesh” 
are the only standpoint, the exclusive point of reference from which to formulate an 
understanding of Calvin’s theology.
99
 This resonates strongly with Barth’s 
understanding of Calvin:  
We need to note above all else that for Calvin…Christ is from the first the key 
with which he unlocks the whole. Christ is that unspoken original 
presupposition in terms of which we see God a priori as the ground and 
goal, …and in terms of which we see ourselves a priori…as sinners, and are 
thus pointed to grace.
100
  
Therefore Calvin’s theology “moves from [and] also toward a single point.”
101
 It is 
beyond doubt that Calvin habitually speaks of Jesus Christ as the goal of the scriptures. 
However, as scholars commonly recognize, the structure of Calvin’s theology is based 
on the duplex cognitio of creation and salvation rather than the single point of Christ. 
To assert that Jesus Christ alone is “the key to the whole doctrine of man” in Calvin’s 
theology, Torrance has indeed viewed Calvin through the lens of Barth. Or to put it 
more simply, he has read Barth’s Christocentrism into Calvin’s theology, as is 
confirmed by his general promotion of Barth’s epistemology for theology. 
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In brief, Barth recognizes God’s revelation only in Christ and expounds the 
content of theology only from God’s side. For him, there is no knowledge of God 
apart from the revelation of the God incarnate in Christ, nor is it possible for us to 
know God except through the power of the Spirit. The “conditions of the possibility of 
Christian theology” thus depend one-sidedly on God.
102
 But furthermore, to focus on 
Christ the incarnate God also means acknowledgement that contact with God in Him 
is still made only from the side of God. Any approach to God made purely from the 
side of humankind must be rejected. Consequently, it is necessary to rule out in total 
terms any independent attempt by humanity to reach God.
103
 That is why Barth 
responded with such an absolute “No!” to Brunner.
104
 
Torrance affirms Barth’s epistemology with obvious sympathy and 
appreciation. He is convinced that this is the scientific method which frees theology 
from “the philosophical epistemology in abstraction” and makes theology “determined 
by the nature of the content and subject-matter [i.e. by God alone]”.
105
 In Torrance’s 
eyes,  
[The way of constructing theology solely on the cornerstone of Christ is] the 
epistemological implication of justification by grace alone, for it forces upon 
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us a relentless questioning of all our presuppositions, prejudgments and a 
priori authorities, philosophical or ecclesiastical, in such a way that in the last 
resort we are thrown back wholly upon the nature and activity of God himself 




He therefore highly commends the development Barth has made of Reformed 
theology as “a very powerful epistemological structure”.
107
  
2.3.2 The Barthian Characteristics in CDOM 
 
Aided by such epistemological convictions, Torrance understands and supports 
Barth’s rejection of natural theology.
108
 They also become a lens for Torrance through 
which to view Calvin’s anthropology. Torrance then proceeds to sort out Calvin’s 
anthropology according to the more “powerful epistemological structure” of Barth’s 
theology and to smooth out Calvin’s inconsistent teachings on humanity under the 
light of Barth’s consistent emphasis on God in Christ. That is what we see in his book 
CDOM.  
2.3.2.1 The Re-ordered Duplex Cognition 
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In the very first chapter of CDOM, Torrance announces a re-ordered procedure to 
understand Calvin’s anthropological discussions. He explains,  
If in the order of his discussion in the Institutes he gives an account of man and 
sin before an account of our salvation, he does that only by taking his stand 
entirely within the gracious redemption of man in Christ, and makes the 
argument from grace regulative throughout. … He does not try to place himself 
in understanding or judgment artificially at a point before the fall of man, but 
views the whole doctrine of creation and the fall from man’s actual position in 
the redemption of Christ. Therefore, though he expounds the doctrine in the 
order of creation in original integrity, the miserable ruin of the fall, and the 
redemption of grace, yet he insists that inasmuch as man has fallen from his 
original, and has been redeemed in Christ, and so restored to God’s original 
intention, we can only make headway in a doctrine of man by viewing the 




In short, Torrance believes that despite Calvin’s duplex cognitio perceiving humanity 
first in creation and then in salvation, the real order should be the other way round. 
This not only indicates the priority of the salvation context over the creation context 
but also the inclusion of the latter within the former. “That is a point”, Torrance states, 
“which I shall be concerned to bring out again and again, though I shall follow 
Calvin’s general order of exposition.”
110
  
With this in mind Torrance begins his interpretation of Calvin’s anthropology 
from his affirmation of humankind’s distinctiveness in the creation and then proceeds 
to his teaching on total perversity. But on the other hand he sets “the confines of 
grace” and “the bounds of the Word” around the self-knowledge expounded by Calvin 
in the context of creation. Given that the confines of grace and bounds of the Word 
                                                 
109
 CDOM, 21, italics added. 
110
 CDOM, 21. 
 53 
mean Christ, Torrance has reshaped Calvin’s dogmatic structure from the original 
duplex cognitio to Christocentrism. As for explaining how to accommodate those 
teachings from Calvin that are not in accordance with Christocentrism, Torrance says, 
“Calvin does…point out the value of thinking of ourselves apart from grace [in 
Christ]” and “does engage in moral denunciations of man apart from the context of 
grace [in Christ]”, but this does “not stand up to his own investigations.”
111
  
This explanation is quite different from the common understanding of Calvin, 
and is questioned by some Calvin scholars. Charles Partee for instance states, “In 
Calvin these ways of knowing do not constitute a ‘scientific’ method from which a 
‘unified field theory’ of knowing is possible.”
112
 Partee argues that instead of seeing 
them as having a genuine validity for Calvin, Torrance views Calvin’s use of them as 
no more than “a didactic device” so that Calvin “can focus directly on anthropological 
themes…in some sense setting aside their theological context”,
113
 which reflects his 
willingness “to exclude the restoration in favor of analyzing creation and fall.”
114
 For 
Partee, Torrance is trying to squeeze disparate elements of Calvin under one roof. 
2.3.2.2 The Two-sided Relationship Actualized by One Action 
                                                 
111
 CDOM, 18, 19. Torrance made this critique immediately after asserting that “the very heart 
of Calvin’s doctrine of man” is formulated “only from the standpoint of the grace of God in 
Jesus Christ” (p.18). For Torrance the word grace in Calvin indicates specifically “the grace of 
God in Jesus Christ”. 
112
 Charles Partee, The Theology of John Calvin (London: Westminster John Knox, 2008), 300. 
113
 Charles Partee, The Theology of John Calvin (London: Westminster John Knox, 2008), 88. 
Refer also to CDOM 18-19 where Torrance speaks of “the value [for Calvin] of thinking of 
ourselves apart from grace” and of how “Calvin constantly employs a didactic purpose in his 
theology…” 
114
 Charles Partee, The Theology of John Calvin (London: Westminster John Knox, 2008), 88. 
 54 
In CDOM, Torrance represents the two-sided relationship between God and 
humankind as being actualized by God’s unilateral action. He observes, “One of the 
difficulties in expounding the thought of Calvin here is that there are two important 
factors constitutive of the imago dei. One is the act of God’s pure grace, and the other 
is the response of man to that act – and both are brought together in one in the doctrine 
of the imago dei.”
115
 The imago-relation involves indeed a two-sided dynamic, a 
movement from God to humankind and a movement from humankind to God. But in 
actuality, the two-sided dynamics subsist in “only one essential motion and rhythm”
116
 
which is to be found only in the action of God. This is because ever since the first man 
and woman, human beings have had their relational movement to God perverted and 
have always failed to maintain it from their side. The continuous dynamic interaction 
between God and humankind must therefore be entirely maintained on the ground of 
“an objective basis which is the act of God’s pure grace”.
117
 
What then is this “one essential motion and rhythm” in Calvin’s theology? 
Torrance refers to it as God’s continuous beholding us as His children, for “from the 
point of view of his theology Calvin has nothing to do with second causes”
118
 and 
always makes everything depend on the immediate action of God. The only ground for 
the imago Dei is “the will of God to regard man with a fatherly eye”.
119
 In other words, 
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in the imago-relation, God keeps regarding us as His children and seeing Himself in us 
as in a mirror, in order to show Himself as a Father toward us.
120
 The imago Dei “has 
to do fundamentally with God’s beholding rather than with man’s.”
121
 Furthermore, 
Torrance argues that “in our natural state we do not know that God wishes to regard us 
with a fatherly eye, and therefore we cannot come to Him as He would have us. It is 
only a saving knowledge of God that can enable us to do that – and that we may have 
through His Word.”
122
 Put simply, knowledge of the Father’s beholding us must rely 
on the knowledge of salvation in Christ.
123
 
This emphasis on the single movement of God’s beholding of us which is 
known only through Christ and his salvation clearly echoes Barth’s acknowledgment 
of the absolute primacy of the action of God in Christ. Not surprisingly, such emphasis 
has also been subject to some critique from scholars who do not view Calvin’s 
theology as being in line with Barth’s. Mary Engel for example criticizes Torrance 
directly, “This narrow focus on God’s beholding and the neglect of what the image 
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means in and to humankind reflect a limited reading of Calvin on this point”, and “I 
believe it is Torrance’s Barthian bias which has led him to this narrow conclusion.”
124
 
2.3.2.3 The Omission of Accommodation  
Accommodation is an important concept in Calvin’s theology. Speaking of revelation, 
Calvin emphasizes that God accommodates Himself to our capacity in order to make 
Himself known by us. It means that God lowers Himself like a father who humours his 
children as he tells them a profound story in language that they can understand. As Jon 
Balserak observes, “Calvin’s treatment of God’s accommodating places huge 
importance upon human capacity.”
125
 In other words, God has chosen to reveal 
Himself in such a way that He intentionally and freely implicates human capacity and 
involves it in understanding Him. Revelation therefore itself seals the involvement of 
human capacity, as God Himself determines, and establishes the special bond between 
God and humankind. This is true of revelation regardless of whether it takes place 
before or after human sin in the Fall.
126
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Torrance, however, gives no treatment to the important concept of 
accommodation in CDOM,
127
 an omission that has not passed unnoticed. In his 
research on Calvin, Edward Dowey made a point of commenting on the omission in a 
footnote, “Torrance pays no attention to accommodation… which other students of 
Calvin have found important for understanding him.”
128
 The omission is perhaps 
better viewed not as a “mistake” on the part of Torrance but as a natural “strategy” as 
he interprets Calvin’s doctrine of humanity. If so, the reason for this can be explained 
as follows: affirming that God makes Himself known to us by accommodating 
Himself to our capacity gives a place, however limited, to our capacity of 
understanding revelation. This detracts from the single focus on God’s grace and 
action and involves human rationality as a necessary element in the imago Dei. As 
such, both consequences would be unwelcome to Torrance. He may not dismiss the 
idea of accommodation itself, but he gives no place to such an interpretation of the 
implications of human capacity. Convinced by Barth, Torrance feels it necessary to 
exclude the role of any independent human capacity from the reception of revelation. 
This conviction also calls him to abandon the static interpretation of the imago Dei 
credited to the rational capacity. The omission of accommodation can be seen to give 
him more space to do so and to explain why he “pays no attention to accommodation”. 
2.3.2.4 The Negation of Conscience 
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As Torrance chooses to downplay such consideration of rationality and omits the 
concept of accommodation, he also downplays another important concept of Calvin, 
that of conscience. 
In Calvin’s theology, conscience has a rich significance which cannot be 
ignored for understanding human nature in the contexts of both creation and 
redemption. In brief, conscience is a constituent part of the rationality endowed to the 
human mind. It is the internal voice making known precepts of God
129
 and is no less 
operative after the Fall.
130
 Twice in the Institutes, Calvin defines conscience as a sense 
or awareness of divine judgment which raises an accusing voice from inside the 
human heart and urges on us the need of redemption.
131
 He also declares that in spite 
of sin “this tiny little spark of light remained, that men recognized man’s conscience to 
be higher than all human judgments.”
132
 Calvin thinks of conscience as God’s own 
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eternal precepts inwardly keeping humanity from being animal-like in their ignorance 
of His laws. It is precisely because of this that human beings have no way to excuse 
themselves from the guilt of sin whether past or present. Calvin also points to the role 
of conscience in establishing the conviction of God’s promises in the human heart. As 
he comments, “Scripture shows that God’s promises are not established unless they 
are grasped with the full assurance of conscience.”
133
 
Torrance addresses the concept of conscience only a little and then quite late in 
CDOM.
134
 He agrees that Calvin indeed “links on what remains of the original 
creation of man in the image of God to a spark of knowledge or a portion of light or a 
seed of religion still lurking in the soul”,
135
 that for Calvin “we naturally possess some 
knowledge of God, [and] that some distinction between good and evil is engraven on 
our conscience”.
136
 However, instead of on Calvin’s positive teaching on it, Torrance 
emphasizes the insignificance and negative function of such dim awareness of God. 
He cites references from Calvin on such knowledge to argue that “from the very start 
it is perverted, so that it is really nothing but the fountainhead of all his [man’s] 
superstition and irreligion.”
137
 Torrance likewise stresses that human beings “are 
blinder than moles” as far as coming to God by natural knowledge is concerned so that 
what little light is left to them in their darkness only serves “to render them 
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inexcusable through the conviction of their own conscience”.
138
 By disallowing any 
real or actual illumination from conscience after the Fall, Torrance rejects any 
connection between conscience and the perception of God’s will.  
Clearly Torrance has the same reason for downplaying Calvin’s teaching on 
conscience as for passing over the concept of accommodation. Acknowledging any 
positive function of conscience will bestow a certain credit to something within 
humanity, allowing some room for the static interpretation of the imago Dei, and 
Calvin does have an inward perspective when examining humanity as the imago Dei. 
As he affirms, the conscience “is nothing but an inward uprightness of heart.”
139
 It is 
certainly a kind of “likeness” of God that He imprints in humanity.
140
 In Torrance’s 
eyes, however, it implies the remnant imago Dei and hence runs counter to what he is 
convinced of by Barth, that total redemption by Christ effectively implies the total 
defacement of any real imago Dei according to a Christocentric ordering of doctrine. 
The acknowledgement of conscience threatens such a conviction and ordering of 
doctrine.
141
 As a matter of strategy therefore rather than as a mistake, Torrance does 
not deny the existence of conscience but only discounts its positive function and in so 
doing eliminates the need to include conscience in defining humanity as the imago Dei.  
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Gospel of a new creation [in Christ] provide Calvin with a problem.” (CDOM, 83.) 
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2.3.2.5 The Critique  
Altogether, there are many traces of Barth’s theology in Torrance’s CDOM. While 
Torrance examines Calvin’s teaching from a vast range of primary sources, he 
displays evidence of a clear Barthian inheritance throughout, from the implicit 
epistemology to the explicit conclusions. It is not too difficult to recognize that he 
hopes to find a unity between Barth and Calvin, in bringing Calvin’s relational 
framework (defining humanity in terms of the God-human relationship) together with 
Barth’s single focus theology (concentrating on God’s revelation in the incarnate 
Christ). As he employs Barth’s lens to analyse Calvin’s anthropology, he cannot help 
being impelled to interpretations and conclusions that ultimately transcend the two-
sided relational framework.
142
 Here the duality in the relationship between God and 
humankind is understood as being fulfilled and transcended at a higher level, the unity 
of God and humankind in the one person of Jesus Christ.
143
  
For Torrance, this transition to a ‘higher’ level is of critical importance and 
exists nowhere else but in the person of Christ. He points to Calvin’s whole procedure 
in understanding the nature of humanity. Calvin begins first with creation apart from 
the Fall, “for it helps us to view the nature of man in direct relation to the grace of 
God in which human nature really consists and in which human nature possesses a 
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 The word transcend is used intentionally in order to avoid the word contradict.  
143
 This is important for Torrance who rejects the influence of dualism in ancient philosophy 




 Torrance then argues that for Calvin the only way to discern the 
original dignity of man in the midst of sin is “by looking to the grace in which he is 
renewed [in Christ] where we see again the grace from which he is fallen”.
145
 It is here 
that Torrance’s relational thinking about the imago Dei shifts from the indirect 
relation between God and humanity to the direct one inaugurated by and in Christ. It 
shifts from the dualistic relationship in which God and humanity are distinguished in 
opposition by the divine/human gulf (especially after the Fall) to the unitary 
relationship in which Christ represents the union in one person of God and humanity. 
Only through such a shift can Torrance hold together Calvin’s relational framework 
and Barth’s single focus.  
Beyond all question, the step that Torrance takes in anthropology is an 
insightful one. To a large extent, it removes the conflict between Brunner’s 
interpretation of Calvin and Barth’s. While Torrance supported Barth in the 
controversy, he softened and counterbalanced somewhat Barth’s vehement opposition 
to Brunner. As already observed, he did not allow Calvin’s relational characteristics 
and dynamic definition of the imago Dei to be suppressed or diluted but promoted and 
developed them. 
Nonetheless, Torrance achieved the development and integration at a cost. As 
we see in CDOM, he finally abandoned, if not denied, Calvin’s multiple perspectives 
for examining humanity and only selected one perspective, the dynamic relational. But 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man (London: Lutterworth, 1949), 84, italics 
added. 
145
 CDOM, 84. 
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Calvin also defines the imago Dei in a static sense and does accord human nature a 
certain validity in its internal dimension of thought. His multiple perspectives allow 
him to affirm human rationality and conscience as well as total depravity. That is why 
his anthropology seems inconsistent. Torrance, however, appreciates and is more 
attracted to Barth’s consistent focus and also wants to avoid Calvin’s seeming 
inconsistency. He therefore mentions Calvin’s inward and static examinations of 
humanity but discounts them from any definition of the imago Dei. He concluded, “In 
gathering together Calvin’s thought…we must say that Calvin does not think of the 
imago dei in terms of being, that is, in terms of man’s being this or that in himself, but 
in terms of a spiritual relation to the gracious will of God.”
146
 By making such a 
conclusion, Torrance resolved the tension and competition caused by the parallel use 
of the dynamic and static definitions. On the other hand, he sacrificed something of 
the richness of Calvin’s anthropology in terms of the complexity of humanity.
147
 This 
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 CDOM, 79-80. 
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 John Leith points out that “Calvin was ready to sacrifice logical consistency in order to do 
justice to the complexity of Christian revelation and experience.” (“Calvin’s Theological 
Method and the Ambiguity in His Theology”, Reformation Studies: Essays in Honor of Roland 
H. Bainton, ed. Franklin H. Littell, Richmond: John Knox, 1962, 108.) This is particularly the 
case in his doctrine of humanity. Many scholars acknowledge that the richness of Calvin’s 
anthropology comes from his taking multiple sources and viewpoints to examine the complex 
reality of the human being and they believe that this explains the seeming inconsistency and 
ambiguity. For example, Richard Prins summarized “four sources” that caused “Calvin’s 
inconsistencies, ambiguities, and contradictions”, and indicated that “Calvin’s inconsistencies 
reflect those of the Bible [i.e. the Scriptural revelation about humanity].” (“The Image of God 
in Adam and the Restoration of Man in Jesus Christ: A Study in Calvin”, Scottish Journal of 
Theology 25, 1972, 33, footnote 1.) Charles Partee noted, “In Calvin these ways of knowing 
do not constitute a ‘scientific’ method from which a ‘unified field theory’ of knowing is 
possible” and “Calvin’s goal is not…logical consistency in knowing.” (The Theology of John 
Calvin, London: Westminster John Knox, 2008, 300, 310.) Mary Potter Engel particularly 
illustrated Calvin’s anthropology as a “perspectival” one, i.e. his interpretation of human 
nature has various perspectives which seem contradictory yet complementary. She pointed out 
that in a deeper unity they describe accurately a complex reality because “the human being is 
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Despite CDOM bearing a rather Barthian character, it is not a work that 
Torrance did as a spokesman for Barth,
149
 otherwise he would not have emphasized 
the imago-relation as an active reflection of God in a humanity which God has not 
created to be idle.
150
 This emphasis clearly resonates with Brunner’s accent on human 
subjectivity and responsibility. We must recognize Torrance as an independently 
thinking theologian who has made his own interpretation of Calvin in response to the 
controversy between Brunner and Barth. In CDOM, he has not blindly agreed or 
disagreed with any of the three masters – neither to Barth nor to Brunner, nor even to 
Calvin. This book distinguishes Torrance from them and should best be considered as 
the start of an anthropology of his own which he distinctively enriched and developed 
in his later systematic writings.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
an essentially mysterious creature that must be described from conflicting viewpoints.” (John 
Calvin’s Perspectival Anthropology, Atlanta: Scholars, 1988, 193.) 
148
 For example, Engel regards Torrance as one of the theologians who interpret the imago Dei 
exclusively through the restored image in Jesus Christ but neglect Calvin’s teaching on the 
remnant image. She criticizes, “those studies which present Calvin's doctrine of the imago dei 
as little more than an extension of or derivation from his Christology are incomplete. Failing 
to attend to Calvin's positive use of the remnant theory, they offer one-sided impressions of 
this aspect of his doctrine of the imago dei.” (John Calvin’s Perspectival Anthropology, 
Atlanta: Scholars, 1988, 62-63.) In the next chapter, we will address the issue that Torrance 
makes anthropology an extension of or derivation from Christology.  
149
 Barth himself would evidently not wholly agree with it as he openly critiques the “happy 
inconsistency” that he found in CDOM. Refer to footnote 25 above. 
150
 Torrance observes, “God has not created men to be idle” and Calvin “taught the dignity of 





From his first work on anthropology, Torrance has made it clear that he emphasizes a 
dynamic instead of a static understanding of humanity in which the imago Dei stands 
for a living relationship requiring humanity’s continuous reflection of God. It is 
neither an internal property nor a lost or perverted capacity of human nature and is 
based on the unity of God and humanity in the person of Christ rather than on the 
duality of the relation between the two. Fallen humankind cannot claim any remnant 
of the imago Dei despite the fact that they retain the capacity for reason. The imago 
Dei exists only in Christ and is revealed by his salvation. The imago-relation 
ultimately relies wholly on the grace of God. “Therefore a man must continually go 
beyond himself” rather than search within his own being to become the imago Dei.
151
  
In advocating such a dynamic knowledge of humanity, Torrance attempts to 
integrate Calvin’s relational thinking and Barth’s Christocentrism. Viewed from a 
superficial level, Torrance’s anthropology represents his considered effort to explain 
Calvin’s inconsistent arguments on humanity. Viewed from a deeper level, it 
manifests his intention to revise the traditional approach in the light of modern 
theological method.
152
 At both levels and especially the latter, he is doing something 
quite original and valuable for Reformed anthropology. Nonetheless, as Torrance 
himself genuinely admits, “It is difficult to see how there can be any ultimate 
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 CDOM, 81. 
152
 Or as we might say, Torrance intends to reconstruct the old orthodoxy in the light of the 
new orthodoxy. For more on the concepts of the old orthodoxy and a theology more 
determined by Christology, see further, Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV.1, 366-367. See also the 
content relating to footnotes 27-29 above. 
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reconciliation between Calvin’s doctrine of total perversity and his doctrine of a 
remnant of the imago dei, although the very fact that he can give them both in the 
same breath seems to indicate that he had no difficulty in reconciling them.”
153
 This 
would mean that some elements from the traditional picture which is untroubled by its 
own inconsistent focus may not be harmonious with a new picture which is concerned 
with scientific consistency. It would also mean that, for the sake of consistency, 
Torrance has to either leave such elements outside of the picture altogether or at least 
only on the margins.  
CDOM is only the start of Torrance’s exploration of anthropology, but it is in 
this book that the dynamic, relational and unitary characteristics of his anthropology 
first shone out to be further developed in his numerous later works. Actually we may 
find these characteristics shining through the entire body of his theology and it is not 
nearly enough to grasp his insights into the anthropology of the imago Dei through 
examining CDOM alone. Hence the remainder of the thesis will endeavour to unfold 
his anthropological contribution from within the full scope of his dogmatic system, 
particularly in his Christology and soteriology, doctrine of the Trinity and doctrine of 
Creation. 
 
                                                 
153
 CDOM, 93, italics added. 
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Chapter 3 
Torrance’s Anthropology                                                 
in Christology and Soteriology 
 
 
In Torrance’s theology, the doctrine of Christ and his salvation does not only reveal 
who Christ is and what he has done for us; it also reveals what we are and who we are 
destined to be for Christology and soteriology form the real heart of Torrance’s 
anthropology. This chapter will therefore focus on Torrance’s interpretation of the 
incarnation and atonement to unfold his insights about the person and work of Christ. 
In terms of anthropology, it aims at unfolding knowledge of humanity as understood 
from its regeneration in the new God-human relationship in Christ. Without any 
intention of compromising the integrity and inseparability of Christ’s person and work, 
this chapter will treat the person first and the work second purely for the sake of 
material organization.  
 
3.1 The Person of Christ – Humanity Is Embraced by God in 
the Hypostatic Union 
 
In Torrance’s theology, all Christological and soteriological truth is grounded on the 
mystery of the incarnation. Regarding this mystery, heretical teaching denies either the 
full deity or the real humanity of Jesus. Torrance opposes both of these vigorously. He 
follows patristic theology in viewing the incarnation as God’s becoming human 
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without ceasing to be God.
1
 It is a historical event that took place in the person of 
Jesus Christ and Torrance’s understanding of Christ is rooted in the Nicene concept of 
the homoousion
2




3.1.1 Incarnation – God Becomes a Man in History  
 
For Torrance, the incarnation is not a metaphysical idea but a historical truth, that God 
entered into spatial-temporal existence and became a human being.
4
 This astonishing 
act of God brings into being in history an inconceivable person, Jesus Christ who is 
God made flesh. This is “the supreme truth that was secured for the church at the 
Council of Nicaea in the doctrine of the homoousion”.
5
 
Homoousion, as employed by the Nicene Creed, is used to emphasize the 
identity of substance between Jesus Christ and God, that Jesus Christ is of one being 
                                                 
1
 Thomas F. Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), 13.  
2
 Homoousion means that Jesus is of the same divine substance as God the Father. 
3
 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, Downers 
Grove: IVP, 2008), 67. The doctrine of the anhypostasia and enhypostasia asserts that Jesus’ 
human nature exists only in union with God (i.e. in the personal being of the incarnate God) 
and Jesus exists as a real human being (i.e. of the same substance of our humanity). Torrance 
affirms this doctrine as “a very careful way of stating that we cannot think of the hypostatic 
union statically, but must think of it on the one hand, in terms of the great divine act of grace 
in the incarnation, and on the other hand, in terms of the dynamic personal union carried 
through the whole life of Jesus Christ.” (See the same book, 84.) We will give it more detailed 
discussion later. 
4
 Thomas F. Torrance clarifies that “The relation between the actuality of the incarnate Son in 
space and time and the God from whom He came cannot be spatialized” while “His actual 
presence in space and time and His personal interaction with our physical existence” must be 
asserted. See Space, Time and Incarnation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), 2-3. 
5
 Thomas F. Torrance, Preaching Christ Today: The Gospel and Scientific Thinking (Grand 
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1994), 18. 
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with God the Father and must be acknowledged as true God. Torrance states, “the 
homoousion of the Son [Jesus Christ] with the Father expressed the conviction that 
what He was towards us in His incarnate activity He was inherently, and therefore 
antecedently and eternally.”
6
 In other words, the full reality of God as He is in eternity 
is just as it is found in Jesus Christ. In affirmation of the point, Torrance refers to his 
teacher H. R. Mackintosh’s assertion in his lectures, “When I look into the face of 
Jesus Christ and see the face of God, I know that I have not seen that face elsewhere 
and could not see it elsehow, for he and the Father are one.”
 7
 Torrance himself would 
often say “There is no God behind the back of Jesus.” What does this statement mean 
for the doctrine of humanity? Torrance in Incarnation explains it from three aspects. 
Firstly, it guarantees that the forgiveness of sin we gain in Christ is valid. Forgiveness 
would not be true forgiveness unless it is from God Himself, for “only God against 
whom we sin can forgive sin”
8
. Secondly, it guarantees that the revelation we receive 
from Christ is real. Revelation has to be brought to us from God Himself and 
“grounded on the reality of God’s presence in it”
9
. Thirdly, it guarantees that the faith 
we have in Christ is rational. If it is not God Himself who suffers and bears the sin of 
the world, the cross would become a “terrible monstrosity”, because “how could we 
believe in a God who allows the best man that ever lived to be hounded to death on the 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), 3. 
7
 Thomas F. Torrance, ‘Hugh Ross Mackintosh Theologian of the Cross, An Appreciation,’ in 
H. R. Mackintosh, The Person of Christ (ed. T. F. Torrance, first published in 1912 by the 
Student Christian Movement, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 77. 
8
 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, Downers 
Grove: IVP, 2008), 187. 
9
 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, Downers 




 The second issue, the reality of revelation, is the one most worthy of our 
attention at this point. As already seen in Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, Torrance declares 
that “for man, knowing (God) and being (man) are bound up together” because 
“Man’s true knowledge of himself is reflexive of his knowledge of God.”
11
 In 
Torrance’s eyes, the incarnation tells us that “the eternal reality of God has actually 
intersected with our creaturely reality, overlapping with it in Jesus Christ in a definite 
span of space-time, and thus constituting Him the one place where man on earth and in 
history may really know the Father”.
12
 It is the revelation of God in Christ, therefore, 
which alone makes our knowing God possible and hence secures our genuine human 
being. If we deny the true and full deity of Christ we would have no means or place of 
knowing God and hence no basis for speaking about humanity. This is the reason why 
the homoousion, the identity in being of Jesus and God, must be emphasized.  
Nevertheless, for Torrance the meaning of homoousion can also describe 
Christ’s consubstantiality with humankind. As he points out, “Christ is of one and 
same being as God, as well as of one and the same being as ourselves.”
13
 To affirm 
Christ’s true humanity is of the same importance here as affirming his deity, for divine 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP, 2008), 189-190. 
11
 Thomas F. Torrance, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man (London: Lutterworth Press, 1949), 13, 23. 
As indicated in the previous chapter, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man is Torrance’s first published 
book on anthropology and the main one among his few works specifically on anthropology. 
Several key themes about humanity are presented and interpreted in this book. Though he 
rarely points back to this book later when talking about humanity in his numerous books on 
other doctrines, he never changes his basic conviction and principles. 
12
 Thomas F. Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), 76. 
13
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Mediation of Christ (the Didsbury Lectures 1983, revised ed. 
Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1992), 124. 
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revelation is only accessible to human beings when it is in creaturely temporal form. 
“Were Christ not man, God’s revelation would not actually be revelation to man.”
14
 
Torrance emphasizes the true and full measure of humanity in Christ more deliberately 
and explicitly than other theologians. He stresses that Jesus’ humanity is neither 
neutral nor divinised but completely identical to ours in both body and soul, flesh and 
mind.  As a real human being, Jesus Christ shares our spatial and temporal limits, 
undergoes all our finite creaturely struggles, and bears all our frailty and infirmity 
under judgment and death like us. To help unfold revelation at a deeper level from the 
perspective of Christ’s humanity, Torrance refers to the statement from Gregory of 
Nazianzen – “the unassumed is the unredeemed.”
15
 He perceives in this statement a 
profound and deeper truth about the atonement that it cannot be understood simply as 
a forensic pardon of sin but has to be thought of as a real regeneration of humanity.
16  
3.1.2 Hypostatic Union – Deity Embraces Humanity in the Personal 
Union in Christ 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP, 2008), 188. This idea reflects somewhat Calvin’s concept of 
“accommodation”, but Torrance does not elaborate on the basic point here that revelation must 
be accessible in human language and thought for “revelation would not actually be revelation 
to us unless it were in our human language and thought”, ibid.  
15
 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP, 2008), 62. Torrance uses this famous statement of Gregory of Nazianzen 
several times in the book. 
16
 This level is “more profound” because of the unexplained logic behind the famous statement 
linking assumption and redemption. The logic is that our sin is such that Christ has to assume 
all that we are and make it his own in order to heal it. Unlike a doctor who does not have to 
assume cancer into himself or herself to save the cancer patient, Christ assumed our sinful 
body, mind and soul in the incarnation in order to heal them in his own humanity. Whatever he 
did not assume would not have been redeemed and hence the statement. Torrance appeals to 
Gregory’s statement to unfold its vicarious perspective and his whole teaching on Christ’s 
vicarious humanity is a fine explanation of it. We will observe and discuss it in both this and 
next sections. 
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The concept of “hypostatic union” lies alongside that of the homoousion as a critical 
one in Christology. Torrance finds in it essential clues to understanding the incarnation 
of God in Christ as well as his atonement for humanity. The hypostatic union 
describes the unique integrity of Christ’s being, that his deity and humanity are united 
in the one person of Jesus. Torrance argues that Jesus Christ must be understood 
“conjunctively as God-man in his one indivisible whole Person.”
17
 Although he has 
two natures, he is but a single personal subject. His person is so integrated that it 
cannot be divided into a divine part and a human part. We must perceive who Christ is 
only as and from this one concrete and united person rather than as two abstract and 
separate natures.  
Nevertheless, this does not mean that we can pay any less attention to the 
difference between the two natures or regard them as being fully ‘equal’ in every way 
in Christ’s person. Torrance here emphasizes the patristic doctrine of anhypostasia 
and enhypostasia. The two Greek words literally mean “not-person” and “in-person”. 
The former indicates that Christ’s humanity has “no independent centre of personal 
being”; the latter indicates that his humanity has “real personal being in the person” of 
Christ.
18
 Torrance explains that on the one hand, there “would have been no Jesus 
apart from the incarnation so that the existence of Jesus even as man is an existence 
only in the Word become flesh, but in that the Word became flesh, there now exists 
[on the other hand] a man Jesus who is true man and exists as historical human beings 
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 Kye Won Lee, Living In Union With Christ: the Practical Theology of Thomas F. Torrance 
(Oxford/New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 2003), 101. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 




 Together the two concepts tell of the full reality of Christ’s existence in which 
the reality of his humanity is dependent on his deity. 
The hypostatic union has two significant dimensions in Torrance’s Christology. 
One is that the acts wrought by Christ in his human nature may also be predicated of 
Christ in his divine nature under his appellation as God, and vice versa. This is usually 
summarized in Reformed theology as the communicatio operationum (the 
communication of acts).
20
 Torrance explains that as “there is but one Christ, we are 
forced to acknowledge that the divine acts in the human nature of Christ, and the 
human acts in Christ, are both acts of one and the same person”.
21
 More importantly, 
the concept of the hypostatic union reveals an unprecedented relation between God 
and humankind: God and humanity are united in the person of Christ. This 
inconceivable relation is crucial for Torrance. It introduces a brand new conceptual 
insight into the God-human relationship, that God embraces humanity into personal 
union with Himself in Christ and it is from within this new relational framework that 
Torrance unfolds the whole divine revelation in Christ.  
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008), 67. 
20
 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008), 226. 
21
 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008), 190. The communication of acts further implies that 
what has taken place in the historical man Jesus is what has taken place in God, and what God 
has intended to do is what the historical man Jesus has done, cf. loc.cit. 191. Torrance deals 
with the technical discussion of communicatio operationum in Incarnation (226) and with its 
meaning mainly in his soteriology, i.e. the atoning work of Christ, which we will observe later. 
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Accordingly and in terms of the new framework, Torrance points out three 
important things about the incarnation. First of all, the incarnation is a dynamic act of 
God. He stresses that Jesus Christ “has his existence only in this divine act of 
condescension in which God gathers man into coexistence with himself”, so that the 
incarnation “refers in one sense to [the] unique event when the Word entered time and 
joined human existence”.
22
 It is fundamentally “an invasion of God” signifying an 
active movement from God to the world.
23
 In other words, the being of Christ is 
recognized as itself an act, and the incarnation as an event. The unity of God and man 
in Christ should be properly understood not in terms of a static status of being but in 
terms of a dynamic action initiated by God alone, God’s entering history and 
embracing humanity into Himself. 
Second, this embracing action is a divine act once for all. Torrance argues that 
as a historical event the incarnation is “a completed event” which “has taken place 
once and for all in the union of God and man in Jesus Christ.”
24
 It indicates an eternal 
act of God that “does not simply fall within the limits and corruption and decay of 
mere historical happening” but “remains eternally real and alive happening”.
25
 In this 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008), 67 (italics added). He clarifies that “the conjunction of 
‘came down’ with ‘for us men and for our salvation’ is to be understood as an act of pure 
condescension on His part and not as an indication of finite imperfection in Him.” See Space, 
Time and Incarnation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), 3. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP, 2008), 8. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008), 67. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008), 67. 
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sense, the historical is not simply the past but is alive and on-going. We must regard 
God’s embracing action as being valid for the whole of history. So also we must 




Third, this uniting action reveals God’s new interaction with humanity as 
being one characterized by incorporation and substitution. Torrance emphasizes that 
becoming flesh in the incarnation is such an invasion of the Creator God into the 
creaturely world that this is even new to God Himself.
27
 And therefore “after the 
incarnation He is at work within space and time in a way that He never was before.”
28
 
In order to save humankind God accomplishes the atonement not as a naked divine act 
wrought in the “upper room” but as a real human act accomplished by a real person in 
spatial-temporal existence. Through this one person, God incorporates Himself into 
our reality, becoming what we are and in exchange so putting Himself into our place 
that the atonement is executed in us and for us. Incorporation therefore is 
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 This point should not be misinterpreted in eternal ontological terms for it does not indicate 
that God is eternally incarnate. The meaning of “once for all” refers to the on-going effect of 
the act rather than the status of being. Please refer here to the next point also. 
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 Torrance indicates, “God was not eternally incarnate, for the incarnation is something new 
even for God.” (‘The Atonement, the Singularity of Christ and the Finality of the Cross: The 
Atonement and the Moral Order’ in Universalism and the Doctrine of Hell, ed. Nigel M. de S. 
Cameron, Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1993, p.232.)  
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 Together they proclaim atonement to be an “act of God done into our 
humanity, wrought out in our place, and as our act.”
30
  
3.1.3 Vicarious Humanity (I) – Jesus as the Vicarious Human Being 
in Union with God 
 
Torrance’s interpretation of the incarnation and the hypostatic union brings to the fore 
a crucial concept in his theology, that of the vicarious humanity of Christ. Put briefly, 
the phrase means that Jesus Christ exists as a man on behalf of all humankind.
31
 He so 
represents us ontologically in his humanity that what he is and does applies to us in a 
real sense. For Torrance, the vicarious humanity of Christ provides the key to opening 
up real knowledge of humankind, a knowledge which may be learned both from 
Christ’s being and from his doing. Although they cannot really be separated, we will 
focus on Christ’s being in this section on Christ’s vicarious humanity, and leave the 
second part on his doing or work till the next section. 
With regard to the knowledge about us perceived from Christ’s being, 
Torrance points us to looking at the mystery of the incarnation from the human side. 
Here we see that while explicitly the incarnation means God’s becoming flesh, 
implicitly it means human life being taken into God. The hypostatic union reveals the 
astonishing status of humanity in Christ, that his humanity exists in such union with 
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 Obviously, the teachings of anhypostasia and enhypostasia and of the communicatio 
operationum all help to also give some explanation and elaboration of this incorporation and 
substitution. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Conflict and Agreement in the Church, vol.1 (London: Lutterworth, 
1959), 244.  
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 Torrance often emphasizes the notion of “one for all”. More discussion will be seen in the 
next section. 
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his divinity that they constitute one person. This united-into-one relationship is the 
“direct relationship” that Torrance emphasizes in Calvin’s Doctrine of Man.
32
 The fact 
that Christ vicariously achieved such a union of humanity with God in his person not 
only marks the unique nature of his person but also reveals the secret to the nature of 
all humanity in their relation to God. In order to properly understand this important 
point, we need a deeper explanation of its content from three perspectives.  
3.1.3.1 The Ontological Content 
This personal union of humanity in God is an ontological union. It indicates an 
existential embracement of humanity but not a substantial transformation of them in 
their nature. Here the word “ontological” does not mean “in nature” or “in substance” 
but means “in existence” or “in reality”. That is what the term enhypostasia implies, 
that the humanity of Jesus Christ really and truly exists in his person; his human 
nature is neither swallowed up by deity, nor deified itself, nor transformed into a third 
type of nature. The ontological union is not an absorption of humanity but in Christ its 
complete fulfilment.  
This ontological union has itself heralded and prefigured the reconciliation of 
God and humankind.
33
 That is to say, when God enters into human existence and 
embraces humanity to become a personal human being, this is reconciliation actually 
being initiated. The incarnation in itself is essentially an act of reconciliation. The 
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 Refer to the previous chapter, footnote 144. 
33
 In Torrance’s mind, the essence of atonement is reconciliation of God to humanity as well 
as of humanity to God. This topic is essential for Torrance’s soteriology. The next section will 
give detailed observation on it. 
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hypostatic union implicitly demonstrates God’s reconciling action even before any 
other saving works. Since this movement and action takes place in the very being of 
Christ who is the man for all, it has ontological significance rather than simply 
functional significance for us.  
3.1.3.2 The Relational Content 
This ontological union is a relational union but not a material combination of natures. 
As God-man, Christ’s vicarious humanity has such a close relationship with his divine 
nature that, without any material confusion between the two or change of either nature 
into the other, the two natures relate to each other so inseparably that they co-mark the 
one personal being. Together they constitute the oneness of Christ’s personhood and 
the integrity of his whole life and action. 
Nevertheless, the relational union does not indicate relational equality but is a 
union conditioned by anhypostasia. Although God and human become one in Christ, 
their unity possesses an internal order in which the latter is wholly dependent on the 
former. That is to say, the two natures in the united relation are not completely parallel 
or equal to each other, but are so ordered that the divine initiates while the human fully 
depends on it and is in that sense ‘subordinate’ to the divine. In other words, the 
hypostatic union in Christ comprises a united but ordered relationship of God and 
humanity such that whenever we think of this united relationship, we need to keep the 
proper order in mind. 
3.1.3.3 The Dynamic Content 
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The ontological and relational union is a dynamic interaction and not a static state. As 
an act of God, the incarnation signifies not only God’s becoming a human but also 
God’s now acting as human. That is to say, the incarnation means first the one-sided 
dynamic of God’s entering the human sphere and embracing humanity; it then means 
the dynamics of the mutual interaction between divine being and human being in 
Christ. We must perceive that Christ’s deity and humanity are both active. They 
interact so intimately that Christ can only be recognized as one acting subject. In this 
one acting subject, the divine nature and human nature communicate their actions to 
each other as outlined by the concept of communicatio operationum. From the 
moment that God became a man, therefore, the ontological union has pointed to the 
dynamic action and interaction of the two natures. Such interaction is self-evidently 
initiated by the self-communication of the divine nature and act to the human nature 
and act, and necessarily results in the mutual communication between them. 
 
3.2 The Work of Christ – Humanity Is Renewed in Substance 
and Reconciled to God Eternally 
 
In the doctrine of salvation, the key theme is atonement. Many theologians use the 
word atonement as equivalent to an understanding of redemption which principally 
signifies Christ’s paying the penalty of sin to reclaim us from the final and fatal 
judgment. But Torrance views its meaning in a far broader and deeper way. For him, 
the atonement is not only the redemption of humanity from sin and death but also the 
ontological renewal of humanity founded on a new God-human relationship in Christ, 
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the relationship of hypostatic at-onement
34
. The atonement reveals the ultimate truth 
about human destiny. In order to understand this important theme in Torrance’s 
soteriology, we need first to look at his interpretation of the nature of sin and of the 
human plight from which human beings are saved. 
3.2.1 Sin and the Human Plight – Relational Brokenness under the 
Dual Threat from Evil and God 
 
As observed in the previous chapter, Torrance interprets the “total perversity” of 
humanity from a relational perspective in which humankind is found to be sinful in 
their perverted relation to God as they rebel against and are alienated from Him.
35
 
Torrance argues that “It belongs to the nature of sin to divide, to create disorder, to 
disrupt, to destroy fellowship.”
36
 The consequence of sin is the brokenness of the 
fellowship and the rupturing of the close relation of harmony between God and 
humankind. As a matter of relation, sin concerns and affects both parties in the 
relation. Torrance  maintains that it is insufficient to think about the event of sin only 
from the human side but rather in terms of the relation between God and humanity. 
“Therefore we must think of sin as objectively real from the point of view of God as 
                                                 
34
 Torrance points out, “It is the hypostatic union or hypostatic at-onement, therefore, which 
lies embedded in the very heart of atonement.” (Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ, ed. 
Robert Walker, Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008, 196.) 
35
 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP, 2008), 247. 
36
 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP, 2008), 38. 
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well as subjectively real from the point of view of man.”
37
 In other words, sin must be 
viewed as a two-sided issue.  
As Torrance explains, “Sin is revealed in its own act to be attack upon God, 
and to be something from which God turns away his face in judgment.”
38
 The former 
concerns humankind’s rebellion against God and the latter indicates that God’s 
sentence on rebellion makes it guilt. Torrance particularly uses the concept of guilt to 
make it clear that sin “is judged and qualified as sin by God…precisely by the act of 
God’s resistance to it.”
39
 As God judges the rebellion as sin and resists and rejects it, 
sin becomes guilt. This implies that “Sin is only possible in the presence of God.”
40
 
Therefore, it is sin and guilt (that is, rebellion and judgement - not just the former) that 
separate humankind from God. It is this “dual nature of the conflict” which marks out 
the fundamentally relational nature and essence of sin.  
The dual nature of the conflict further points to “the double change in attitude” 
that causes humankind and God to each become hostile to each other.
41
 For 
                                                 
37
 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP, 2008), 248. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP, 2008), 246. Here Torrance particularly appeals to Kierkegaard’s 
understanding of the God-forsakenness conveyed by the cry of Jesus Christ on the Cross, “My 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP, 2008), 252. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP, 2008), 252. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP, 2008), 248. 
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humankind, the awful fact of sin is that “we resist God and are resisted by God.”
42
 
Torrance emphasizes that the “real ‘change’ in God’s mind and attitude toward 
man…constitutes the innermost gravity of sin”.
43
 While the brokenness of the God-
human fellowship is initiated by rebellious human beings, it is dreadfully finalized by 
God in wrath and sinful human beings have no way in themselves of getting close 
again to restore the relationship. God’s condemnation seals the utter brokenness rather 
decisively. 
The plight of humankind, as Torrance sees it therefore, is doomed by a two-
sided brokenness. On the one hand, sinful humankind faces a “constitutive change” of 
existence because the very foothold of humanity, its relation to God, has been 
destroyed. Their corruption is “not incidental or accidental” but “is constitutive and 
now has to do with the very existence of human being as such.”
44
 Human beings’ total 
depravity therefore refers primarily to a “contradiction to God at the basis of human 
existence.”
45
 On the other hand, fallen human beings are powerless to save themselves 
from such a predicament. This is because they “cannot escape out of their self-will”
46
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP, 2008), 112.  
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP, 2008), 252. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP, 2008), 253. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP, 2008), 253. 
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when rebellion characterizes their very existence in relation to God. “The more they 
strive in their self-will to save themselves, the more they sin”.
47
 In addition, their 
hopeless situation is also determined by God’s judgment. As God has judged sin as 
guilt, guilt now “belongs unalterably to the past” and “determines the existence of 
every human being in the present.”
48
 On top of human beings’ radical alienation, 
God’s radical rejection seals their hopeless plight. Therefore sinners exist “under the 
threat of destruction not only from the inherent negation of evil but from the negation 
of it through the divine judgment.”
49
 This double threat causes all the anxieties and 
disorders of our life.
50
  
3.2.2 Atonement – Reconciliation between God and Humanity 
through Christ’s Mediation 
 
Atonement is the key word employed by Torrance to talk about the saving work of 
Christ. In line with his understanding of the human plight, he interprets atonement as 
reconciliation through the mediation of a Christ who works on both God’s side and 
our side to restore the unity of God and humanity. In Torrance’s soteriology the 
mediatory work of Christ is wonderfully illustrated by a series of twofold themes. 
Here we summarize four of them that help us to approach the implications of Christ’s 
reconciliation for anthropology.  
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Downers Grove: IVP, 2008), 254. 
49
 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP, 2008), 243. 
50
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3.2.2.1 The Twofold Obedience of Christ 
First of all, the heart of Christ’s mediatory work is obedience. This has both passive 
and active elements and Torrance is highly appreciative here of Reformed teaching 
about the twofold obedience of Christ. He interprets Christ’s passive obedience as “the 
submission of Jesus Christ to the judgment of the Father upon the sin”, “his willing 
acceptance of the divine verdict” which he endured in his passion. 
51
 His active 
obedience is “the positive fulfillment of God’s saving will in the whole life of Jesus in 
his sonship”, his maintaining from the beginning to the end “a perfect filial relation to 
the Father in which he yielded to him a life of utter love and faithfulness, and in which 
he received and laid hold of the love of the Father.”
52
 His twofold obedience gives us 
the necessary further light with which to comprehend the two sides (divine and human) 
to Christ’s humiliation and sacrifice. While his sacrificial death is a transcendent act of 
humiliation by God, it is also an earthly act of human humiliation. On the one hand, 
Jesus Christ as the Son of God lays aside his divine majesty and glory to endure death 
on the cross. On the other hand, he as man and “in the form of man” submits to the 
creaturely estate under the judgment of the law even to the point of death on the 
cross.
53
 The transcendent act of humiliation on the part of God “has its counterpart 
even within his earthly and human existence as Jesus bent to shoulder the cross and 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP, 2008), 80-81. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP, 2008), 80. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP, 2008), 75. 
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died in humiliation upon it”
54
 These two types of humiliation underlie and are the 
backdrop to the passive and the active content of Christ’s obedience, and it is this 
twofold obedience that fulfills God’s redemptive purpose. 
3.2.2.2 The Twofold Faithfulness of Christ 
Secondly, Christ’s twofold obedience signifies and is lived out in the twofold 
faithfulness from both the divine and the human side. Torrance declares that Christ 
embodied at one and the same time the “faithfulness of the divine truth and love” and 
the “faithfulness of a [human] life wholly obedient to the Father.”
55
 The former speaks 
of God’s “affirming and consummating love of union with men and women even in 
the fire of the divine wrath” and the latter of the “utter and absolute reliance” of 
humanity upon God.
56
 From God’s side, Christ’s faithfulness reveals God’s 
steadfastness of love and grace even in judgment. From the human side, Christ’s 
faithfulness steadfastly carries out the life of obedience and confidence in the Father 
that enables him as the son of man to call upon God in trust.
57
 Through his twofold 
faithfulness Christ reveals that the atonement is significant for both God and human 
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3.2.2.3 The Twofold Righteousness of Christ 
Thirdly and most significantly, the twofold obedience and faithfulness of Christ 
accomplish the twofold righteousness that Christ achieved for humanity, the negative 
righteousness of remission of sins and the positive righteousness of a perfect human 
life of obedience and love. Torrance argues that negative righteousness is 
accomplished by Christ’s death on the cross and positive righteousness is fulfilled by 
“his obedient and loving life lived in perfect filial relation on earth to the heavenly 
Father.”
59
 As the divine sacrifice without blemish Christ paid the price of sin to fulfill 
the forensic and judicial element in righteousness. As the perfect man, he lived out the 
right relationship with God to fulfill the requirement of positive human righteousness. 
The former fulfilled God’s righteousness in judgment. The latter achieved 
righteousness in actual human flesh. Both aspects of Christ’s righteousness are 
necessary for the justification of humanity before God, for as Torrance emphasizes, 
justification “means not simply the non-imputation of our sins through the pardon of 
Christ, but positive sharing in his human righteousness.”
60
  
3.2.2.4 The Twofold Reconciling Movement 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP, 2008), 81, italics added. 
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Finally, reconciliation between God and humankind is actualized by Christ through a 
double movement rather than a single one. Torrance depicts it as a movement “of 
God’s faithful seeking and assuming of man back again into fellowship and of man’s 
faithful return in Christ to God and complete dependence upon him.”
61
 Reconciliation 
is indeed like Jesus’ teaching in the parable of the prodigal son: the returning son is 
reunited with and fully restored by his welcoming father.
62
 In his life and death Christ 
achieved both dimensions or sides of the reconciling act at one and the same time. His 
atonement is a unity of the divine act and the human act. Torrance concludes:  
The significance of atonement lies not merely in that Jesus Christ as man 
offered a perfect sacrifice to God, nor does it lie merely in that God here 
descended into our bondage and destroyed the powers of darkness, sin, death, 
and the devil, but that here in atonement God has brought about an act at once 
from the side of God as God, and from the side of man as man: an act of real 
and final union between God and man. Atonement means that God’s action 
was translated into terms of human action, for only in so doing does it reach 
men and women and become relevant to them as saving act; but it remains 
God’s action, for only so does it touch and lay hold of them, and raise them up 




It is on the ground of all these twofold actions and their meaning that Torrance affirms 
Christ as the Mediator. He declares that “As both God of God and Man of man Jesus 
Christ is the actual Mediator between God and man and man and God in all things, 
even in regard to space-time relations.”
64
 “Atonement is real and actual only if and as 
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3.2.3 Vicarious Humanity (II) – Christ as the Vicarious Human Being 
Living out the Life of Perfect Obedience to God 
 
Although again Christ’s being and work cannot be neatly separated, the second part of 
Christ’s vicarious humanity, on his work, now emerges more from Torrance’s 
soteriology: Christ vicariously lives out in his human life the perfect obedience of 
humankind to God. Torrance emphasizes that “We are saved not only by the death of 
Christ which he suffered for our sakes but by his vicarious life which he lived for our 
sakes.”
66
 That is to say, before Christ died his redemptive death, he first lived out a 
perfect human life in our place. His atoning work must include his living for us. With 
regard to the substance of Christ’s saving work, while it is the moment on the cross 
that shows the climax of his passive obedience, the whole course of his life as a man 
shows his perfect active obedience to God. The latter, as well as the former, 
constitutes a vital and necessary part of salvation for if the vicarious life of Christ is 
neglected, “then not only do the active and passive obedience of Christ fall apart but 
we are unable to understand justification in Christ as anything more than a merely 
external forensic non-imputation of sin.”
67
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For Torrance, justification must not be understood simply as the forgiveness of 
sin in terms of a judicial pronouncement but as having to deal with the problem of sin 
itself, of undoing the rebellion with which humankind sins against God. Otherwise 
humanity would not really be sanctified from sin. Torrance asserts that the sanctifying 
process takes place not elsewhere but in Christ, who was born, crucified, resurrected 
and ascended on our behalf. In his vicarious humanity, Christ “sanctified what he 
assumed [i.e. our fallen humanity] through his own self-consecration as incarnate Son 
to the Father, and in sanctifying it brought the divine judgment to bear directly upon 
our human nature both in the holy life he lived and in the holy death he died.”
68
 His 
vicarious acts fulfilled both the sanctification of our humanity and the righteousness of 
God’s judgment. It is in this fulfilled sense that humanity is regenerated and we are 
renewed. It is the resurrection which signifies God’s complete approval of regenerated 
humanity and the ascension which points to the final destiny of humankind. And it is 
in both together that the significance of the statement, “the unassumed is the 
unredeemed”
69
 is seen in the final redemption of the assumed. 
It is apparent that the significance of Christ’s vicarious humanity is just as 
great in his doing as that in his being, and just as the incarnation provides a rich source 
of direct knowledge about humanity, so likewise does the atonement.  In the following 
section therefore, we will examine it also in greater depth from the ontological, 
relational and dynamic perspectives. 
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3.2.3.1 The Ontological Content of the Atonement 
First of all, the atonement is the ontological rebirth of humanity, an “internal” 
justification and sanctification of human nature which restores it in its innermost being 
to true righteousness and holiness. Here the word “ontological” does mean “by nature” 
or “in nature”. In Torrance’s view, the “most fundamental truth” of God’s salvation is 
“the coming of God to save us in the heart of our fallen and depraved humanity”.
70
 
That is, Christ assumed corrupt human nature in order to work out our sanctification 
from within it. While humanity had been corrupted by willful disobedience, Christ 
reversed that by his active obedience. Such obedience is not something that could be 
presupposed or taken for granted even in his humanity, but was a hard battle that 
Christ had to fight and learn throughout the whole course of his life. Christ “learned 
obedience by the things which he suffered; …it had to be fought out with strong 
crying and tears and achieved in desperate anguish and weakness under the crushing 
load of the world’s sin and the divine judgment.”
71
 In other words, Christ has the same 
mind and soul that we do and faced the same temptations and struggles just like us, but 
he nevertheless overcame all the temptations and struggles by his active response to 
God in obedience throughout his whole life. His doing so is not merely exemplary but 
vicarious and in this he took to himself and appropriated our fallen humanity from 
within. The effect is not external but internal, that is, ontological. Moreover, the 
ontological character of Christ’s appropriation of our fallen humanity is reinforced by 
the fact that Christ himself embodies the atonement. Torrance points out that Christ is 
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not simply the agent mediating between God and humankind but that as the Mediator 
he “embodies what he mediates in himself.”
72
  He is actually the “very matter and 
substance” of the mediation.
73
 The oneness and identity of the Mediator and his 
Mediation secures the nature of his atoning work as ontological rather than 
instrumental. It is these two layers of the ontological meaning of Christ’s atonement 
that together help us to understand it as recorded in 2 Corinthians 5.21: “For our sake 
he made him to be sin who knew no sin, so that in him we might become the 
righteousness of God.” (NRSV) 
3.2.3.2 The Relational Content of the Atonement 
Second, the atonement affirms the responsibility of humanity in the relational 
reconciliation between God and humankind. With regard to Christ’s life, the focus 
falls on his obeying God as a man. His action of obedience is simply the proper, active, 
human response to God and Torrance emphasizes that we must “think of the whole 
life and activity of Jesus from the cradle to the grave as constituting the vicarious 
human response” to God.
74
 Christ embodied not only “our questions to God and God’s 
answers to us”, but also “God’s questions to us and true answers from us to God”.
75
 
That is to say, alongside the initiating movement from God’s side, atonement also 
contains a responding movement from the human side. Although humanity can in no 
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way save itself from its total depravity, the duty of humanity to actively respond to 
God must be affirmed as a constitutive element of atonement. Without this element the 
atonement would become God’s one-sided forensic pardon of sin, but not that mutual 
reconciliation in the relationship of God and humanity which necessarily requires 
repentance and correction from the human side. To put it even more briefly, the 
responsibility of humanity does matter for reconciliation and salvation and this is what 
Christ reveals in his life.
76
  
However, this two-sided and interactive relationship between God and 
humanity is not an abstract relation but acutely personal in Christ. In contrast to the 
normal dual logic of two parties in relation, the God-human relationship in Christ is 
hypostatic, unitary in one person. The two natures in the person of Christ are not 
separate from each other as two individual subjects, but are united as one acting 
subject. This rules out any over-emphasis on Christ’s humanity as if he undertook his 
human responsibility as an individual in his own strength. What he did vicariously for 
and within humanity he always did in the personal union of his human with his divine 
nature. This means for us that “the relation which obtains in faith…is not just a logical 
relation, but a profounder relation of personal intercourse or communication or even 
incorporation with Christ”.
77
 If this acutely personal element is missing, faith would 
become illogical. 
3.2.3.3 The Dynamic Content of the Atonement 
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For Torrance, “all the ingredients and features of God’s atoning work are knit together 
in one dynamic whole.”
78
 On one level, this means that Christ’s atoning work is a 
continuous movement that “takes place from Jesus’s birth throughout his life and 
ministry and comes to its apex in the atoning reconciliation in the cross and 
resurrection and ascension.”
79
  During the whole time he lived as a man, Christ offered 
himself moment by moment as a sinless sacrifice before God to redeem our sin. The 
price for that redemption was “a continuous vicarious sacrifice” that Christ began to 
pay “from the very beginning of his incarnate existence”.
80
 At a deeper level, Christ’s 
atoning work contains a double dynamic (described as substitution and incorporation) 
between his reality and our reality.
81
 Substitution is the exchange of what Christ 
accomplished for what we failed to do. Christ has fulfilled human faithfulness in our 
stead and his faithfulness is substituted for our unfaithfulness. His faithfulness not 
only sets us an example but becomes ours. Incorporation is the mutual participation of 
Christ and us. On the one hand, every action that Christ did is an action of uniting 
himself with us. His death, for instance, is his participation in our death. Christ died, 
not only to pay the wages of sin for us, but to participate and share in our actual 
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human death and so come into utter solidarity with us. On the other hand, we are 
incorporated into Christ through faith. Due to the vicarious nature of Christ’s 
humanity, we can find ourselves in Christ and participate in his life, death, 
resurrection and ascension. By this we are not only redeemed, healed and renewed but 
also exalted with him into eternity to share the life of God. The double dynamics of 
substitution and incorporation together secure the promised reality and fruit of Christ’s 
atonement for humankind.  
3.2.4 The Destiny of Humanity – Being Brought into Union with God 
in Christ 
 
In Torrance’s theology, the vicarious humanity of Christ reveals our final destiny of 
being brought into union with God and sharing His life. As the one for all, Christ 
ascended to God the Father, not just himself, but for us too and on our behalf. 
Salvation finds its consummation far beyond the forgiveness of sin in the exaltation of 
humanity to God. While Christ’s resurrection confirms our renewal and restoration, 
his ascension seals our ultimate destiny. The ascended Christ continues his work of 
uniting our humanity with God in his one person and presenting us vicariously before 
Him, so that “we are gathered up in him and included in his own self-presentation 
before the Father”.
82
 In other words, the ascension is not merely about the incarnate 
Son returning back to the Father but about the vicarious human being going up to God 
in eternity. Our very humanity is thus exalted with Christ into eternity and is united in 
fellowship with God forever.  
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In thinking about such a lofty destiny for humanity, we need to notice three 
things. First, Christ’s atonement establishes an intrinsic unity with God that extends 
well beyond the restoration of any external harmony in the God-human relationship. It 
reinforces the atonement as a complete reconciliation in which “God and man are not 
simply brought near each other” but in Christ “God and man become one for all 
eternity.”
83
 Second, this unity signals not only the divine-human co-existence in Christ 
but also the mutual participation in which humanity can even share God’s life and 
glory. In Torrance’s words, reconciliation “means much more than the reconstituting 
of relations between man and God, though it certainly means that”; it “means that men 
and women are savingly reconciled to God by being taken up in and through Christ to 
share in the inner relations of God’s own life and love.”
84
 Third, humanity now finds 
its life and being in God rather than in itself. As “we are enfolded within the infinite 
dimensions of the love of God”,
85
 humanity enjoys a completely new relationship with 
God. This relationship is only found in the divine Being and is nothing else but the 
communion within the Trinity. Reconciliation must therefore be understood as 
meaning nothing less than that God “draws [humanity] within the embrace of the 
eternal Communion of love which God is in himself.”
86
 This is the final dimension of 
Torrance’s understanding of human salvation and makes the knowledge of humanity 
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ontologically grounded on knowledge of the Trinity. We will focus on this theme in 
the next chapter. 
 
3.3 Critique – Anthropology in Christology and Soteriology 
 
 
In Torrance’s Christology and soteriology Christ reveals not only the saving God but 
also the saved humanity. We see the former in his identity as the incarnate God and 
the latter in his identity as the vicarious man. Christ thus discloses immediate 
knowledge of who we are and will be. Such disclosure concerns our existence directly. 
In this sense, knowledge of Christ is existential knowledge of humankind, but 
Torrance’s idea differs from anthropocentric existentialism
87
. Without separating our 
existence from Christ’s revelation, Torrance’s anthropology is by nature not existence-
centered but revelation-centered, i.e. Christ-centered. His Christocentrism sets him in 
opposition to those theologians who think in terms of anthropocentric existentialism. 
In order to see the Christocentric character of Torrance’s thought more clearly, we will 
make some comparative observations on him and Rudolf Bultmann. 
3.3.1 In comparison with Bultmann 
 
As is well known, Bultmann is famous for his demythologizing and 
existentialist interpretation of the New Testament.
88
 He objects to proclaiming the 
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“mythical” stories of Jesus, such as the incarnation and resurrection. He also has little 
interest in the historical Jesus with whom the mythical stories are associated. Focusing 
on our existence here and now, Bultmann argues that the historical Jesus is only 
meaningful to those first disciples who had personal interaction with him. Since that 
personal connection cannot be reproduced in our life, “who Jesus is” in history is not 
important for us. In particular, Bultmann points out that the “myth” of Jesus’ birth 
makes no sense to modern people who do not think mythically. Christian faith cannot 
be grounded on the confession of any mysterious identity of Christ.
89
 
Anthropologically speaking, Bultmann and Torrance are in stark contrast to each other 
when they interpret human plight, human relationship with God, and the realization of 
human salvation. 
3.3.1.1 The Human Plight – What Is the Relational Problem?  
                                                                                                                                            
existentialist perspective Bultmann raises a “decisive question” for theology; “whether 
precisely this salvation event, which is presented in the New Testament as a mythical 
occurrence, or whether the person of Jesus, which is viewed in the New Testament as a 
mythical person, is nothing but mythology. Can there be a demythologizing interpretation that 
discloses the truth of the kerygma as kerygma for those who do not think mythologically?” In 
his eyes, mythologies “do not have their point in their objectifying representations” and do 
indeed need such demythologizing. (New Testament and Mythology and Other Basic Writings, 
ed. Schubert Ogden, London: SCM, 1985, 14 & 15) 
89
 Walter Schmithals interprets it like this: “Jesus is acknowledged to be the Christ, the pre-
existent, incarnate and risen Lord, because his cross has been experienced as saving event, and 
not vice versa.” (An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, translated by John 
Bowden, London: SCM, 1968, 140) The mysterious identity of Christ is also depicted by the 
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incarnation. As Bultmann understands it, “The fact of Christ’s pre-existence, so understood, 
does not make faith in the crucified easier (as if the assertion of the cross’s salvation-
significance would be credible, once it were recognized that it was precisely the pre-existent 
Son of God who died on the cross) but itself becomes a ‘scandalous’ and ‘foolish’ matter of 
faith at one with the ‘word of the cross.’” (Theology of the New Testament, vol.1, translated by 
Kendrick Grobel, London: SCM, 1952, 304) 
 98 
A fundamental issue of anthropology is about the human plight. Christian 
anthropology not only needs to give it a correct explanation, but also aims at 
expounding its solution. Bultmann perceives the human plight as being that 
humankind has fallen victim to this world. In his eyes, this world is one “of transience 
and of death” and no longer God’s creation.
90
 “God stands over against the world” as 
the “wholly other”, and human beings are victims of the world since they submit to its 
power.
91
  As victim, humanity loses its radical openness for the future, i.e. the 
possibility of change and becoming. According to Bultmann, human existence means 
an ability to become. The situation is that, “the being of man is removed from his own 
control, it is risked continually in the concrete situations of life and goes through 
decisions in which man does not choose something for himself, but chooses himself as 
his possibility.”
92
 Once submitted to the power of the world, human beings surrender 
themselves as the only possibility of change and becoming and cannot be open to the 
future any more. In this specific sense of openness and possibility, human beings “cut 
[themselves] off from encounter with God”
93
 and their hearts become darkened, cut 
off from the light of God.  Correspondingly, salvation means to save human victims 
out of the bondage of this world, so that they may once again “open [themselves] 
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freely to the future.”
94
 It is apparent that Bultmann finds the primary problem of 
humankind to be their relationship with the world. The plight of humanity is caused by 
the comfortless relation of human enslavement to the world which results in human 
estrangement from God. As the third party, God is involved in this relation only 
indirectly and distantly. He is more of “the future” which humankind needs to reach 
rather than the present help to which humankind may appeal for rescue. In other words, 
God is the prospective goal, not the immediate solution. 
Torrance sees the problem quite differently. In his eyes, the human plight is 
caused, determined and defined by human’s relationship with God rather than with the 
world. As observed in the previous section, he explains that fallen humankind is 
hopeless in the face of the dual threat from evil and from God. While we cannot 
escape from doing evil in rebelling against God, we pitifully find no way to escape 
from God’s judgment. The misery of human life comes from nothing but this broken 
and disastrous relation between God and humankind. This primary relational problem 
occurs first and leads to the other relational issues such as our twisted relationship 
with the world. Salvation must therefore first deal with the God-human relationship 
and the reconciliation of humankind back to God. It must also be from God who alone 
is able to remove the dual threat facing humanity and who has revealed and 
accomplished His salvation through incarnation. The incarnate God is thus the real and 
only solution.  
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Obviously, Torrance would not agree with Bultmann in regarding humankind 
as the victim of the corrupted creation. The truth of humanity’s plight is not that 
human beings are oppressed and enslaved by the world which somehow has become 
corrupted and is no longer the creation of God. On the contrary, it is human beings 
rebelling against and alienating themselves from God that corrupts God’s creation and 
causes other problems. So Torrance would also disagree with Bultmann in regarding 
the misery of humankind merely as the loss of possibilities. That is to say, the 
authentic existence of humankind does not mean “an ability to be” (or “an ability to 
become”) and “openness to the future” through bondage-free self-decision (choosing 
oneself as one’s possibility). On the contrary, it means that one’s condition of life 
should not be self-determined but should be determined by the God-human 
relationship in both present and future. The fundamental reason for our destruction 
resides in the judgment from God rather than in the transience and death found in this 
world. Without doubt, Torrance penetrates to the root of humanity’s plight. His 
interpretation based on the God-human relation is deeper than Bultmann’s 
interpretation based on the world-human relation. 
3.3.1.2 The Human Relationship with God – What Is the Ontological Foundation?  
These different understandings of the human plight reflect different perceptions of the 
second issue, the human relationship with God. We may see these more clearly from 
considering Bultmann and Torrance’s differing interpretation of the revelation of 
Christ.  
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Bultmann argues that “the Revelation is no worldly occurrence, but an other-
worldly one.”
95
 He calls Jesus Christ “the revealer”
96
 and maintains that all the 
miraculous works of Jesus “are remarkable occurrences” which make the activity of 
the revealer “a disturbance of what is familiar to the world.”
 97
 In his eyes, the 
incarnation is not the self-revelation of God but a “paradoxical way” in which “the 
claim of revelation sounds loud and clear”.
98
 It basically means God’s sending a 
revealer to perform the saving act and make the divine act audible and visible. This act 
takes place only on the cross. As for the miracle of God made flesh, it “is not visible 
or ascertainable like worldly events.”
99
 So likewise is the miracle of resurrection. 
Therefore only the crucifixion can really define Jesus’ identity. The whole New 
Testament is about the crucified one who is proclaimed as the Christ and Lord.
100
 
Moreover, for Bultmann, revelation ultimately conveys only knowledge of the world 
and of the human self but not the knowledge of God. Although he occasionally admits 
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that God’s reality and love become visible and tangible in Jesus, more often he argues 
that Jesus “has imparted no information about God at all, any more than he has 
brought instruction about the origin of the world or the fate of the self.”
101
 The divine 
revelation discloses nothing new but who we already are authentically.
102
 As 
Bultmann focuses on “anthropocentric” revelation, he also asserts that revelation is 
authenticated not by God’s incarnation, but by believers’ recognition and 




We find that Bultmann’s interpretation of Christ’s revelation has little to do 
with the God-human relation directly, let alone with relational reconciliation. 
Indirectly, we can see that he views the relationship of humankind to God through a 
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dualistic framework of the world vis-a-vis a God who stands over against this world as 
the “wholly other”. It is this dualistic presupposition which makes Bultmann regard 
revelation as also other-worldly. For him, the whole story is about God’s sending a 
revealer from the other world and our recognizing him in this world. And the relation 
we find is one of a dualistic confrontation not only between God and the world but 
between Christ’s revelation and our recognition of it. While God initiates sending and 
revealing from the divine side, we confront that and respond to it with 
acknowledgment or denial from the worldly side. Neither side can complete the 
revelation on their own. In this picture, Christ is defined only by his functional role 
and not by his ontological being. To God, he is the one sent by Him to perform 
judgement. To the world and humankind, he is the one crucified and proclaimed as 
Lord. As for whether he is of divine or human nature, it does not matter nor can it be 
verified. Actually it is impossible to identify him in terms of his nature for oddly 
enough he somehow straddles two sides which contradict each other in dualistic 
tension. There is reason to believe that this explains why Bultmann in his theology 
ignores the importance of both the miracle-doing Jesus and the historical Jesus. 
Compared to Bultmann, Torrance depicts a totally different picture of Christ’s 
revelation. He also unfolds a new understanding of the God-human relationship which 
completely reverses the dualistic one and is in fact diametrically opposite to that of 
Bultmann. Torrance does assert the brokenness of the relationship between God and 
humankind after the Fall. But as mentioned already, he believes that the plight of 
humankind is due to nothing else but our alienation from God and God’s resistance to 
us which together separate humankind from God by an awful gulf. Nevertheless, 
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Torrance perceives that this broken relationship does not confine Christ but is what 
Christ works upon and inverts or reverses. Torrance especially calls our attention to 
the fact that the revelation of Christ not only conveys the message of God’s saving us 
by reversing the broken relation but actually is the relational reversion. This points to 
the innermost core of his Christology and soteriology, that it is the personal being of 
Christ himself which is the ontological foundation for salvation in terms of restoring 
the God-human relationship. For Torrance, the incarnation sets the cornerstone for 
revelation, and the hypostatic union defines “the heart of Reconciliation and its full 
substance”.
104
 The incarnation literally means God’s breaking into human existence 
and becoming a human being, Jesus the Nazarene. In Jesus, God did not merely live 
alongside people within history but even acted as man to recreate humanity from 
within. The hypostatic union demonstrates God’s overcoming the gulf to establish in 
Christ a unitary relationship with humankind. It reverses any concept of a dualistic 
relationship so thoroughly that God and humanity even become one in the one person 
of Christ. This is what Torrance sees in the revelation of Christ and this is why he 
claims that the hypostatic union is “the immediate ground for all Christ’s mediatorial 
and reconciling activity in our human existence.” 
105
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This revelation further implies that our relationship with God is found in our 
relationship with Christ. On the one hand, Christ himself is God. There is no other 
God behind Christ, so how we relate to Christ is identical to how we relate to God. 
Moreover, Christ is the one human for all. We find ourselves in him.
106
 How he relates 
to God in his vicarious humanity determines how we relate to God. These two 
dimensions of deity and vicarious humanity doubly confirm the person of Christ as the 
ontological foundation of the God-human relationship. He is not just the revealer who 
is the instrument of revelation; he is himself the revelation who directly embodies the 
God-human reconciliation. This conviction shines through Torrance’s Christology and 
soteriology in complete and striking distinction from Bultmann’s anthropocentric 
account of revelation.  
3.3.1.3 The Fulfillment of Human Salvation – What Is Its Dynamic Essence? 
The revelation of Christ brings about the salvation of humankind. In what sense does 
salvation become fulfilled? This question becomes another division between Bultmann 
and Torrance.  
Bultmann’s answer corresponds to his teachings about the identity of Christ, 
the God-world relationship and the substance of revelation. He regards salvation as 
fulfilled in terms of God fully revealing His judgment on the world. The cross visibly 
manifests God’s condemnation of this world and thus makes human beings of the 
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world see themselves clearly and ask no more questions.
107
 The compelling act of 
God’s judgment compels them to make a final decision, i.e. to surrender to God or to 
the world.
108
 As long as one chooses to surrender to God, judgment becomes salvation, 
otherwise it becomes condemnation. It is in this sense that “Revelation has taken place 
once for all in the full historical appearance of a man, so that death and life for all are 
decided for ever in men’s attitude to him.”
109
 To a certain degree, salvation is nothing 
other than the condemnation. If something has been accomplished in the perfect tense, 
it cannot be anything more than the judgment of God. The actual salvation of 
humanity waits for and depends on our response, and whether we are saved or not 
cannot be finalized until we have made a decision for ourselves. That is to say, the 
fulfillment of salvation contains the dynamics of God’s judging and our personal 
decision .
110
 While the former has been guaranteed by the crucifixion even in the past, 
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the latter relies on us here and now for salvation can only be in the present. Therefore 
the fulfillment of salvation cannot be affirmed in a complete sense by Christ alone. 
For Torrance, the fulfillment of salvation is one hundred percent guaranteed by 
Christ alone in his person and work. The incarnation and the hypostatic union disclose 
the fundamental content of the whole dynamics of salvation in Christ, God’s coming 
to the world and embracing humanity in Himself, and humanity’s depending on and 
acting in unity with God. The life of Christ further discloses God’s correcting of 
humanity through Christ’s active obedience. The death, resurrection and ascension of 
Christ then finally disclose God’s justifying, renewing and lifting up of humanity. All 
these dynamics have been fulfilled in the past tense in Christ, who is not only the 
incarnate God but also the vicarious man. Therefore, whether from God’s side or the 
human side, salvation has been accomplished already.  If there is still something going 
on, it is the living and unifying dynamics of the risen Christ, who continues 
representing us before God and in whom we continue participating in God’s life. In 
Torrance’s theology, the fulfillment of salvation has clearly a richer dynamic content 
that extends far beyond the rival picture of judgement from God’s side versus personal 
decision making from the human side. In Torrance the dynamic consists of the 
profound humiliation of God and the real transformation of humanity and its essence 
is the unifying movement which God executes through the incarnation. Without the 
incarnation, the inconceivable reality of the hypostatic union in Christ, salvation 
cannot even begin, let alone find its fulfillment. 
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The comparison between Bultmann and Torrance shows that what Bultmann 
demythologizes Torrance emphasizes, namely, the unique person of Christ. For 
Bultmann, the person of Christ has only an outward function as an instrument of 
revelation, and has nothing to do with the objective reality of either the revelation or 
of the salvation itself. For Torrance, Christ reveals God Himself, changes the God-
human relationship and fulfills salvation all in his own personal being. The objective 
reality of God’s revelation and of human salvation is internally secured in the person 
of Jesus. Therefore what for Bultmann is the “myth” of Christ is for Torrance just the 
“secret” of revelation and salvation. To understand revelation and salvation then 
means to recognize the secret.
111
  
This helps us to see more clearly the Christocentrism in Torrance’s Christology 
and soteriology. For Torrance, Christocentric epistemology pivots upon the person of 
Christ. Jesus Christ per se is the revelation and salvation of God. The validity of his 
work is determined by his unique personal identity as the God-man. His teaching, 
healing and sacrifice on the cross are salvific because he alone is the person who 
mediates. Anyone else (e.g. Peter who also taught, healed and died on a cross) cannot 
make the same works salvific. While Christ’s person and work can in no way be 
separated from each other, his work depends on his person, but not the other way 
round.
112
 Therefore the meaning of the incarnation deserves our complete and 
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undivided attention. Without the incarnation, everything else, the whole saving work 
of Jesus, would lose its foundation. 
3.3.2 Torrance’s Anthropological Contribution  
 
How does Torrance contribute to theological anthropology through his Christology 
and soteriology? Perhaps the best way to begin assessing it is to view Torrance in the 
broader picture of theological tradition. We need to keep in mind that Torrance’s 
theology takes its stand on the Greek fathers’ teaching, abides by Reformed theology 
and bears the influence of Barth’s thought. But he does not merely repeat them in 
putting together a learned, recondite combination of them. His Christology and 
soteriology, though not revolutionary, are reconstructive to a highly significant degree. 
We may review them from three perspectives to discover their contribution to 
theological anthropology. 
3.3.2.1 The Direct Revelation of the Nature of Human Being  
In the debate about Christ, the Church fathers provided the fundamental concept of 
homoousion to affirm Christ as true God. This concept not only explains the 
incarnation but also defines revelation. Revelation is worthy of the name due to the 
fact that it is the self-revelation of God. With this concept, the Church fathers 
countered the heresies that denied Christ as God incarnate with true and full deity. It is 
fair to say that Christian faith and theology must take its stand on the confession of the 
homoousion. In parallel fashion, the Church fathers also asserted that Christ’s true and 
                                                                                                                                            
deity while they are integrated in one personal subject. The integrity contains a certain order. 
This is what Torrance means to say about the relation between Christ’s person and work. 
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full humanity is another necessary facet of the incarnation. God became a real man 
rather than a man-like phantom. But this facet seems not to be definitive for the notion 
of revelation, for it is Christ’s deity rather than his humanity that legitimates divine 
revelation. Therefore we usually think of Christ’s revelation as the provider of 
immediate or direct knowledge of God. As to knowledge of humankind, we often 
regard it as an inference from but not the direct content of revelation. This thinking is 
not basically wrong, but very narrow.
113
 Its consequence often manifests itself in an 
inclination to make Christology focus only on the God who is incarnate and make 
theology no more than an expounding of God’s being and doing. If we talk too much 
from the angle of humankind, we deviate from the direct revelation in Christ. This 
partially explains why “the place of anthropology in theology” can become such a 




Torrance, however, broadens our vision beyond the narrow understanding of 
revelation. He considers the revelatory significance of the homoousion to be not only 
from Christ’s deity but also from his humanity. In other words, Christ is homoousious 
with humankind also and in such a profound sense that his humanity is not just real 
but vicarious. This implies that, as the vicarious human being, Christ directly reveals 
not simply Himself as God, but himself as man and therefore reveals our human 
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 There is no intention of denying here the basic conviction of theological anthropology 
claimed in the previous chapter, that self-knowledge is reflective of God-knowledge. The 
point here falls simply on how we should observe the revelation of Christ more in the round, 
but this actually confirms the previous chapter. 
114
 Refer to the footnote 13 of the previous chapter. 
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nature and life. Our reality is by no means secondhand knowledge or an inferior 
revelation from God. It is actually also incarnate and embodied by God Himself. By 
emphasizing Christ’s vicarious humanity, Torrance helps us see that Christ is an 
immediate revelation of self-knowledge also. This marks a remarkable development 
that he has made in thought on the basis of patristic theology. He not only 
comprehended patristic teaching but explored it more deeply. While the Church 
fathers set a solid foundation for theology on Christ’s deity, Torrance went further in 
exposing the significance of Christ’s humanity. Without doubt, Torrance’s discovery 
opens a new door for theological anthropology. We may now see it more clearly from 
the following aspects. 
3.3.2.2 The Full Affirmation of Responsibility from the Human Side 
One of the controversial issues between Brunner and Barth is about the subjective 
responsibility of humankind. Brunner considers the function of intelligence positively 
in order to affirm the responsibility of humankind in their relationship to God. Barth 
opposed Brunner in order to defend the conviction that salvation is by God’s grace in 
Christ alone. To be fair, Brunner did not mean to deny the Reformed conviction of 
sola gratia and solo Christo, nor did Barth mean to reject our God-given responsibility. 
The difficulty lies in how to affirm both in the doctrine of salvation. As the 
controversy shows, Barth avoids talking about salvation from the anthropological 
angle. Except for the topic of sin, other positive discussion on human responsibility 
seems to be taboo in his soteriology. While human beings are fully responsible for sin, 
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they must be fully passive for salvation. To acknowledge any active participation from 
the human side would fail to acknowledge God’s grace as total.  
As a theologian with a deep appreciation of Barth, Torrance nevertheless broke 
this taboo. His soteriology boldly affirms the responsibility of humanity in Christ’s 
life. Due to his insight into Christ’s vicarious humanity, he saw that we are saved not 
only by Christ’s sacrifice on the cross but also by his life lived on earth as a man. The 
whole course of Christ’s life manifests a human life characterized by the movement of 
active response to God, and this life is not external to us but is our life which Christ 
lived vicariously in our place. Such an active and vicarious human life constitutes a 
necessary link in Christ’s entire revelation and salvation. If we may not ignore it, it 
follows that we must acknowledge the all important truth, that the active response 
from the human side does participate fully in God’s plan of salvation. Its surety is that 
the incarnate God has Himself confirmed, disclosed and secured it. We may thereby 
claim without reserve that according to what Christ has revealed, our active response 
does matter for salvation.  
This point reveals that salvation is not a mere remission of sin in the forensic 
sense but the real rebirth of humanity in the ontological sense. Because Christ has 
completely fulfilled all human responsibility in his vicarious human life, humanity is 
intrinsically purified and sanctified. This shows us that, as humanity must take 
responsibility for sin, salvation in Christ has indeed dealt with the problem of 
responsibility from the human side. Without affirming human responsibility explicitly 
and positively, the doctrine of salvation would hardly escape from seeing forgiveness 
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simply as God’s sentence of forgiveness bypassing human responsibility, as God’s 
waiving the judgement due to us and declaring us not guilty in the legalistic sense 
because of Christ – regardless of how greatly this might testify to God’s grace. Does 
Torrance’s soteriology violate the Reformed conviction of sola gratia and solo Christo? 
The answer must be, not at all. He does acknowledge human responsibility but his 
acknowledgement of human responsibility is of one that takes place only in Christ 
who is identified primarily as the God who is incarnate. It is this incarnate God who is 
found to be the vicarious human being rather than simply an exemplary model.
115
 In 
fact, the unique significance of the term vicarious makes us see God’s grace even 
more deeply, for his grace is so complete that God even steps down to fulfill our 
responsibility for us. In depth, such a conception of God surpasses others such as 
God’s seeking us, embracing us, paying the price of sin for us and pronouncing us free. 
We may justifiably argue that in his exposition of the grace of God Torrance has taken 
a step beyond Barth and that he provides a more balanced interpretation of sola gratia 
and solo Christo without sacrificing the necessary responsibility inherent in human 
nature. 
3.3.2.3 The New Vision of the Relationship of God and Humankind 
The relationship between God and humankind is a key issue in Christology and 
soteriology. To think the relationship in a dualistic way usually brings about difficulty 
in understanding the incarnation and incarnational salvation. Dualism makes one 
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 We should not confuse Torrance’s concept of ‘vicarious’ humanity with any kind of model 
theory which thinks of Christ just as a moral model. 
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unable to deal with the event of God really made flesh as it is. Its influence is also seen 
in the inclination to marginalize the incarnation, dislodging it from the center of the 
salvation story, or, even if the incarnation is explained properly, treating it only as a 
preparation for actual atonement. The substance of salvation then rests ultimately only 
upon the crucifixion rather than on the incarnation also. Many Reformed theologians 
have been aware of the detrimental dangers of dualism and made efforts to change 
it.
116
 In fact, Reformed theology has produced insightful teaching on the integrity of 
Christ’s being and doing which gives a clue as to how to make the change. This 
insight nevertheless does not often get unpacked nearly sufficiently. Most of the time, 
we merely acknowledge the integrity of Christ’s person and work from a surface level, 
where the act of atoning sacrifice on the cross is undertaken by God incarnate. There 
seems to be no deeper meaning with which to integrate incarnation and atonement. 
This interpretation may not be wrong but it does not completely solve the dualistic 
understanding of the God-human relationship. It explains God’s redeeming grace but 
not the necessary unitary relationship between God and humankind in Christ. 
In his Christology and soteriology, Torrance has completed the conversion in 
how we conceive the relationship. Through seeing Christ as the incarnate God who 
becomes the vicarious human being, Torrance elucidated the substantive connection 
between the incarnation and the atonement, that the “the incarnation is inherently 
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 For instance, Brunner and Barth both wanted to break the dualistic framework of “the 
subject vs. the object” when regarding the God-human relationship. They just tried different 
ways. Brunner considers both God and humankind as subjects. Barth insists on God as the 
only subject and downplays the object side, i.e. he only emphasizes knowledge of God and 
downplays knowledge of humankind. 
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atoning and the atonement is intrinsically incarnational.”
117
 That is to say, first and 
foremost, the incarnation itself reveals the substance of at-one-ment, the bringing of 
humanity into unity with God. As a result, the whole process of atonement is the 
incarnation worked out: God made flesh is not an event which took place only at the 
time of Christ’s birth but an event which is on-going throughout the entire course of 
Christ’s life, death, resurrection and ascension. At each stage, Christ acts as God-man 
concurrently in his divine and human natures united in his one person. It is the unity of 
God and humanity in his person which lies at the heart of and runs throughout the 
atonement. The dynamic conception of incarnational atonement means the complete 
abandonment of the dualistic separation between God and humankind and from 
beginning to end confirms the oneness of the new unitary God-human relationship in 
the person of Christ. The concept reverberates around Torrance’s Christocentrism 
pivoted in the person of Christ, meshing with and crystallizing his insight into Christ’s 
vicarious humanity. That is to say, the atonement is achieved not merely by but 
actually in the hypostatic union, the significance of which points beyond a static and 
isolated concept of the being of Christ to its dynamic and vicarious implications for all 
human beings. In short, Torrance locates the incarnation (i.e. the person of Christ) at 
the very centre of salvation. He is able to mine from it a deeper understanding of the 
integrity of Christ’s person and work and rejects dualism with more convincing weight. 
Anthropologically, he brings us a new vision with which to examine our humanity in 
the unitary framework of the God-human relationship founded on Christ, for in him 
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 Elmer M. Colyer, “The Incarnate Saviour: T. F. Torrance On The Atonement” in An 
Introduction To Torrance Theology (ed. Gerrit Scott Dawson, London: T&T Clark, 2007), 36. 
 116 
our relation with God has been transferred into a new category, and our human nature 
has been renewed by this new category. It is Christ’s atoning incarnation and 
incarnational atonement that has inverted the concept of a dualistic relation and in its 
place established the concept of a unitary relationship.  
Considering the three aspects together, we see that through his exposition of 
Christ and his atonement in coherence with the direct revelation of the incarnation, 
Torrance has succeeded in delivering an inspiring Christocentric anthropology. Its 
core content can be summarized like this: In salvation, human beings are brought into 
a unitary relationship with God in Christ, in which and in whom their response to God 
is one of active obedience throughout the whole course of life to the final destiny of 
union with God and participating eternally in God’s life. At the heart of such 
knowledge lies the portrayal of humanity as the unique imago Dei, distinct from other 
creatures and this interpretation revealingly uncovers the dynamic character of the 
imago. Torrance views it from the perspective of Christ’s vicarious human life rather 
than from any static conception of human being. This distinguishes it from any 
ontological interpretation derived from an anthropocentric approach and while this 
conception of the imago vigorously demands human responsibility, it does not credit 
human beings with having any intrinsic properties of the imago. The so-called 
“remnant imago” finds no foothold in them. Nevertheless this imago does have 
ontological validity and material relevance for all human beings because Christ has 
achieved it, not just as an example but vicariously. The impact of this is the inspiring 
truth that being the imago Dei is not merely the goal we must make an effort to 
achieve through following Christ, but is actually the destiny that has already been 
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fulfilled and confirmed for us in him. It is knowledge of this destiny that impels us 
moment by moment to follow Christ as in him we respond to God in active obedience 




To summarise the discussion above, we may conclude that Torrance’s Christology and 
soteriology demonstrate a clear inheritance from the patristic confession, Reformed 
teaching and Barthian Christocentric conviction. Torrance has succeeded in 
comprehending the essence of all three and developing his own further interpretation 
of Christ. In his interpretation, Christ is not only the incarnate God but also the 
vicarious human being. He is himself the mediation between God and humankind and 
as the mediator works from both sides. The incarnation defines salvation as being 
fundamentally the complete reconciliation of God and humankind in the full 
restoration of the relationship between them. The atonement goes well beyond the 
forensic remission of sin and signifies, together with the incarnation, the ontological 
regeneration of humanity. Salvation points finally to the exaltation of humanity into 
relational union with God. All of these are embodied in the person of Christ and 
fulfilled by his death and his life, his whole life, death, resurrection and ascension. In 
him we see the reality of God as well as the reality of humanity. Jesus himself is the 
revelation of both. 
The most distinctive insight in Torrance’s Christology and soteriology is the 
vicarious humanity of Christ. Through expounding the whole vicarious nature of 
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Christ’s humanity, Torrance brought to light the atoning significance of Christ’s 
human life and uncovered the real meaning of God’s act of saving humanity out of sin. 
This insight enables us to fully acknowledge the active responsibility of humanity in 
the doctrine of salvation without diminishing God’s grace. It also convincingly rejects 
the dualistic view of our relationship with God by changing our abstract concept of the 
God-human relationship for the personal one found in Christ in the hypostatic union. 
Most meaningfully, it provides a direction for theological anthropology, one built 
upon the immediate revelation of God. As Jesus Christ is not only a real and perfect 
human being but the vicarious human being, we may confidently see ourselves in him 
rather than just see him as an external model for us. Without this conviction, we can 
hardly have any real confidence to declare the objective fulfillment of our salvation. 
As God has achieved and embodied in Himself the knowledge of our human reality 
and destiny, we may confidently affirm the place of positive anthropological 
knowledge in theocentric theology. Without this confidence, we will miss the deepest 
meaning of the inseparable unity between God-knowledge and self-knowledge. In 
these terms, Torrance has made a significant reconstructive contribution to theological 
anthropology. Does this reconstruction contain any flaw? Yes, as we will observe 




Torrance’s Doctrine of the Trinity                                   
in Anthropological Perspective 
 
 
As a Reformed theologian indebted to Calvin, Torrance is convinced that self-
knowledge is reflexive of God-knowledge.
1
 He asserts, “Calvin laid it down from the 
very start that there can be no true knowledge of man except within our knowledge of 
God.”
2
 That is to say, the doctrine of humanity is not only subordinate to, but is also 
contained within the doctrine of God. Why so? He explains,  
Man is a creature in total dependence of being, and motion, and life, upon the 
gracious will of God. He is created out of nothing, and has neither origin nor 
being in himself, but is given being, and maintained in being, by the grace of 
God. In relation to God, therefore, man is only an image. That is to say, his life 
is absolutely reflexive of the action of God, and can be lived only in a motion 
of continued reflection. This is a very important point in the Reformed doctrine 
of man, for it is just here that a decisive break is made with the Aristotelian 
man of scholastic theology, in which the living, dynamic relation of man to 




It is clear for Torrance that knowledge of humanity as the imago Dei is thoroughly 
dependent upon knowledge of the Trinitarian God. Since humankind is only an image 
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 This was discussed in Chapter 2 on Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, e.g. in the chart in section 
2.1.3. Torrance makes it clear right at the very beginning of the book, that “Man’s true 
knowledge of himself is reflexive of his knowledge of God.” (Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, 
London: Lutterworth, 1949, 13) This is the basic rationale for Torrance’s theological 
anthropology. 
2
 Thomas F. Torrance, Theology In Reconstruction (London: SCM, 1965), 99, italics added. 
3
 Thomas F. Torrance, Theology In Reconstruction (London: SCM, 1965), 102-103, italics 
added. 
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of God, we cannot set norms for ourselves, but must follow the paradigm from the 
source. Unless we grasp the original truth grounded in God, we will not be able to 
understand ourselves correctly. This chapter will therefore focus on Torrance’s 
doctrine of God in order to unfold some principles that significantly affect his 
anthropology.  
 
4.1 The Trinitarian God 
 
Christianity believes in a Trinitarian God, i.e. the Trinity of the Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit. 
4.1.1 The Relational Being 
 
For Torrance, the doctrine of the Trinity rests upon the cornerstone of the Nicene 
homoousion. The incarnation discloses that the personal interrelations of the Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit in the economy of salvation are identical to the interrelations of 
the three Persons in the ontological deity.
4
 The homoousion “pointed to eternal 
consubstantial relations within the Trinity and thus to the consubstantiality of the 
Trinity as a whole.”
5
 Although the Trinity is ultimately a mystery beyond our 
                                                 
4
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1996), 136. For Torrance, the incarnate Son and Word is the connection between 
our epistemological knowing of God and the ontological being of God Himself. Cf. Kang 
Phee Seng, “The Epistemological Significance of homoousion in the Theology of Thomas F. 
Torrance”, Scottish Journal of Theology, vol. 45, 1992, 341-366. 
5
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 10. Following the 
Nicene tradition, Torrance distinguishes hypostasis (i.e. person) and ousia (i.e. being) and 
asserts that the three hypostases are the one ousia of God who is “perfectly homogeneous and 
unitary, both in the threeness and oneness of God’s personal activity, and in the threeness and 
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comprehension, Torrance is convinced that we can still apprehend it on the basis of the 
revelation of Jesus Christ. 
4.1.1.1 Persons in Relation 
Torrance indicates that the homoousion of the economic Trinity “refers to immanent 
personal relations in the Godhead.”
6
 It discloses a wholly new concept of person, that 
is, “the relations between the divine Persons belong to what they are as Persons – they 
are constitutive onto-relations. ‘Person’ is an onto-relational concept.”
7
 By the term 
onto-relational, Torrance emphasizes that the relations within the Godhead have 
ontologically constitutive significance for the Persons. He contends, “No divine 
Person is who he is without essential relation to the other two, and yet each divine 
Person is other than and distinct from the other two.”
8
 From all eternity, Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit subsist in utter distinction; yet who they are is defined precisely by 
their mutual relatedness. 
                                                                                                                                            
oneness of his eternal unchangeable personal Being.” (The Christian Doctrine of God: One 
Being Three Persons, 155.) 
6
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 131. 
7
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1996), 157. Torrance addresses this concept in several places in this book, for 
instance, pages 102, 124, 133, 157 and 163. Onto-relationality has been widely recognized as 
a key theme in Torrance’s Trinitarian theology. Refer to Paul D. Molnar, Thomas F. Torrance: 
Theologian of the Trinity (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 59-61.  
8
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1996), 156-157. 
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This onto-relational recognition of the divine Persons deepens and strengthens 
Torrance’s understanding of the divine Being.
9
 He points out that God has Being by 
being triune. The triune relations not only define the differentiation-and-unity of the 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit; they also disclose that God is “essentially personal, 
dynamic and relational Being.”
10
 The Trinitarian differentiation-and-unity had been 
elucidated by the Nicene theology to which Torrance subscribed. The conception of 
God as “personal, dynamic and relational Being”, however, had not yet been unfolded 
fully. This, therefore, becomes the focus of Torrance’s exploration.  
4.1.1.2 Being in Act 
As we have seen in his Christology and soteriology, Torrance emphasizes that God’s 
act and being are not separable in Christ. This emphasis is given further explanation in 
his doctrine of the Trinity.  
Firstly, Torrance reconfirms the meaning of incarnational revelation. He 
alleges that God must be known as a “dynamic personal Being, for God is who he is in 
the Act of his revelation.”
11
 The uniqueness of the incarnational revelation rests upon 
the fact that God’s revealing and God’s being emerge as one thing: the revealing 
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 By focusing on the onto-relational concept of person, Torrance shifts the traditional question 
of “What God is”, which focuses on the attributes of God, to “Who God is”, which focuses on 
the personal being of God. The former is static and the latter is dynamic. This is regarded by 
many scholars as an insightful contribution to the doctrine of God. For example, Gary Deddo 
endorses it as being “essential to giving full theological significance to the Incarnation and the 
triunity of God.” (“The realist and onto-relational frame of T. F. Torrance’s Incarnational and 
Trinitarian theology”, Theology in Scotland, volume XVI, 2011, 121.) 
10
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1996), 124. 
11
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1996), 4. 
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action itself discloses who God is. Because of the fact of the incarnation, we can no 
longer imagine a static and metaphysical God, for the concept of God cannot be 
separated from the living person of Christ, who is God incarnate. 
Secondly, Torrance appeals to the biblical revelation of God as covenant-
making. According to the Bible, God manifests Himself as the Lord who actively 
makes and maintains covenant with humankind, even renewing the covenant in the 
face of human sin. This biblical revelation obviously differs from the static 
metaphysical notion of God as contained in Greek philosophy. Torrance points out 
that the covenant history attested in the Bible shows us a living God who actively 
creates fellowship with humankind despite His transcendental self-existence. The 
being of God is “known only in the fellowship created through his personal self-
naming, self-affirming and self-giving to his people.”
12
 Therefore God should be 




Nevertheless, Torrance extends his demonstration to the level of the 
transcendent, beyond the concrete act of God in Christ and in biblical history. As a 
third point, he indicates that God’s dynamic reality is self-grounded in the immanent 
Trinity as the essential character of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit “is none other than the 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1996), 123. 
13
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1996), 124. 
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living dynamic reality of God Almighty.”
14
 It is the Spirit of God that finally signifies 
“the outgoing movement of his being whereby he makes himself open to our 
knowing”.
15
 We will come back to this point in more detail when reviewing the 
spirituality of the Trinity. 
4.1.2 The Relational Dynamics 
 
What, then, are the relational dynamics within the Trinity? In the Gospels, Torrance 
notices a double mutuality between the divine Persons, mutual knowing and mutual 
indwelling. 
4.1.2.1 Mutual Knowing 
Torrance regards Matthew 11:27 as the key evidence which “is precisely what we find 
in the evangelical account of the relation of mutual knowing between the Son and the 
Father.”
16
 In his examination, the mutual knowing “involved a mutual relation of 
being between them as well”.
17
 This is highly significant to him. He contends, 
[T]he mutual relation of knowing and being between the Father and [the Son] 
Jesus Christ constitutes the ontological ground for our knowing of God, for in 
and through it our knowledge of God the Father is objectively rooted in the 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 209.  
15
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 214.  
16
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1996), 77. The scripture passage reads, “All things have been handed over to me 
by my Father; and no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father 
except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him.” (NRSV, paralleled by 
Luke 10:22) Torrance stresses this in several of his works, such as, The Christian Doctrine of 
God, 77; The Trinitarian Faith, 58; Reality and Evangelical Theology, 111; The Doctrine of 
Jesus Christ, 44; Theology in Reconciliation, 223; Karl Barth, 214.  
17
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 58-59. 
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eternal being of God himself. … Moreover, it is on the same ground that we 
know that the Holy Spirit who comes to us from the Father through the Son, as 
the Spirit of the Father and the Son, belongs to the one being of God, for there 
is a mutual relation of knowing and being between the Spirit and the Father 




For Torrance, this mutual knowing is a crucial mark of the Trinitarian relations 
between the divine Persons. It discloses the internal knowledge of the triune being, 
and therefore secures the authenticity of the revelation. Obviously, the mutual 
knowing of the Father and Son has a primary position in Torrance’s argument. He 
emphasizes that “any prior knowledge of God which we may claim to have” must be 
“reconstructed through our sharing in the mutual knowing of the Father and the 
Son.”
19
 The reason is, that through the incarnation of the Son, God the Father 
“communicate[s] his self-revelation to us in such a way that authentic knowledge of 
God is embodied in our humanity... and understood by us.”
20
  
4.1.2.2 Mutual Indwelling 
Another dimension of the relational dynamics within the Trinity is the mutual 
indwelling of the three divine Persons. The biblical reference is from John 14:10.
21
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 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 59. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 60. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1996), 1. For this reason Torrance affirms that “we are given access to the closed 
circle of divine knowing between the Father and the Son only through cognitive union with 
Christ.” (The Trinitarian Faith, 59.) The point is, as Colyer interprets it, “the intensely 
personal self-revelation of God and the fully human understanding of that revelation coincide” 
in Christ. (How To Read T. F. Torrance: understanding his Trinitarian and scientific theology, 
Downers Grove: IVP, 2001, 66.)  
21
 The scripture reads, “Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me? The 
words that I say to you I do not speak on my own; but the Father who dwells in me does his 
works.” (NRSV) 
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Torrance approaches this biblical teaching through the idea of perichoresis as 
introduced by the Church fathers.
22
 He explains that perichoresis comes from the 
Greek term which basically means “to contain”.
23
 It discloses “the way in which the 
Persons of the Holy Trinity reciprocally contain one another while remaining what 
they are in their otherness from one another.”
24
  
Although this idea is not naturally understandable, Torrance emphasizes it as 
an important facet of the doctrine of the Trinity. He indicates, 
[The application of perichoresis in the doctrine of the Trinity] enables us to 
recognize that the coinherent relations of the Father, the Son and the Holy 
Spirit, revealed in the saving acts of God through Christ and in Spirit, are not 
temporary manifestations of God’s Nature, but are eternally grounded in the 
intrinsic and completely reciprocal relations of the Holy Trinity. In this way 
the concept of perichoresis serves to hold powerfully together in the doctrine 
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 Gregory Nazianzen first employed the term perichoresis with reference to the hypostatic 
union of Christ, i.e. how Christ’s two natures remain fully what they are while yet coinhering 
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the doctrine of divine coinherence.” (The Trinitarian Faith, 10.) 
23
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In other words, perichoresis must be recognized as a vital component of Trinitarian 
onto-relations, for it guards the indivisible unity of God. Without it, God’s united 
being and action will not be fully discovered, and we will not be able to identify the 
immanent Trinity with the economic Trinity. For Torrance, “It is precisely here that 




4.1.3 The Relational Essence 
 
In the doctrine of the Trinity, Torrance expounds the essence of the Trinitarian onto-
relations to be love and communion. He believes that both disclose the innermost 
nature of God.  
4.1.3.1 Love for Others 
Regarding the triune being of God, Torrance employs another Greek term, pros ti, 
which echoes perichoresis. He explains that the notion of pros ti indicates “the kind of 
‘for to’ relations that subsist eternally and essentially in God which are beyond all 
time, beyond all origin and beyond all causality.”
27
 The Father, Son and Holy Spirit 
are for one another, so that God’s being is “inherently altruistic, Being for other, 
Being who loves.”
28
 Therefore the Trinitarian relation is a relation of love for others. 
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This love is “a dynamic kind of love in freedom”.
29
 It tells the innermost nature of 
God. 
Torrance further points out that such a dynamic and unconditional love should 
be understood “not simply in terms of the self-grounded Being of God, but as the 
Being of God for others with whom [i.e. humankind] he seeks and creates 
fellowship.”
30
 He underlines that God loves us with the very love that God is, and that 
Christ exactly reveals. Elmer Colyer interprets Torrance’s point like this, 
[T]he self-giving love for others, the communion of love with others, the 
freedom of love to others manifested through Christ and in the Holy Spirit for 
us in the activity of the evangelical Trinity flow from and correspond to the 
self-giving, communion-creating, free-flowing love of the Father, the Son and 
the Holy Spirit for one another, the eternal love that God is. … And it is this 
free overflowing love of the Father (giving up the Son), the self-giving of the 
Son (even to death for our sins) and the self-giving of the Spirit (through 





For Torrance, the salvation effected by the economic Trinity must be the embodiment 
of the love of the immanent Trinity in our midst through the incarnation.
32
 He argues 
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that our salvation attests to the essential love of the Trinity. It shows that God does not 
stay isolated in Himself and withhold from us the eternal love that He is; on the 
contrary, God’s eternal love flows freely out to humankind.
33
 In order to bring 
humankind back to God, and enable them to participate in Himself, God even self-
surrenders to the point that the Father does not spare the Son in atoning sacrifice for 
our sins. Thereby Torrance alleges, “God has revealed that he does not keep himself to 
himself but loves us without any reserve, more, astonishingly, than he loves 
himself.”
34
 This becomes the uttermost manifestation and testimony of God’s inner 
nature as love for others. 
4.1.3.2 Communion and Coactivity 
Torrance also confirms that the triune God must be understood as Being in communion. 
If “love for others” considers the distinction of the Persons, “communion” (koinonia) 
aims at the unity of them. Torrance proclaims that, though God is three Persons, these 
Persons “are Three in One.”
35
 The personal distinction between the Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit is only known within their oneness. The oneness indicates “not simply a 
mutual indwelling and coinhering of the three persons, but also the mutual 
                                                 
33
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interrelation and interpenetration of the distinctive activities of the three persons.”
36
 
Namely, the three Persons not only love and dwell in one another but also give to and 
receive from one another. It is “in their self-giving to one another and their receiving 




Similarly, the ontological communion of the immanent Trinity is also revealed 
by the economic Trinity and here Torrance points to the coactivity of the three Persons 
in redemption. He explains that God “in the incarnate economy” has disclosed to us 
the “real objective onto-relations in the eternal movement of Love in the Communion 
of the Holy Trinity”.
38
 While the homoousion initially signifies the oneness of the 
three Persons in being, it further indicates the oneness of the three Persons in activity. 
The latter is equally important in the ontological sense, because God’s activity is 
inherent in His Being.
39
 Torrance indicates that the gospel of John in particular 
witnesses “a significant coordination and unity of Being (ousia) and Activity 
(energeia) in the Holy Trinity, from the Father, through the Son and in the Holy 
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Spirit”, which he calls “the perichoretic coactivity of the Holy Trinity”.
40
 He affirms 
that the coactivity of the three Persons in the incarnate economy of salvation is a 
necessary part of God’s self-revelation associated with the immanent communion of 
the three in the Godhead. Indeed, for Torrance, the knowledge of God “depends on the 
soteriological and ontological interconnection between the being and activity of the 
Father, of the Son and of the Holy Spirit in the economy of salvation.”
41
  
4.1.4 The Fatherhood of God and the Father-Son Relation 
 
One of the most important themes in Torrance’s doctrine of God is that God is 
primarily Father rather than Creator.
42
 Greatly indebted to Athanasius’ theology, 
Torrance more than once appeals to his statement that “it would be more godly and 
true to signify God from the Son and call him Father, than to name him from his 
works and call him Unoriginate.”
43
 Torrance strengthens this thought with his accent 
on Christocentrism. He alleges that “it is the Fatherhood of God as revealed in Jesus 
Christ [within the Father-Son relation] that determines for us precisely how we are to 
understand the nature of his divine Being.”
44
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4.1.4.1 God as Father 
Torrance points out that “Father” is a Trinitarian name of God disclosed by Christ, the 
God Son. In Christ, God personally names Himself as Father. Thus this name should 
not be a mere title or epithet, but must be a personal name which is “bound up with 
the radically new understanding of God” inherent in the very Being of the Trinity.
45
 
What does it mean? Corresponding to the onto-relational understanding of person and 
being, Torrance explains that this Trinitarian name “provides the specific personal 
content of God’s name ‘I am who I Am/I will be Who I will be’”.
46
 He argues: while 
God tells Israel about Himself as “I am who I Am/I will be Who I will be” in the Old 
Testament, the culmination of the revealing dialogue is found in God’s incarnation in 
Jesus Christ as testified by the New Testament. As God became flesh, Christ’s 
revelation of God discloses the very being of God, and not simply something about 
God on top of the Old Testament’s account. This is what the homoousion ultimately 
signifies. In other words, God is the One whom the incarnate God calls “Father”. This 
name is the name God uses to identify Himself in and through Himself.
47
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Following the Nicene confession, Torrance also affirms God to be “the Father 
almighty, the Maker of heaven and earth”. However, in his eyes, this confession does 
not diminish but reinforces God’s nature as Father rather than Creator. For it 
“deliberately gave primacy to the concept of the Fatherhood of God” indicating that 
“knowledge of God as Creator is taken from knowledge of God as Father, and not the 
other way round.”
48
 He asserts that God is the Creator of heaven and earth “only 
because God is eternally Father of the Son”.
49
 
Torrance calls our attention to the different usage of “Father” language 
nonetheless. He underlines that God’s fatherhood is defined only by the divine 
revelation, and not by our human analogy. Our perception of fatherhood when it 
comes to God must undergo a transformation from the common usage. He explains 
that the biblical use of “Father” applied to God is “utterly different from its ordinary 
use when applied to a human being.”
50
 For example, God is not like a human father 
who has a male image. This is not only because the second commandment of the 
Decalogue has clearly prohibited the creation of any image of God, but more 
importantly because the Trinitarian revelation of Christ discloses God as Spirit. Given 
that Spirit is intrinsic to God’s Being, we must understand God, the Father Almighty, 
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“in an essentially spiritual way, and of course in a completely genderless way.”
51
 
Similarly, we should not think of the Father’s begetting the Son after the analogy of 
giving birth among human beings. Actually the fact is just the opposite – “we know 
him as Father in himself in an utterly unique and incomparable way which then 
becomes the controlling standard by reference to which all notions of creaturely 
fatherhood and sonship are to be understood.”
52
  
If the content of God’s fatherhood cannot be learned from human analogies, 
where then can it be learned? Torrance’s answer is: from the Cross. Torrance views 
the Cross as the “window into the heart of God”, guiding us to see the unique fatherly 
love deep in God’s nature.
53
 He indicates, “it is in the Cross of Jesus Christ above all 
that God has both exhibited the very Nature of his Being as Love and has irrevocably 
committed his Being to relationship with us in unconditional Love.”
54
 That is to say, 
God’s fatherhood finds interpretation in Christ as unconditional and passionate love, 
and it is disclosed in its full extent on the Cross. This love is what the Bible calls 
agape. It marks the very nature of God’s being and of His relationship to humankind 
as well. This point of Torrance is noted by Colyer as the “language-molding power of 
the gospel”, i.e. the meaning of agape “is not drawn from any fatherly or motherly 
human love toward a child, but rather from the self-revelation of God’s utter self-
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giving love, especially in the cross.”
55
 This gives Torrance another reason to advocate 
that one cannot have access to the knowledge of God except on the ground of the 
atonement. 
Torrance also draws our attention to the fact that Father is a twofold 
designation. He clarifies, “Throughout the early Church the Father was understood in 
a two-fold but indivisible way, as the one being of the Godhead, and as the Father of 
the Son, whose Person is distinct from the Person of the Son and from the Person of 
the Spirit – although, of course, the one being of God is known to us only through the 
Son and in the Spirit.”
56
 This implies on the one hand that fatherhood defines the 
nature of God, and hence establishes the distinction between God and those that are 
not God; on the other hand, the fatherhood of God is defined by the ontological 
relations within the Trinity and hence indicates the personal distinction of the Father 
from the Son and Spirit. These two definitions are indivisible because the latter 
decides the former. It is the immanent Trinitarian relation that establishes our 
understanding of God as the Father, for God’s fatherhood refers to nothing outside of 
God. Our recognition of God as Father is based upon the Trinitarian relation alone. 
For Torrance, the Trinitarian relation uniquely integrates who God is and how we 
know God. Such an understanding cannot be derived from God’s relation to creation.  
4.1.4.2 The Father-Son Relation  
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In conformity to his insistence that God should be known as Father according to the 
Son, Torrance emphasizes that the Father-Son relation is the foundation and centre of 
the Gospel and theology. He contends,  
In accordance with the apostolic tradition the Church concentrated upon the 
primacy and centrality of the Father/Son relation which it found in the Gospel 
and high-lighted it in the Creed, for it was precisely on and around that relation 
that everything else in the Gospel seemed to be built. … [I]t was by reference 
to the inner relation of the Son to the Father in the centre of its faith that the 
Church formulated its understanding of everything else: creation, salvation, the 




Torrance particularly takes pains to argue the superiority of the Father-Son relation 
over the Creator-creation relation. One of his arguments is derived from Athanasius’ 
statement mentioned above. As Torrance interprets it, “In this statement Athanasius 
was reflecting the emphasis of the Council of Nicaea on the centrality of the 
Father/Son relation and its primacy over the Creator/creature relation.”
58
 He further 
argues:   
The Nicene theologians contrasted [the] two approaches to God, from his Son 
and from his works, as from what God has begotten of his own nature and 
from what he has made out of nothing in complete difference from his nature. 
When we think and speak of God from the perspective of the Creator/creature 
relation, or the Unoriginate/originate relation, we can only think and speak of 
him in vague, general and negative terms, at the infinite distance of the 
creature from the Creator where we cannot know God as he is in himself or in 
accordance with his divine nature, but only in his absolute separation from us, 
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For Torrance, the superiority of the Father-Son relation means the unique validity of 
the Father-Son relation for disclosing who God is. Namely, true knowledge of God 
must come from the Father-Son relation alone, which excludes the Creator-creature 
relation. He explains, God “does not need relation to us to be what he is as the living 
acting God.”
60
 In Colyer’s phrase, which is even clearer, “The incarnate Son’s filial 
relation to the Father reveals that God is eternally Father in himself as God 
irrespective of God’s relation to creation.”
61
 More importantly, Torrance underlines 
that to consider God as God in His outward relation with creation would be to commit 
the anthropocentric error. 
[I]f we try to reach knowledge of God from some point outside of God, we 
cannot operate with any point in God by reference to which we can test or 
control our conceptions of him, but are inevitably flung back upon ourselves. 
Even if we relate God negatively to what we are in ourselves, we are 
nevertheless quite unable to escape using ourselves as some sort of measure for 




By these arguments, Torrance rejects the Creator-creature relation, and singles out the 
Father-Son relation as the fundamental measure for theology.  
The centrality of the Father-Son relation echoes the centrality of Christ. 
Torrance’s adamant Christocentrism is given powerful support by his doctrine of the 
Trinity. It is here that we find “the dynamic correlation between epistemology and 
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 in Torrance’s theology: Christocentrism not only concerns the 
epistemological issue as to how we can know God, but also concerns the ontological 
issue as to how God’s nature is defined. Consequently and necessarily, Torrance’s 
Christocentrism also affects how humanity is defined in relation to God. While 
Christology and soteriology supply the immediate information to anthropology in 
terms of the unitary God-human relation established in Christ, this relation relies more 
profoundly on the Trinitarian relations within the Godhead. As Kye Won Lee points 
out, “For Torrance, the inner relations of the hypostatic union and the homoousion in 
Jesus Christ are essential to the scientific formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity.”
64
 
4.1.5 The Spirituality of God 
 
Besides the fatherhood of God and the centrality of the Father-Son relation, the 
spirituality of God is another point that Torrance highlights in the doctrine of the 
Trinity and which illuminates his anthropology. It involves two important perceptions: 
the imagelessness and the intelligibility of God. Torrance derives these from the third 
Person of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit. 
4.1.5.1 The Imagelessness of God 
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The Trinity asserts that the Spirit is God and is of one substance with the Father and 
the Son. For Torrance, this confirms not only the deity of the Spirit but also the 
spirituality of the deity of God. He points out,  
In the Holy Scriptures and in the writings of the Church fathers, the word 
‘spirit’ was often used in an absolute sense of God, in respect of his infinite, 
transcendent, invisible, immaterial, immutable nature, in sharp contrast to the 
contingent, transient and limited nature of creaturely beings. … In this absolute 




First of all, the spirituality of the deity indicates the imagelessness of God. 
Torrance contends: God must “be understood and expressed only in an essentially 
spiritual way”, namely, “without the crude use of creaturely or material images”.
66
 
This is proved by God’s commandment forbidding humankind to make any image or 
likeness of God (Exodus 20:4). Corresponding to the transformation in language, 
Torrance emphasizes that the terms “Father” and “Son” are an imageless reference, 
excluding any material forms of thought. The Father-Son relation “is essentially a 
relation in the Spirit” without material images.
67
 In fact, the term “image” itself must 
be understood according to the imageless principle when it is used to illustrate the 
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image-relation between the Son and the Father as well as between the Spirit and the 
Son. Torrance indicates, 
The effect of the doctrine of the Spirit on the doctrine of the Father and the Son 
may be discerned in the statement of Athanasius that while Christ is the only 
Eidos or ‘Form’ or ‘Image’ of Godhead, the Spirit is the Eidos or ‘Image’ of 
the Son. The idea that the Spirit is the ‘Image’ of the Son may be rather 
puzzling until it is realised that the Spirit himself is imageless. This implies 
that, since the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are of one and the same 
nature, it must be in an ineffable, imageless and wholly spiritual way that we 





Torrance explains further: in the Hebraic idea “all images properly used in 
speech and thought of God refer to him without imaging him.”
69
 They are “pointing 
beyond to what is unimaginable though knowable.”
70
 Hence, we must perceive them 
“in a ‘see-through’ way and not in any mimetic or descriptive way.”
71
  
How can we do so? Torrance’s answer is: “within the bounds prescribed by the 
Word”.
72
 That is to say, the Word of God (i.e. the logos) defines the image conception 
of God, and our understanding must be in accordance with what God Himself says. In 
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Torrance’s eyes, God’s spirituality has an intrinsic bond with God’s self-
communication.
73
 He claims that God is “intrinsically eloquent, speaking being” 
whose revelation is identical with His objective self-communication in His Word.
74
 To 
penetrate the imagery-laden language and perceive God in a purely spiritual way 
demands that we perceive that the inner being of God is not dumb, but speaking. 
Failure to acknowledge God’s own speaking will lead to idolatry, i.e. understanding 
God from a center “in the human self and its fantasies”.
75
 For Torrance, God “speaks 
his eloquent Word in the very person and work of Jesus of Nazareth [i.e. the incarnate 
Son].”
76
 By this Torrance distinguishes Christian theology from Greek mythology 
which thinks of the logos only as “an abstract cosmological principle”.
77
 Thus, from 
another angle, Torrance has confirmed the unique revelation of God in Jesus Christ. 
4.1.5.2 The Intelligibility of God 
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Hellenic thought included the concepts of word and activity in addition to the notion of 
image.” (Thomas F. Torrance: Theologian of the Trinity, 49.) On the one hand, Torrance 
distinguishes the incarnate Son as the Word. On the other hand, he reverses the process and 
distinguishes the Word as the Son. He alleges that God created the world through the Word; 
and it is because we know that is the Son who is the Word that we call God “Father”, thus 
acknowledging Him as the Maker of the world. However, if we name God “the Unoriginate” 
only from his works, then we would “not know the Son any more than the Greeks.” (The 
Trinitarian Faith, 76-77.)  
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Torrance asserts that God is knowable. This is not only because of the Word incarnate 
but also because of the “Spirit of knowledge”. The spirituality of God also means the 
intelligibility of the divine being. He contends, “That God is ineffable does not mean 
that he is unintelligible, for he is intrinsically intelligible and knowable, and as such is 
the active ground and source of our knowing of him through Jesus Christ the Word 
made flesh and in the Holy Spirit whom he mediates to us.”
78
 In Torrance’s belief, 
God is a rational being and the Spirit is “the outgoing movement of his being whereby 
he makes himself open to our knowing.”
79
 He underlines that our apprehension of God 
depends heavily on the intelligible mediation of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit 
“marvellously gives us access to the intrinsic intelligibility of God” and “mediates to 
us the truth of God’s self-revelation”.
80
 He continues, “It is through communion with 
[the Holy Spirit], who is in Christ and is himself God of God, that we are lifted up to 
have knowledge of God as he is in himself”.
81
 Torrance also contends that the 
intelligibility of God in the Spirit provides for us a reasonable stance from which to 
confirm the Nicene confession of the Holy Spirit as the “Giver of life”: “We must 
think of the Holy Spirit, then, as the creative, energising, enlightening presence of God 
who freely interacts with his human creatures in such a way as to sustain their relation 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 214. 
79
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 214. 
80
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 215, 214. 
81
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 215. In this sense 
Torrance has the idea of a double-mediation, for “The Word and the Spirit of God coinhere 
inseparably in one another.” (The Trinitarian Faith, 214.) Together they communicate God to 
humankind and therefore Christ the incarnate Son and the Holy Spirit both make the 
mediation. 
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to himself as the source of their spiritual, personal and rational life.”
82
 Due to the 
presence of the Holy Spirit in all the creating and saving activities of God, God “is not 




In fact, for Torrance, the Spirit does not just seal the intelligibility and 
rationality of God, but is the source of all intelligibility and rationality in the universe. 
Torrance thinks of the universe “as an intelligible whole” in need of a higher 
intelligible source beyond itself.
84
 It is the eternal intelligibility of God that “ultimately 
lies behind all the reasonableness of the created order.”
85
 This idea introduces 
Torrance’s insightful arguments on divine and contingent order which we will 
consider in the next chapter on his doctrine of creation. 
 
4.2 The Trinitarian Paradigm for the Knowledge of Humanity 
 
In Torrance’s eyes, the knowledge of God has paradigmatic significance for the 
knowledge of humankind. That is to say, the Trinity provides the fundamental 
criterion for our understanding of humanity. Rather than being free to be decided by 
human will, the rationale of anthropology relies on the Trinitarian paradigm. It is in 
this sense that knowledge of the self is reflective of knowledge of God. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 227. 
83
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 227. 
84
 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 20. 
85
 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 35. 
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How does Torrance’s interpretation of the Trinity back up his anthropological 
arguments? Or more simply, how does the Trinity shape understanding of humanity? 
Torrance did not address this question directly and systematically, but it is possible to 
extrapolate the relation from his wider theology.
86
 We will explore the question in 
three steps. 
4.2.1 What Is the Criterion for Defining Humanity? 
 
The primary concept in Torrance’s doctrine of the Trinity is the onto-relational 
concept of Person. For Torrance, the homoousion of Christ reveals the Trinitarian 
relation within the Godhead. It reveals a new way to understand the concept of 
“person”, namely that a person is constituted and defined by relations. This approach 
disagrees with the kind of philosophical ontology which treats a person as an 
individual understood primarily in terms of an inner “self”. Rather, Christ’s 
homoousion affirms interpersonal relationships as definitive of personal being. There 
can therefore be no abstract understanding of a person in isolation. Hence a purely 
ontological standpoint finds no support in God’s revelation in Christ. Instead, the 
Trinity sets out a paradigm that considers the relational category as prior to the 
ontological category. Or to put it more precisely, this paradigm integrates the 
ontological category within the relational category. Therefore the ontological element 
                                                 
86
 Torrance affirms the reflective relation but does not unfold its meaning in detail or 
systematically from the anthropological angle. As a theologian similar to Barth, Torrance has 
less interest in making explicit and systematic arguments from the anthropological angle. Thus 
his theology is finally a system of God-knowledge rather than a system of God-knowledge 
and Self-knowledge. 
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cannot subsist by itself but must associate with the relational element. This is what 
Torrance means by the term onto-relational. 
This Trinitarian understanding of God provides the basis for Torrance’s shift 
from an ontological to a relational framework when he thinks of humankind. On the 
one hand, this Trinitarian approach explains his insistence that humanity must be 
known in terms of the God-human relationship. As we have seen in previous chapters, 
the relationship between God and humankind marks the definitive index in Torrance’s 
depiction of humanity. Human corruption and salvation are both expounded by means 
of the relational connection. On the other hand, the Trinitarian approach also explains 
his resistance to focusing on some inner property of human being. In his response to 
the Brunner-Barth controversy, he rejected Brunner who affirmed the remnant imago 
Dei and natural theology by emphasizing the inherent intelligent capacity in 
humanity.
87
 For Torrance it is completely beyond the point of compromise that any 
inner property of human being should have independent power to define humanity 
ontologically: human being is defined only when the relational connection is fulfilled. 
This relation-decisive framework is not optional, but necessary, because it is 
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 Torrance does provide a certain acknowledgement of humanity’s rational endowment in the 
second chapter of Calvin’s Doctrine of Man where it reads as an agreement with Brunner. 
However, in none of the other chapters does he interpret the imago Dei from the angle of 
humanity’s unique endowment. He also discounts its meaning for theology. Please refer to 
Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
88
 We should not think that Torrance is simply attempting to look at humanity from another 
perspective. It is not that Torrance chooses the onto-relational perspective from among many 
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Moreover, Torrance sees mutual knowing as the leading element in the 
Trinitarian relation and therefore emphasizes the dimension of mutual knowing in the 
being-constitutive relationship with humanity. It is this dimension that specifically 
makes the revelation authentic and it is this Trinitarian knowledge which gives him 
reason to highlight the role of knowing in the constitution of human being. That is 
why he places the accent so firmly on the bond between being human and knowing 
God: to affirm ourselves as human specifically demands that we first know God. 
Without knowing God, even our being human is put into question. This further 
explains why Torrance maintains his Christocentrism when it comes to anthropology, 
and since he regards Christ as the only revelation that makes our knowing God 
possible, he cannot imagine any other way to think or speak about our being human. 
4.2.2 What Is the Criterion for Perceiving Humankind’s 
Distinctiveness in Creation 
 
The mystery of the Trinity is not only about the three Persons coexisting and knowing 
each other in one being, but also about their mutual indwelling and loving. It contains 
a profound truth that the three Persons are not confused with each other, but 
nevertheless participate deeply in the life of each other. The Trinitarian relation is a 
dynamic communion, not a static coexistence; the oneness of the three indicates an 
organic union, not a mechanical combination.  
                                                                                                                                            
possible perspectives from which to view humankind; rather, he regards the onto-relational 
perspective as the only and as the inevitable perspective, since self-knowledge must conform 
to God-knowledge. In other words, there is no other choice according to the paradigm seen in 
God. 
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Torrance has this unique relationship in mind when he illustrates the atonement. 
As seen in the previous chapter, Torrance considers the atonement as a thorough 
healing and restoration of the God-human relationship into full reconciliation in which 
humanity is not only forgiven and renewed, but also embraced and raised into a unity 
with God.
89
 The atonement ultimately means that humankind and God become one in 
Christ.
90
 But what does this at-onement relationship look like? Torrance illustrates the 
relationship according to the Trinitarian paradigm. The atonement relationship makes 
us indwell in God and participate in God’s life, but we are nevertheless not confused 
with God. The God-human relationship in atonement conforms to the Trinitarian 




                                                 
89
 Unity in one person is what the phrase hypostatic union means. Torrance believes that 
Christ’s hypostatic union has itself signalled the atonement, and that the atonement is realized 
fully and only in Christ who is the hypostatic union. Therefore the atonement and hypostatic 
union closely and mutually interpret each other. The reconciliation and unity of God and 
humanity found in the atonement is therefore a kind of personal unity, analogous to the 
hypostatic union in Christ and found only in him.  
90
 This idea may lead to theosis or the deification of humanity. (About this topic, one may see 
Myk Habets, Theosis in the Theology of Thomas Torrance, Farnham: Ashgate, 2009.) 
Torrance’s theology is often noticed with the inclination of theosis. But Torrance does not 
agree that he intends to confuse the divine and the human. He argues, “What happens to this 
human nature, happens to it entirely in the grace of God, in the gracious will of God to exist in 
identity with this man, but in the grace of God it is raised far above anything we can conceive 
or imagine, and yet not in such a way as to cease to be what God made it, creaturely human 
nature. As the creator condescended to be a creature, he did not make the creature creator, but 
in its unity of existence with his Son, he assumed it into fellowship with his own being as God, 
the creator and Lord.” (Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ, ed. 
Robert Walker, Downers Grove: IVP, 2008, 228.) John Webster once noted that Torrance 
interprets the Christian tradition in a manner which is not wholly dissimilar from that of 
contemporary theologies of participation, but he does it “with much greater caution about 
confusion of the divine and the human.”  (“Editorial: T. F. Torrance 1913-2007”, International 
Journal of Systematic Theology, vol.10, no.4, 2008, 370.) 
91
 This relationship may be seen to echo the biblical teaching of “Abide in me as I abide in 
you” (John:15:4, NRSV). 
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For Torrance, this at-onement relationship with God marks the lofty destiny of 
humankind. Therefore we may consider it the ultimate mark of distinction of 
humankind in Torrance’s theology, for the uniqueness of humankind lies in this: that 
alone of all creatures, humanity is privileged to participate in God’s own life; and that 
this at-onement relationship is founded on the Trinitarian relational paradigm. This 
unique relationship of God with human beings is revealed and secured peculiarly by 
Christ in his vicarious humanity. 
This gives us an important clue to understanding human nature. If humanity is 
singled out by the at-onement relationship with God, and if the at-onement 
relationship follows the criterion of the Trinitarian relationship, then the nature of 
humanity must conform to the essence of the Trinitarian relationship. Torrance 
unfolds the Trinitarian relationship as being essentially perichoretic love (i.e. love for 
others) which brings the three Persons into communion (koinonia) and coactivity. 
Accordingly, we may say that the nature of human being also subsists essentially in 
the love which is for one another and which issues in communion in coactivity. It does 
not point inwardly to what we are in ourselves, but points outwardly to others towards 
whom and with whom we act. This is true both of our relationship to God and of our 
relationship to our fellow humans beings. Here we see the deep hidden reason why 
Torrance does not feel content with the traditional understanding of human nature 
based on inward searching and emphasizing human rationality. It is only from this 
outward-pointing perspective that we can fully and fairly abandon the idea of making 
a direct link between human nature and the endowment of intelligence, whether before 
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or after the Fall.
92
 Furthermore, it is only from this perspective that we can avoid the 
deification of human nature in the atonement. That is to say, we are brought into at-
onement with God so that we might participate in the life that is love poured out for 
others, and not so that we can acquire deity for ourselves. This outward-pointing 
perspective focuses on the participation in the perichoretic loving communion of the 




4.2.3 What Is the Criterion for Understanding the Imago Dei? 
 
In the doctrine of the Trinity, Torrance points out an important principle when 
thinking of God: that is, imageless thinking. By calling attention to God’s spiritual 
nature, he proposes that God must be known according to God’s self-defining 
revelation rather than through human experience. Nevertheless, this principle also has 
a crucial significance for anthropology, for it provides the criterion for understanding 
the imago Dei. Humanity can be truly defined as the image of God - as long as 
“image” is understood in an imageless way.  
                                                 
92
 This does not mean that intelligent endowment has no place in human nature: it merely 
cancels its meaning as immediately definitive. In other words, our rationality cannot directly 
define our humanity, even while we are distinguished from other creatures in respect of 
intelligence. The next point will be about the meaning of intelligence in connection with 
revelation through the Spirit. More discussion on the role of intelligence will be carried out in 
the next chapter on Torrance’s doctrine of creation. 
93
 This helps us to understand better Philippians 2:6, “though he [i.e. Jesus Christ] was in the 
form of God, (he) did not regard equality with God as something to be exploited” (NRSV). As 
the incarnate God who vicariously lived as a human being in our place, Jesus manifested the 
oneness of God and humanity while still remaining human. In him we find the paradigm of 
our participation in God. 
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What does that mean? When we examine Torrance’s arguments concerning the 
imago Dei, we find that it means interpreting the concept of “image” dynamically 
rather than statically. As observed in previous chapters, the imago Dei always has a 
dynamic connotation. In Torrance’s eyes, there is therefore no static element that can 
encapsulate the image; rather, it is the dynamic motion of reflection that constitutes 
the image. Therefore we may claim that the word “image” is fundamentally a verb 
rather than a noun in Torrance’s theology. It primarily means to actively reflect God, 
not just the likeness of God.  
We may understand this point more clearly from his insistence on relational 
thinking instead of ontological thinking.
94
 To a significant degree, relational thinking 
shows a more dynamic character because it concerns an outward interaction with 
others. In Torrance’s Christology and soteriology, the God-human relationship depicts 
not only the status of, but also the movement between, God and humankind.
95
 Since it 
is clear that relational dynamics can by no means exist statically, human nature as 
defined by the relationship must manifest this dynamic characteristic. We should 
neither perceive the imago Dei as a fixed portrait, nor depict it by any static category. 
It has to be a living image defined by the reflective movement. Ontological thinking, 
by contrast, focuses inwardly on the attribution of being; therefore it can hardly avoid 
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 We have clarified that Torrance does not generally deny ontology. What he disagrees with is 
purely ontological thinking, namely, the kind of process that starts from and concentrates on 
the abstract substance of a thing in isolation. Torrance’s theology manifests the onto-relational 
character of being, in which the ontological category submits to the relational category. This 
undoubtedly relates to his conviction of “being in relation”, namely that relation has 
constitutive significance for being.  
95
 For example, that the relationship is corrupted by sin illustrates not only the situation of 
separation between God and humankind but also our movement of alienation away from God 
who responds with His resisting and judging dynamics. 
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thinking of the imago Dei as the likeness of God that humankind possesses as an 
ontological property. Although many of the properties of humanity are not figurative 
(e.g. the capacity for intelligence), Torrance still refuses to use them to define God’s 
image in humanity; for to anchor the definition of “image” in these “inward” qualities 
would mean still anchoring it to a static pattern and transgressing the principle of 
imageless thinking. This may explain why he noted Calvin’s acknowledgment of 
human intelligence and conscience, yet downplayed them in his own arguments about 
human nature. 
 
4.3 Critique – The Christocentric Premiss for the Relational 
Framework 
 
It is reasonable to conclude that Torrance’s insistence on defining humanity in terms 
of the God-human relationship is derived from his perception of the Trinity. The 
Trinitarian persons-in-relation informs his relational concept of being, in which he 
approaches ontological knowledge through the knowledge of relation. This idea is 
often recognized as similar to John Macmurray’s philosophy, which emphasizes the 
understanding of “person” in terms of the “You and I” relation. However, while it is 
worth noticing the similarity, Torrance ultimately differs from such philosophical 
thinkers. As a theologian Torrance’s relational framework is underpinned by his 
Christocentric premiss. We have seen this premiss in his doctrine of the Trinity which 
emphasizes the primacy and centrality of the Father-Son relation. Now we want to ask: 
what does it mean anthropologically? Or to make it more specific: what does this 
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Trinitarian-Christocentric premiss mean for the God-human relationship? Our 
discussion needs to be extended from this angle. Accordingly, we will compare 
Torrance with John Macmurray at some key points in order to see more clearly how 
his Christocentric premiss affects his argument and conclusions.   
4.3.1 In Comparison with Macmurray 
 
John Macmurray was Torrance’s contemporary and is noted as a philosopher who 
influenced Torrance’s insistence on the need to think about the person in terms of 
relation.
96
 In brief, Macmurray’s philosophy militates against dualistic, individualistic 
and static understandings of the self, in which the self is conceived as a cognitive 
subject who observes others as objects.
97
 Instead, he claims that “the Self is a person, 
and that personal existence is constituted by the relation of persons.”
98
 From this 
standpoint, Macmurray transforms “the self as subject” into “the self as agent”, and 
promotes a relational and personal thinking of the self. Specifically, the self “has its 
being in its relationship” and “this relationship is necessarily personal”,
99
 so that 
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 John Macmurray (1891-1976) was a Scottish philosopher known for his relational thinking 
concerning the person. He held the Chair of Moral Philosophy (1944-58) at the University of 
Edinburgh, which Torrance also joined (1950-76). In the Gifford Lectures delivered in the 
University of Glasgow in 1954, Macmurray presented his thoughts on “the self as agent” and 
“persons in relation”, which were later published as two volumes under the same titles, The 
Self as Agent (1957) and Persons in Relation (1961). As David Fergusson indicates, “it is 
striking to note that the most direct influence of John Macmurray on Scottish theology is to be 
found in the work of T. F. Torrance.” (“John Macmurray and Scottish Theology”, Journal of 
Scottish Thought, vol.1, no.1, 2007, 139-145.) 
97
 Macmurray contends that this way of thinking is isolated and egocentric, and fails to hold 
together the entire human experience. He identifies this approach in Cartesian and Kantian 
philosophy. Refer to The Self as Agent, 39-61. 
98
 John Macmurray, The Self as Agent (London: Faber and Faber, 1957), 12. 
99
 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation (London: Faber and Faber, 1961), 17. 
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personal individuality “is achieved through the progressive differentiation of the 
original unity of the ‘You and I’.”
100
  
There are several insights in which Macmurray and Torrance can be heard 
echoing one another. Firstly, in order to avoid a static and abstract concept of person, 
they both underline the integrity or inseparability of person and act. Macmurray 
indicates that by a personal being “we mean to denote the whole manifold of entities, 
activities and relations”, and we “take the practical standpoint for granted”.
101
 A real 
personal entity can never be separated from his or her action in relation. This recalls 
Torrance’s idea of being in act when he talks about God. He alleges that God must be 
known as “dynamic personal Being, for God is who he is in the Act…and his Act is 
what it is in his Being.”
102
  
Secondly, for both scholars, personal relationship necessarily bears a dynamic 
character: Macmurray asserts that “the Self only exists in dynamic relation with the 
Other”,
103
 while Torrance focuses on the dynamic elements of mutual knowing and 
indwelling in order to expound the personal relations within the Trinity.  
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 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation (London: Faber and Faber, 1961), 91. 
101
 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation (London: Faber and Faber, 1961), 24. He explains: 
“We know existence by participating in existence. This participation is action.” (See the same 
book, 17.)  
102
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1996), 4. 
103
 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation (London: Faber and Faber, 1961), 17. For 
Macmurray, self, agent, person and an existing being are synonyms. “Any ‘self’ – that is to say, 
any agent – is an existing being, a person.” (See the same book, 24.)  
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Thirdly, regarding the essence of personal relations, both men point to love and 
communion which bring persons into unity. Macmurray identifies positive personal 
relation in “community”, which “rests upon a positive apperception by its members of 
the relation” and unites them as a “unity of persons.”
104
 Community “presupposes 
love” for others and aims at “the celebration of communion”.
105
 This resembles 
Torrance’s illustration of the perichoretic love and koinonia (communion) within the 
Godhead. Furthermore, they both highlight the parent-child relationship as the basis 
for understanding the person-in-relation. Macmurray alleges that the mother-child 
relation is the starting point for personhood. It provides “the original pattern” and 
remains “the ground pattern” for our behavior and motivation in all personal 
relations.
106
 For Torrance, the Father-Son relation is the primary and unique guide to 
knowing the Trinity and it is it which orients the whole map of persons in relation. 
These insights explicitly highlight similarities between the two scholars. 
However, there is an implicit difference that distinguishes them on a basic level: 
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 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation (London: Faber and Faber, 1961), 147. 
105
 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation (London: Faber and Faber, 1961), 151, 147. 
Macmurray parallels “community” and “society” as two different types of unified 
relationships of persons: the former presupposes love and is for the sake of friendship, while 
the latter presupposes fear and protection. The celebration of communion only takes place in a 
community. He underlines that the positive apperception of community, as opposed to society, 
demands that we put others first and means that “self-consciousness is not primary but 
secondary; not a positive but a negative aspect of the personal relation. My primary 
knowledge is knowledge of the Other.” (See the same book, 160.) 
106
 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation (London: Faber and Faber, 1961), 66. After 
introducing the standpoint of understanding the Self only as a person in relation, Macmurray 
proceeds to “Mother and Child” in the second chapter. This chapter points ahead to all the 
other chapters, in which he further unfolds the concept of “persons in relation” under different 
categories (e.g. “morality”, “community”, etc.). For him, the rationale is, “Genetically, the first 
correlate of the Self is the mother; and this personal Other…is gradually differentiated in 
experience till it becomes the whole community of persons of which I am an individual 
member.” (See the same book, 80.) 
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Macmurray is talking about the self-knowledge of human persons, while Torrance is 
talking about the self-knowledge of the divine Persons. Moreover, as a philosopher, 
Macmurray seeks a universal application of these principles, which are applicable also 
to our understanding of human persons in relation to God. He has rather less to say 
about God, and does not specifically differentiate the “God and I” from the “You and 
I” framework.
107
 For him, God is simply the universal “You” who sets the eternal 
ground of persons in relation and action. For Torrance, by contrast, while these 
principles perceived from the knowledge of God are indeed applicable to the 
knowledge of human self, the application is not immediate. In regard to the human 
person, we must discern in Torrance’s theology that the definitive framework of “You 
and I” indicates the vertical relationship between God and humankind through Christ, 
as opposed to Macmurray’s horizontal schema.
108
 The difference is that the former 
involves two parties that are unequal in position, while the latter involves two parties 
that are of equal position. Although in Christ God becomes a human person and has a 
kind of horizontal relation with us, the relational characteristics are still distinct from 
those Macmurray depicts. We can consider this from three aspects. 
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 Macmurray mentions God as “a universal personal Other” late in Persons in Relation (164), 
but obviously takes it neither as the starting point nor as the main concern in his whole 
argument. 
108
 This horizontal character is clearly reflected by his emphasis on the necessary “social 
reference” for a human person. He alleges, “human behaviour is comprehensible only in terms 
of a dynamic social reference” (The Self as Agent, 38). What lies behind this emphasis is the 
concern for social justice and community which Macmurray has in common with many 
theologians in the mid-twentieth century. As David Fergusson comments, it is clear that 
“Macmurray has not forgotten the social, economic and cosmic dimensions of personhood. 
The maintenance of justice in the regulation of economic life is a necessary though 
insufficient condition for the creation of personal relations in a community. Justice is a 
necessary component of every personal relation.” (“The Contours of Macmurray’s 
Philosophy”, John Macmurray: Critical Perspectives, ed. David Fergusson and Nigel Dower, 
New York: Peter Lang, 2002, 47.)  
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4.3.1.1 The Love Is Not Equal 
In the idea of “community”, Macmurray emphasizes the mutuality of self-giving love 
that applies equally to all community members: for unless every one gives their self 
for the other, community cannot form.
109
 But Torrance does not and will not place the 
same accent on the mutuality of self-giving in the God-human unity in Christ. After 
asserting the perichoretic love within the Trinity, Torrance derives an important 
principle for anthropology: because God is self-giving Love, He does not withhold but 
freely lets His love flow out to us.
110
 It is this free and unconditional love that brings 
us into unity with Him. For Torrance, this love is revealed by nothing other than 
Christ’s atonement through his self-giving sacrifice.
111
 He sees in Christ that God’s 
love is not only unconditional for humankind but also sufficient – and self-sufficient – 
to (re)build the God-human relationship. Indeed, the incarnation itself has indicated 
this relational reconciliation, and the whole course of atonement fully rests upon 
Christ’s living and dying for us. There is no possibility of an equal love flowing from 
us to God or Christ. Therefore the “God and I” in Christ does not presuppose the 
mutuality of self-giving, but relies on God alone. In this sense, the “You and I” 
                                                 
109
 See John Macmurray, Persons in Relation (London: Faber and Faber, 1961), 157-165. 
Macmurray asserts that the basic structure of community is a positive relation between persons 
who are “related as equals” and “for the sake of the other” (158). He illustrates a community 
as a group of persons “in which each cares for all the others and no one for himself” (159) and 
he emphasizes that the celebration of communion “must be a common activity.” (162) 
110
 This love is agape. It differs from philia, the one that Macmurray talks about. In a certain 
sense, the difference between the two scholars reflects the difference between the two types of 
love in Greek. 
111
 Torrance never speaks about God’s love apart from Christ’s atonement. In this sense, the 
God-human relationship is necessarily founded upon the economy of salvation (but not of 
creation). It therefore reinforces the Barthian Christocentricism in Torrance’s anthropology 
from the perspective of God’s love. 
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relation between God and humankind has less of an equally reciprocal character in 
Torrance’s theology, as opposed to Macmurray’s philosophy. This reflects the vertical 
rather than the horizontal nature of the God-human relationship.  
4.3.1.2 The Role Is Not Exchangeable 
Macmurray also mentioned the unequal dimension in the mother-child relation, i.e. the 
child is totally helpless and dependent upon its reference to the mother.
112
 
Nevertheless, we should note that Macmurray underlines the mother-child pattern in 
order to illustrate how a kind of positive reciprocity is constituent of the “You and I” 
relation, so that the two roles are exchangeable in his horizontal framework.
113
 That is 
to say, a person can act sometimes as the mother and sometimes as the child: “You” 
and “I” can take turns to play the two roles for one another. But this will never happen 
in Torrance’s framework based on the Father-Son relation. When we regard God and 
humankind as “You and I”, we must remember that God always has the Father role 
while human beings always play the filial role. Even though we find a horizontal 
dimension of the God-human relationship in Christ, there is never any role exchange. 
This shows that Torrance does not consider a pure mutuality of relation without 
hierarchical order. For him, the mutual relation between God and humankind always 
                                                 
112
 As Macmurray writes, “The baby does not feed himself, he is fed. He does not protect 
himself, he is protected. The provision for his various needs falls within the mother’s care as 
aspects and manifestations of it.” (Persons in Relation, 62.) 
113
 Macmurray indicates, “The whole of this [positively reciprocal] aspect of human 
development … falls … within the ‘You and I’ of the mother-child relation. For the mother 
plays with the child, and the child responds; the child calls for the participation, or at least the 
attention of the adult, and for the admiration and approval of his success.” (Persons in 
Relation, 59.) Put plainly, we play with one another as the mother, and we respond to one 
another as the child, so that we develop the “You and I” relation positively. It is in this sense 
that Macmurray acknowledges the mother-child relation as the original and basic pattern.  
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has an orderly character. It always presumes a God who is Lord and an obedient 
humankind. 
4.3.1.3 The Act Is Not Same 
The last and most important distinction between Torrance’s theology and 
Macmurray’s philosophy concerns their differing conceptions of the dynamic 
character of being. In Macmurray’s understanding of person, action is “the 
distinguishing characteristic of the personal.”
114
 He particularly emphasizes that action 
has priority over knowledge. He declares that “The human differentia…is not the 
capacity to think, but the capacity to act.”
115
 A human person should first be 
recognized as an acting agent rather than a knowing subject. In his view, to start from 
knowledge has dualistic dangers despite its methodological advantage: “It seems to 
presuppose an observer self standing over against the Other and gradually 
differentiating the Object with increasing distinctness and clarity.”
116
 But Macmurray 
does not mean to create another type of dualism which makes action the antithesis of 
knowledge. He clarifies, “knowledge is the negative dimension of action”
117
 and 
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 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation (London: Faber and Faber, 1961), 24. In his eyes, 
“the mutuality of the personal” requires us to pay attention to “the primacy of the practical in 
human experience” and “to transfer the centre of gravity in philosophy from thought to 
action.” (Persons in Relation, 12, 11.) It is practical action that makes one personal. 
Macmurray targets here the cognition-based concept of the self as impersonal. 
115
 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation (London: Faber and Faber, 1961), 27. Regarding the 
function of reason, he claims, “Reason becomes, then, the capacity to act, and only in a 
secondary and derivative sense the capacity to think, that is to say, to pursue a merely 
theoretical intention.” (Persons in Relation, 27.) 
116
 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation (London: Faber and Faber, 1961), 86. 
117
 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation (London: Faber and Faber, 1961), 86. The term 
“negative” indicates “being derivative rather than primary”. He claims, “Against the 
assumption that the Self is, at least primarily, a ‘knowing subject’, I have maintained that its 
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action itself includes knowledge. There is an integrity and unity of knowledge and 
action, but under the primacy of action.
118
 Clearly, in regard to the dynamic character 
of personal relation, Macmurray’s accent falls on the practical rather than the 
cognitive act. It is “I do” rather than “I know” or “I think” that makes the self an agent 
and establishes the dynamic relation of “You and I”. It is also for this reason that 
Macmurray views ritual as primary, and doctrine as secondary in religion.
119
  
Torrance, by contrast, has a high view of knowledge. He particularly 
underlines the connection between knowing and being when examining persons in 
relation. This is true for both the Trinity and humankind. For the Trinity, as we have 
seen, “mutual knowing” is the primary element that constitutes the ontological 
relationship among the three divine Persons. Christ as homoousios with God implies 
not merely Christ’s deity but his perfect knowledge of God the Father. This perfect 
knowledge is pivotal in Torrance’s eyes. Without it, revelation would have lost its 
foundation and everything based on revelation would become impossible. About 
humankind, Torrance emphasizes that being human must be bound up with knowing 
                                                                                                                                            
subjecthood is a derivative and negative aspect of its agency.” (The Self as Agent, 11-12, 
italics added.) 
118
 Macmurray explains: “The particular unreality which concerns us is the disruption of the 
integrity of the Self through a dualism of practical and theoretical activity.” In fact he argues 
for “the unity of theory and practice under the primacy of the practical.” (The Self as Agent, 78, 
83.) 
119
 Macmurray asserts, “Religion, therefore, has two aspects, ritual and doctrine. The first is 
aesthetic in form, the second scientific. Of the two aspects, the aesthetic is the positive and 
primary, since it…refers to the intention of action; the scientific is secondary and negative, 
since the means presupposes the end.” (Persons in Relation, 174) 
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God, and knowing God comes from understanding the Word.
120
 The human differentia 
indicates that humankind has been uniquely created as intelligent beings in order to 
understand the Word.
121
 The foremost thing for a human person is to know God, “so 
that he possesses his life only as deposited in the Word of God.”
122
 In Torrance’s 
opinion, “It is this knowledge [of God/Word] which forms man into the [unique] 
image of God.”
123
 Such a conviction gives him an important reason to support Barth in 
claiming the absolute loss of the imago Dei after the Fall.
124
  
However, neither does Torrance dualistically separate knowledge and action. 
In fact he openly appreciates Macmurray’s conviction that “knowledge in action is our 
primary knowledge”.
125
 As David Fergusson comments, “In theological terms, what 
                                                 
120
 Refer to Torrance’s interpretation in Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, which we have discussed in 
the second chapter of this thesis. 
121
 See Torrance’s interpretation in chapters 2 & 3 of Calvin’s Doctrine of Man. It is obvious 
that Torrance would not endorse Macmurray’s interpretation of reason as being the capacity to 
act in the first place. Basically, he holds the traditional understanding which regards reason as 
the cognitive capacity, i.e. the capacity to understand. 
122
 Thomas F. Torrance, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man (London: Lutterworth, 1949), 23. 
123
 Thomas F. Torrance, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man (London: Lutterworth, 1949), 31. 
124
 Barth firmly rejects the idea of a “remnant image” in fallen humanity. Associated with that 
rejection is his downplaying, if not outright denial, of the distinction of humankind from all 
the other creatures after the Fall. In Barth’s criticism of Brunner, one of his points is that even 
though a sinful man is not a tortoise, his reason does not give him distinction because it does 
not make him more capable of knowing God. Barth underlines this point with an analogy: “the 
fact that he was a man and not a lump of lead” is in no way to his credit when he is saved from 
drowning by a competent swimmer. Refer to Emil Brunner, Natural Theology (London: 
Centenary, 1946), 79. Torrance still treats human distinction as a necessary issue when 
examining humanity as the Imago Dei. However, he is convinced by Barth that after the Fall, 
the image has been completely defaced. His belief is that despite fallen human beings 
retaining the endowment of reason, they have lost the capacity to know God, and hence lost 
the knowledge that forms them as God’s image.  
125
 Thomas F. Torrance, Theological Science (Oxford: Oxford University, 1969), 3-4. He 
writes, “It is Professor Macmurray’s contention that knowledge in action is our primary 
knowledge, for the knowing Self is an agent having his existence in time where he is active 
both in pre-scientific and in scientific knowledge.” 
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this means for Torrance is that the knowledge of God is always and only shaped in a 
life of faith and obedience to the divine Word that becomes incarnate in Christ.”
126
 
Crucially, however, Torrance departs from Macmurray in his understanding of priority. 
Where Macmurray prioritises the practical act over the cognitive one, Torrance would 
never do so. In the midst of similarity, this is a critical distinction between the two 
men. Although both hold to an anthropology which has a distinctive dynamic 
character, Torrance would never put acting prior to knowing when it comes to defining 
humanity in the God-human relationship. This connects closely to his emphasis on the 
objectiveness of Christ’s salvation. That is to say, our salvation in Christ presupposes 
nothing from our action, and does not need to be verified by our action.
127
 It has 
objective certainty by itself beyond what we do. Therefore we must not regard 
ourselves as agents in the God-human relation restored in Christ. Rather, the only 
thing we can do is to know it correctly, that is, know the real God-human relation in 
the objective salvation. For individuals, unless one has this knowledge, he or she has 
no personal relation with God, regardless of how he or she acts. And for the Christian 
community, doctrine is by no means secondary to ritual, but must take priority over it 
and lie at the centre of religious life.  
                                                 
126
 David Fergusson, “John Macmurray and Scottish Theology”, Journal of Scottish Thought, 
vol.1, no.1, 2007, 139-145. 
127
 Only our faith in that knowledge does need to be verified by our action. What Reformed 
theology underlines is that our knowing God (i.e. faith) causes our acting in response to God 
(i.e. work). The order is not the other way around. As a Reformed theologian, Torrance 
definitely would not confuse the order between knowing and acting while he values the 
embodiedness of faith in life. 
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Ultimately therefore, Torrance’s anthropology is very different
128
 from 
Macmurray’s despite the similarity of their concept of persons in relation. As a 
theologian, Torrance always has in mind the unconditioned pre-eminence and 
Lordship of God. Although human beings do find the self in the dynamic “You and I” 
relation with God, they have no power either to make this relation or to control it.
129
 
The relation at its foundation manifests an asymmetry. To a certain degree, this 
asymmetry corresponds to Barth’s one-sided emphasis on God and explains 
Torrance’s sympathy with Barth at least with regard to the God-human relationship.
130
  
4.3.2 Deification of Humanity: the God-human Relation Swallowed 
in the God-God Relation? 
 
Now we can have a closer observation to what the Trinitarian-Christocentric premiss 
means for the God-human relationship in Torrance’s theology. In Torrance’s theology, 
the doctrine of the Trinity provides many significant clues to his anthropology. It is 
indubitable that the norms and principles for understanding humankind must image 
those same principles in God according to God’s self-revelation. However, in 
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 It is different but it does not contradict. This is because theology differs from philosophy in 
respect of its basic rationale and ultimate concern. The former has a transcendent level above 
the latter, but not necessarily in contradiction to the latter. This is reflected by the fact that 
Macmurray never argued against Torrance’s theology, and nor did he endorse it. While 
Torrance gave Macmurray’s work distinct commendation, and borrowed freely from it, 
“Macmurray would hardly have endorsed the uses to which Torrance put his work.” Refer to 
David Fergusson, “The Influence of Macmurray on Scottish Theology”, Journal of Scottish 
Thought, vol.1, no.1, 2007, 147. 
129
 By the term “make”, we mean “to establish in the positive sense”. Of course, we cannot 
establish a positive God-human relationship by our own power. 
130
 It is interesting to note that Macmurray was not a sympathizer of Barth. As David 
Fergusson has noted, Macmurray “was generally critical of Karl Barth’s theology with his 
dialectical shape”, while Torrance was “a leading exponent of Karl Barth in the English-
speaking world.” (“The Influence of Macmurray on Scottish Theology”, Journal of Scottish 
Thought, vol.1, no.1, 2007, 147, 146) 
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examining Torrance’s doctrine of God, the possibility arises that his Trinitarian 
approach to anthropology could potentially lead to a certain deification of humanity. 
This anxiety is the result of Torrance’s failure to address specifically and explicitly the 
crucial differences between the God-human relationship and the God-God relationship, 
the relationship of God to God within God. In order to address this anxiety, we need to 
consider more deeply his account of God’s internal identity, and thereafter to open up 
its implications for the God-human relationship.  
Torrance asserts that we should know God as “Father” according to Christ the 
Son, and that the Father-Son relationship should dominate our knowledge of God. He 
elucidates the reason for this from an epistemological perspective. Nevertheless, when 
he makes a doctrinal claim that “God was always Father, not always Creator”,
131
 an 
anthropological question emerges: what is the fundamental identity of God in the God-
human relationship? The consequent question must be, what then is the fundamental 
relationship between God and humankind?  
Needless to say, the God-human relationship inevitably dictates how we 
identify God. Torrance’s statement that God was always Father and not always 
Creator may be taken to imply that if He is to be identified first and foremost as Father, 
and not as Creator, then we always relate with a Father God, but not always with a 
Creator God. If so, then we cannot always define our relationship with God as that 
between creature and Creator and the Creator-creature relationship cannot be a 
necessary and fundamental index for understanding the God-human relationship. But 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 88, 89.  
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if we do not always need the reference of the Creator-creature relation to regard the 
God-human relation, what is the necessary and fundamental one? As seen, it is the 
Father-Son relationship which Torrance singles out above all as critical.  
However, when the Father-Son relation becomes the exclusive index without 
the accompaniment of the Creator-creature relation, the problem is that the relation 
between God and humankind has only one analogy, the relation between the divine 
Persons, and the risk is that the God-human relation may become assimilated to it. 
Indeed, there may be a risk that the divine-human relation is so absorbed into it that it 
becomes virtually identical to the God-God relation within the eternal Godhead.
132
 In 
this sense there may be an ambiguity in Torrance’s teaching about the vital distinction 
between the God-human relationship and the God-God relationship. We cannot help 
asking: How can we necessarily distinguish the former from the latter if the Creator-
creature relation is not upheld as an equally necessary and fundamental index for 
conceptualising the God-human relationship? If God is always Father but not always 
Creator, where is the reference and proof for us to assert that we remain creaturely 
even as we share in the filial relation to God in Christ? 
133
 The point is this: how can 
Torrance avoid the deification of humanity, not because he promotes the Father-Son 
relation, but because he undervalues the Creator-creature relation? Or is it perhaps that 
he lets the latter be swallowed by the former? 
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 As Elmer Colyer indicates, “God is eternally Father in himself as God irrespective of God’s 
relation to creation.” (How To Read T. F. Torrance, 141, italics added.)  
133
 In other words, our filial relation to the Father is not completely identical with the Christ’s 
filial relation to the Father. While Christ is the begotten Son, begotten not made, we are made 
but not begotten, i.e. we are adopted and not “natural” sons and daughters. 
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Torrance’s chosen emphasis reflects his Christocentrisim, in which he 
resembles Barth rather than Calvin. Generally speaking, the Father-Son relation 
corresponds to the economy of salvation, while the Creator-creature relation belongs 
to the economy of creation. By contrast, Calvin holds to a dual recognition of 
salvation and creation. These two knowledges go hand in hand and together provide 
the foundation for theological cognition. For Barth, however, his Christocentrism 
means that the knowledge of salvation becomes the unique foundation for theological 
cognition. Knowledge of creation is no parallel.
134
 Epistemologically, Torrance 
sympathizes with Barth, which is why he singles out the Father-Son relation as having 
precedence over the Creator-creature relation.  
By asserting that “God was always Father, not always Creator”, Torrance 
affirms his Christocentrism in the doctrine of God, and appeals to Athanasius for 
support. Nevertheless, we need to notice that Athanasius and Torrance are not writing 
about precisely the same thing. The second half of Torrance’s assertion is not an 
inference which must necessarily be drawn from Athanasius
135
 and it may seem that in 
a certain sense, Torrance has developed Athanasius’s statement into a Barthian claim, 
and that his Christocentrism has taken him beyond the position of the Church fathers. 
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 The economies of creation and salvation have been discussed in the second chapter of this 
thesis. Please refer to section 2.1.2 on Barth’s single-focal lens and section 2.2.1 on Calvin’s 
duplex cognitio. 
135
 The statement of Athanasius reads: “it would be more godly and true to signify God from 
the Son and call him Father, than to name him from his works and call him Unoriginate.” 
(Refer to the footnote 43.) The connotation of “more godly and true” is not identical to that of 
“always”.  
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How might Torrance himself have answered the above questions and concerns? 
In particular, what is the relation between knowledge of God as Father and knowledge 
of God as Creator? And also, if God is always Father and not always Creator, what is 
the guarantee of our creaturely humanity? It is not too difficult to piece together and 
work out from his various writings what would have been the shape of a brief response. 
4.3.2.1 Knowledge of God as Creator Comes from Knowledge of God as Father 
Torrance argues that all knowledge of the Creatorship of God comes from knowledge 
of His Fatherhood and that this is embodied in the Nicene Creed. “In its confession of 
belief in one God the Father Almighty, the Maker, the Nicene Council deliberately 
gave primacy to the concept of the Fatherhood of God, for knowledge of God as 
Creator is taken from knowledge of God as Father, and not the other way round.”
136
 
After quoting Athanasius’ key statement just referred to above,
137
 Torrance then adds 
that it follows from it that all understanding of God as Creator must be taken from the 
Son
138
 and proceeds to cite a lengthy statement of Athanasius in support.
139
 He 
concludes that “for Athanasius the concept of God as Creator is wholly governed by 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 76. 
137
 See again footnote 43. 
138
 “It follows from this, however, that our understanding of God as Creator must likewise be 
taken from the Son, for it is through the Son and Word who is eternally in God and proper to 
his essential nature that God is the Creator and Maker of everything.” (Thomas F. Torrance, 
The Trinitarian Faith, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988) 76). 
139
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 76-77. 
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the coinherent relation between the Father and the Son” and cites Hilary also in further 
support of this “Nicene doctrine of God as Creator”.
140
  
It is clear from Torrance’s discussion, that his statement that “God was always 
Father, not always Creator” is not intended to belittle in any way the importance of 
God as Creator. He is simply saying that God is Father before he is Creator, that his 
Fatherhood is basic to His Being in a way that His Creatorship is not, and that the only 
way we can know God as Creator is by being first restored through the Son to 
knowledge of Him as Father (and Creator), for it is only through the Son that the 
Father is known. 
4.3.2.2 God Can Be Known Only as both Father and Creator through the 
Incarnate Son 
God was not always Creator but now He is Creator, just as there was a time when the 
Son was not man, but now is man. We can only know God because He is now Creator, 
because we have been brought into being as creatures, and because the Son has now 
become man in our creaturely being. “God was always Father, not always Creator, but 
now he is Creator as well as Father. It is in similar terms that we may speak of the 




                                                 
140
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 76-77. 
141
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 88. 
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Both creation and incarnation are decisive new acts, new in the eternal life of 
God.
142
 Likewise, “God’s communication of himself to us in Jesus Christ who is of 
one and the same being and nature as the Father, is something new to the eternal being 
of God.”
143
 Once they were not, but now creation and incarnation ARE. All 
knowledge of God as Father is therefore now in and through these fundamental new 
realities.  
For Torrance creation and incarnation go together, with the latter as the way to 
the former which can only be interpreted in terms of it. In the incarnation,
144
 the 
Creator Word and Son assumes creaturely reality so that in his own creaturely 
humanity human being and creation itself might be restored to full reality. The 
incarnation and life of Jesus Christ are the restoration of creation and “in Jesus Christ 
God has established and secured a new relation between the creation and himself”.
145
 
In fact Torrance sees the work of Jesus as one that so undoes the tangled thread of 
human history and sin, “makes contact with creation” and “has set our life back on the 
basis of creation”
146
 that in the cross and resurrection “redemption and creation come 
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 That is to say, to create something different from His own being and to become something 
different from His own Being are both new for God’s life. Torrance underlines that “In the 
incarnation God was free to do something new even for himself, for he was not eternally 
incarnate, and free to move outside to himself.” (Divine and Contingent Order, 6, italics 
added.) 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 88-89. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 89. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 106. 
146
 Thomas F. Torrance, Atonement: the Person and Work of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 




 It is only through its renewal in Christ that creation is restored 
to be seen as it really is and was meant to be and that God can be fully known as 
Father. 
4.3.2.3 Incarnation and Resurrection Are the Guarantee of Our Permanent 
Humanity 
Torrance would argue that far from belittling or denigrating the God-human relation as 
understood in terms of God as Creator, a Christocentric approach actually strengthens 
it. In his eyes, the incarnation is the affirmation of creation and of humanity: the fact 
that the Creator Word Himself became flesh is the affirmation of creaturely human 
being,
148
 and the fact that he rose and ascended in the same human body into heaven is 
the ultimate affirmation of the reality of creaturely existence for God in perpetuity.
149
 
Just as the Word assumed our actual human flesh,
150
 so in the resurrection he rose in 
actual physical body
151
 and in a body which as now glorious and “spiritual” is not less 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Atonement: the Person and Work of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2009), 220. 
148
 See Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008), 65-66. 
149
 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008), 65-66, 220f, 238-39, cf. 298-301. 
150
 Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: the Person and Life of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008), 61. 
151
 “Jesus arose in physical body, arose as very man in the fullness and integrity of human 
nature.” Cf. “Since human beings are the concrete reality they are, human resurrection in the 
nature of the case can only be bodily resurrection – any ‘resurrection’ that is not bodily is 
simply a contradiction in terms.” (Thomas F. Torrance, Atonement: the Person and Work of 
Christ ed. Robert Walker, Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2009, 241.) 
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In his chapters on resurrection and ascension in Atonement it is abundantly 
clear that Torrance regards Jesus’ resurrection “as very man in the fullness and 
integrity of human nature”, together with the ascension, as the definitive guarantee of 
our own continuing creaturely humanity. Has he done enough to allay any possible 
anxieties about the extent to which he takes the God-human creature relation seriously? 
The coherence, force and logic of his vigorous Christocentric position can indeed be 
appreciated, but in emphasizing it has he given insufficient attention to human ability 
and in particular rationality? 
4.3.3 Rationality – Spiritual or Natural? 
 
Another question we want to ask of Torrance concerns just this topic of rationality. In 
the doctrine of the Trinity, Torrance highlights the Spirit as the Spirit of knowledge 
and the source of all rationality. He emphasizes that revelation also depends on the 
Spirit’s intelligible mediation, which concerns not only how God reveals, but also how 
we know. Such an accent on the rational character and function of the Spirit inspires 
the question: If rationality is constitutive of the spiritual nature of God, is it then 
constitutive of our spiritual nature? Is our rationality a gift of the Spirit? What does the 
“intelligible mediation of the Spirit” mean from our side?  
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Atonement: the Person and Work of Christ (ed. Robert Walker, 
Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2009), 299. 
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In Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, Torrance disagrees with Calvin’s teaching on the 
“natural gifts” as being a portion of God’s image in fallen humankind. Torrance places 
the emphasis on the spiritual (supernatural) nature of humanity, and identifies 
rationality in the human mind as “natural” rather than “spiritual”.
153
 He also asserts 
that how the human mind knows God is a mystery of the Spirit who appeals to no 
natural capacity in human beings.
154
 Clearly, these arguments give a negative answer 
to our questions about the ability of the human mind to receive revelation. Is Torrance 
perhaps guilty of a kind of rationality dualism, where the supernatural rationality of 
the Spirit is pitted against the natural rationality of humankind, so that when the Spirit 
mediates the knowledge of God to humankind, there is no necessity, for real 
communication between the two, of any prior capacity to grasp revelation?
155
 To 
acknowledge the Spirit as the source of all rationality, and then to discount human 
rationality as part of the epistemological equation, does not seem to make sense of our 
relationship to the God who is rational Spirit.  
This contradictory situation would seem to illustrate a difficulty that Torrance 
apparently did not manage to overcome in his theology. On the one hand, he 
penetrates to the profound rationality and intelligible character of God (and 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man (London: Lutterworth, 1949), 83-105. Refer 
to the second chapter of this thesis, section 2.2.3. Torrance in this book responds to the 
Brunner-Barth controversy by siding clearly with Barth. Brunner regards rationality as the 
“contact point” between God and humankind. He also acknowledges it as the remnant image 
in fallen humanity. These teachings are opposed by Barth. Therefore Torrance’s arguments 
here also express his disagreement with Brunner. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Calvin’s Doctrine of Man (London: Lutterworth, 1949), 128-153. 
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 In other words, there is no necessary contact between the two such that the Spirit 




); but on the other hand, he does not want to give the human endowment of 
intelligence any kind of role in defining the imago Dei. His knowledge of the 
rationality of God is derived from his perception of a rational creation; however, his 
rejection of any role for unaided and unenlightened human rationality in the 
knowledge of God is the outworking of his understanding of salvation. Therefore this 
difficulty actually reflects the tension between the doctrines of creation and salvation 
in Torrance’s theology. As he is convinced of the uniquely definitive position of 
salvation in systematic theology, he chooses to compromise the former and hold firm 
the latter. This may partially explain what we have just observed: his high affirmation 
of the Spirit as the source of all rationality, even as he denies the capacity of humanity 
after the Fall to comprehend revelation and so strips the spiritual color from the 




For Torrance, anthropology can be neither self-existent nor self-explanatory, but relies 
on the knowledge of God to provide the foundation for its existence and explanation. 
It is in his doctrine of the Trinity that we find the origin of his ontological-relational 
framework for anthropology. This framework explains why he insists on interpreting 
humanity within its relation to God rather than in the isolation of the human self. It 
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 Torrance’s emphasis on the rational intelligibility God’s creation will be addressed in the 
next chapter. 
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also discloses some important principles for understanding the imago Dei in the light 
of the Trinity.  
Nonetheless, we should notice the advanced Christocentrism in Torrance’s 
doctrine of the Trinity, as in every part of his theological system. When he emphasizes 
God as “Father” alone and the Father-Son relation as the primary measure of our God-
knowledge, his Christocentrism has become an ontological conviction governing the 
epistemological conviction, i.e. a conviction of who God is for us governing how we 
can know God. At a fundamental level Torrance excludes the Creator-creature relation 
from first place in his consideration of God’s identity for us. This leads to an anxiety 
that despite his denials his anthropology may possibly be heading towards, or at least 
is not sufficiently protected from, a kind of deification of humanity, owing to the lack 
of a clear index with which to distinguish the God-human relationship from the God-




Torrance’s Doctrine of Creation                                      
in Anthropological Perspective 
 
 
Alongside the salvific relation of God to humanity in Christ, the dependent relation 
between God and the universe in creation marks another axis guiding Torrance’s 
interpretation of who God is and who we are. Although Torrance does not take this 
axis as the primary criterion for his doctrine of humanity, he does establish in relation 




5.1 Creatio Ex Nihilo and Contingent Creation 
 
Creatio ex nihilo is a distinctive Judeo-Christian idea which means God created the 
universe out of nothing. It became firmly established as the teaching of the church in 
the writings of Irenaeus and Tertullian against their Gnostic opponents. Based on 
biblical teaching, Torrance interprets the act of creation as “the unique aboriginal act 
of God through his commanding Word in bringing into being what did not previously 
exist and giving it reality and stability before him.”
2
 On the one hand, God made 
something utterly new which is neither from Himself nor from any resource elsewhere. 
On the other hand, God grants to what He has made a true and persistent existence, so 
                                                 
1
 They are actually important for his whole theology in which anthropological thoughts are 
scattered and integrated with other themes. 
2
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 95-96. 
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that it is neither a shadow substance nor a state of chaos but a reality that can be 
recognized with authenticity and integrity. By underlining these two aspects, Torrance 
points out a pivotal notion – contingence – to illustrate the nature and order of the 
creation.  
5.1.1 The Contingence of Creation – Dependence and 
Independence  
 
By contingence Torrance means that “as created out of nothing the universe has no 
self-subsistence and no ultimate stability of its own, but that it is nevertheless 
endowed with an authentic reality and integrity of its own which must be respected.”
3
 
The notion of contingence delicately contains a “peculiar interlocking of dependence 
and independence” of the created world, i.e. “the world depends entirely upon the free 
creative act of God to give it being and form wholly differentiated from himself, but 
that is then an independence that is delimited by the dependence that anchors the 
world beyond itself in the freedom of the Creator.”
4
 For Torrance, contingence is the 
“basic and essential feature of the universe” describing the “constituting condition of 
its reality and actuality” which is true not only in the original birth of the universe, but 
also in its continuing existence.
5
 
5.1.1.1 The Dependence of the Universe 
                                                 
3
 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), vii. 
4
 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 35. 
5
 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 37, 
and see his The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1996), 217. 
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Torrance expounds the dependence of the universe as a necessary antithesis of the 
freedom of God. In his view, God is the One self-sufficient and conditioned by 
nothing. “Far from being immanently bound up with the universe, God remains 
eternally and transcendently free”.
6
 The creation is not something that must happen 
but something happened as God wishes so. The birth of the universe depends on the 
will and power of God, who creates out of liberty rather than necessity. 
Likewise, the current reality is not something inevitable for God when He 
created. It is out of complete freedom that God created this universe with its peculiar 
appearance and form as it shows now. Being unlimitedly creative, God could have 
created a universe different from this one. The existence mode of the universe is 
contingent and dependent on God’s freely willed prescription for it. 
Due to the unconditioned freedom of God in creation, Torrance asserts, “There 
is no intrinsic reason in the universe why it should exist at all, or why it should be 
what it actually is.”
7
 In the fundamental sense of being brought into existence and 
existing in this particular form, the universe is not self-existing but radically relying 
on God. This seals the dependence of the universe. 
5.1.1.2 The Independence of the Universe 
However, in spite of that, the universe is not a shadow or attachment of God. It has an 
independent identity once it has been brought into existence. Torrance holds a 
                                                 
6
 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 2. 
7
 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 36. 
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scientific sight in theology. He sees the independent identity of the universe as the 
authentic reality of the natural world which also comes from the creatio ex nihilo. He 
underlines that the creaturely universe is not a part of God since it is made out of 
nothing. There are “a total otherness in being and a complete disparity in nature 
between the Creator and the creature.”
8
 This absolute difference signifies that the 
universe must be identified with its authenticity and subjectivity distinctive from what 
identifies God.
9
 In this sense the creation has its independence. 
Torrance recognizes the independence of creation through its intrinsic 
consistency. He indicates, “[T]he universe is endowed with an autonomous character 
both as a whole and throughout its immanent relations, with features and patterns and 
operational principles which belong to it as by intrinsic natural right, and which 
require an autonomous mode of investigation appropriate to their distinctive nature 
and integrity.”
10
 For Torrance, this fact is significant for both natural science and 
theology. It forces us “to treat contingence not merely as a presupposition, but as an 
essential factor in scientific understanding and interpretation of the natural order.”
11
  
5.1.2 The Rationality of Creation – The Contingent Order 
 
                                                 
8
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1996), 207. 
9
 This echoes what Torrance stresses in his doctrine of the Trinity, “there is no likeness 
between the eternal Being of God and the being of created reality, [therefore] God may be 
known only out of himself”. See The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 52. 
10
 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 36. 
11
 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 28. 
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The intrinsic consistency and intelligibility of the universe clearly impress Torrance. 
He points out that the creative act is an intelligent act. “Far from being merely an 
arbitrary product of God’s will,” the creation should be regarded “as ultimately 
grounded in the eternal truth and rationality of God.”
12
 For Torrance, the Bible’s 
teaching that “the universe was created by God through his eternal Word” confirms the 
fact that creation “was neither conceived nor brought into being ‘without reason’, but 
on the contrary was an intelligible product of the divine Mind.”
13
 The rationality of 
creation has a twofold content in Torrance’s arguments – the eternal purpose hidden in 
God and the contingent order displayed in the universe. We will discuss the latter first 
and leave the former to the next section.  
Torrance contends that the universe is endowed with an inner order in which 
all creaturely things are held together as a whole. Moreover, this order is contingent in 
that it is not necessary that created reality should have a particular character or 
structure.  
Natural science tacitly assumes the contingence, as well as the orderliness, of 
the universe. …It is through relying on the indissoluble bond between 
contingence and order in the universe that natural science has come to operate 
with the distinctive interconnection between experiment and theory which has 




He acknowledges that this contingent order displays a rationality on which science 
depends. Contingent order is in fact the matrix of natural science. This idea 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 2. 
13
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 92. 
14
 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 26. 
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distinguishes the Christian doctrine of creation from Greek thought which regards 
“contingence” as the antithesis of “logic” or “rationality” and hence at odds with the 
rational discourse or scientific explanation.
15
 Christian theology instead affirms the 
modern scientific understanding of the universe, since it is “an inalienable assumption 
of all scientific inquiry that the universe is everywhere immanently rational and as 
such open to rational apprehension”.
16
 It is necessary to ask “What is the kind of order 
that the contingent universe in its multivariable nature reveals in other aspects of our 
experience of it, for example when we have to do with live realities or events?” and 
we must answer the question “only out of the realities and events themselves, by 
penetrating into their own structures.”
17
 
For Torrance, contingent order is grounded in the uncreated rationality of God. 
Corresponding to the idea of the dependence and independence of creation, there is a 
dialectical link in Torrance between the uncreated rationality of God and the created 
rationality of the universe. On the one hand, creatio ex nihilo implies that “God 
created not only the materiality of the universe out of nothing, but its very rationality 
and order as well, including the human mind or sou1.”
18
 There is a clear-cut 
                                                 
15
 See Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 100, and 
also The Ground and Grammar of Theology (Belfast: Christian Journals, 1980), 53-54. For 
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distinction between the uncreated rationality of God and the created rationality of the 
universe, including the rationality of humankind. The two types of rationality are 
substantially different. On the other hand, the created rationality does derive from God 
according to His will and might as well as His wisdom and Word. The created 
rationality must be acknowledged as originated from and grounded in the uncreated 
rationality of God. It is a rationality that is dependent upon and grounded in the 
uncreated divine rationality. In Torrance’s own phrase, God “makes his own eternal 




Torrance points out that such a description of being both absolutely-distinct 
from and necessarily-grounded in is almost an oxymoron in Greek philosophy, but 
this oxymoronic dialectic is just what contingent order means in the Christian 
understanding of creation based on Biblical idea of creatio ex nihilo. It rejects the 
dualism between theology and science by affirming a unique rationality grounded in 
God and inherent in the universe. We will explore this further under the following 
three headings. 
5.1.2.1 The Unitarity of the Order 
                                                 
19
 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 21. 
This is why Torrance indicates that the contingent order “has also a contingent ‘necessity’ of 
its own, in the sense that it cannot not be what it now is as this universe possessed of this and 
not some other created rationality” (22).  
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Torrance claims that “there is one pervasive rational order throughout the universe” 
despite the fact that “the order inherent in the universe is manifold in character”.
20
 
While the universe indeed possesses different modes of rational order, they 
nevertheless do not conflict but contribute to the integral character of the universe. 




In Torrance’s eyes, this one pervasive rational order must be the incarnate 
Word of God. He asserts, “[T]he incarnate Son or Logos, through whom all things 
were made and in whom they hold together, is the central and creative source of all 
order and rationality within the created universe.”
22
 The incarnate Word not only 
granted the definitive revelation through God’s self-communication to the created 
world, but also “gave rise to the conception of the universe as one harmonious system 
of things characterized by one pervasive if multi-variable order throughout.”
23
 For 
Torrance, it is the Word incarnate in Christ that has sealed the unitarity of the 
contingent order and thus “carried with it a rejection of the dualism, pluralism, and 
polymorphism of ancient philosophy, religion, and science.”
24
  
5.1.2.2 The Hierarchy of the Order 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 17. 
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 Torrance write, “[W]e do not believe we are really in touch with reality if we come up with 
results in one aspect of the universe which conflict with those we derive elsewhere.” (See 
Divine and Contingent Order, 17.) As a theologian acquainted with the natural sciences, he 
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biology, for example, may be found in Divine and Contingent Order, 18-20. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 2. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 3. 
24
 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 3. 
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The one pervasive and unitary order, however, has within itself hierarchic levels. 
Torrance indicates that “the universe in its immanent structure comprises a hierarchy 
of levels of reality which are open upward but not reducible downward”.
25
 Appealing 
to some recent discoveries in biology, Torrance points out that there is “an ontological 
stratification in the universe comprising a sequence of rising levels, each higher one 
controlling the boundaries of the one below it and embodying thereby the joint 
meaning of the particulars situated on the lower level”. 26  This does not imply a 
disguised Neo-Platonist theory of the hierarchy of the phenomenal world and celestial 
beings, nor does it come down to a Darwinism evolution of species starting from the 
lower level as the root. By “ontological stratification” and “hierarchy of reality”, 
Torrance means that in the one unitary order with many levels “no one level provides 
the sufficient reason for its own contingent order which may be formalized only 
through reference to another level or to other levels beyond it.”
27
 In other words, each 
level of the universe is not self-defined but subject to its upper reach, so that 
ontological order is from the top down. Examining the meaning of existence, he 
appeals to Michael Polanyi. “[A]ll meaning lies in the higher levels of reality that are 




5.1.2.3 The Openness of the Order 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 20. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 20. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 20. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 20. 
The original words see Michael Polanyi, “On the Modern Mind”, Encounter, May, 1965, 15. 
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Besides the unitarity and hierarchy, Torrance also explores the openness of the 
contingent order. He asserts that the universe is essentially “not a closed but an open 
system” since the contingence is not self-sufficient.
29
 This means that the universe 
needs a sufficient reason above the contingent level to support and define the 
contingent order. This sufficient reason can be “disclosed only through correlation 
with some meta-level beyond.”
30
 For Torrance, the openness is the deepest secret of 
contingence. It explains why “the nature of the universe as it discloses itself to us 
constantly takes us by surprise.”
31
 Thus we are inspired to “discover an 
uncircumscribed range of rationality grounded beyond the universe itself but reaching 




The openness of the order implies two important things: first, the universe is 
not imprisoned within a pointless circularity of inescapable necessities; second, the 
final truth of the universe lies outside its own reality. Torrance argues that, although 
the universe has a kind of necessity in the sense that it excludes any type of order other 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1996), 217.  
Torrance’s idea is inspired by his sympathetic study of the Greek fathers and Nicene theology. 
As Colyer helpfully notes from Torrance’s Trinitarian Faith, 104, “Torrance sees the Nicene 
theologians working this out in light of the incarnation, for the incarnation (and the 
resurrection) implies that the created order of the universe with its spatio-temporal structures 
is open to God’s recreative and reordering activities in Jesus Christ in space and time.” “This 
means that while the incarnation is a new event in space and time and in the life of God, 
Torrance does not view it as a breach of natural law.” See How to Read T. F. Torrance 
(Downers Grove: IVP, 2001), 171-172, and the footnote 81 on 172. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 4. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 15. 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 20. 
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than the existing one, the final explanation of this necessity cannot be gained from the 
study of it, namely, from natural science. Rather, the explanation opens our conceptual 
system to what transcends this creaturely universe and carries us up to its ultimate 
ground in the Creator.
33
 In other words, the explanation of the universe is not 
contained within created phenomena such as “space and time” or “cause and effect” 
that seem absolute for it, but is free from them and anchored in the infinite freedom of 
God who can relate to what He has made creatively according to His immeasurable 
rationality. This idea, as Colyer notes, “shatters necessitarian and deterministic notions 
of the universe and human life…whether it be the tyranny of fate, inexorable cyclical 
processes, or the modern determinism of the materialist cause-and-effect universe.”
34
 
It leads a new look to the relationship between the Creator God and the created world 
including humankind. 
5.1.3 The God-world Relationship 
 
We mentioned at the beginning that the notion of contingence implies an interlocking 
of creation’s dependence on God and its independence of God. Torrance employs this 
in his in-depth examination of the God-world relationship in creation. Among his 
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theology (Downers Grove: IVP, 2001), 172. Refer to Torrance’s Trinitarian Faith, 104, and 
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arguments based upon this relational emphasis, there are two points especially worthy 
of our attention. These are the freedom of creation and the unity of creation with God.  
5.1.3.1 The Freedom of Creation 
Torrance argues for the freedom of creation within its contingent ordering. He points 
out that, “Just as there is an order in the universe transcendentally grounded in God, so 
there is a freedom in the universe transcendentally grounded in the freedom of God.”
35
 
This freedom is “derived from” yet “not as an extension of” God’s own freedom.
36
 It 
bears a contingent and constrained character.
37
 He claims that the universe enjoys a 
limited but real freedom of its own. On the one hand, the freedom is not unlimited 
because created rationality is not self-sufficient. He explains, “[An] absolute freedom 
in contingency would not be freedom but an irrational arbitrariness”; nevertheless, a 
limited freedom is the freedom proper to the contingent creation “for it is inseparably 
bound up with its contingent rationality.”
38
 On the other hand, such a freedom is not 
an illusory freedom because it is grounded in the true and unlimited freedom of God. 
He indicates that “the freedom of the creation must mirror the freedom of God, and be 
unlimited and inexhaustible in its own way and on its own creaturely level.”
39
 As long 
as the universe exists under God’s free interaction with it, it must have a true freedom 
to reflect God’s infinity and inexhaustibility.  
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 4. 
36
 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 21 
37
 This echoes again, as Colyer notes, “the elusive character of the independence of creation, 
which is nevertheless dependent on God in and for its liberty.” See How To Read T. F. 
Torrance: understanding his Trinitarian and scientific theology, 173. 
38
 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 5. 
39
 Torrance F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 107.  
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5.1.3.2. The Unity of God with the World 
In recognizing God’s constant sustaining of the universe, Torrance perceives the unity 
between the Creator and the creation. According to the Jewish concept of God, there is 
only one God who alone is the source of all “so that if he were to withdraw his 
creative and upholding presence from the creation it would lapse back into chaos and 
sheer nothingness.”
40
 The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo has its roots in the Old 
Testament. It indicates not merely the absolute beginning of creation out of nothing 
but also “the continuity, stability, and uniformity of the natural world as grounded 
beyond itself in the constancy, faithfulness and reliability of God its Creator and 
Preserver.”
41
 That is to say, the world is shaped by its constant unity with God. In this 
unity the world remains at every moment dependent upon God, while God Himself 
remains inseparable from the world. This unity enables the universe to be stable, and it 
is held up by nothing other than God’s faithfulness.  
Once again, there is an interlocking of necessity and liberty in this unity. In 
one sense, the unity is necessary for both the world and God. Torrance points out that 
the world as the creation of God always finds its existence without separation from 
God. The truth of the world includes God’s constant interacting with the world. 
However, this unity by no means violates the absolute liberty of God. It is because the 
“interaction rests upon the free ground of God’s own transcendent being and 
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rationality,” namely, the Word.
42
 In this sense, the unity is far from being an external 
constraint upon God as if He were at the disposal of necessities other than those of His 
freedom and love. Torrance notes that we hardly discern the unity between God and 
the world simply through a scientific examination of nature. This is because the unity 
demands that the world be in conformity with God’s Word but not the other way 
round. Apart from the revealed Word, natural science will tend to posit a dualist 
characterization of the God-world nexus as opposed to relational unity in difference. 
5.1.3.3 The Medium of Space and Time 
Torrance’s perception of our contingent freedom and the God-world unity shows his 
opposition to determinism, deism, dualism and naturalism, all of which fail to register 




Torrance finds that familiar ways of thinking about God have been distorted by 
faulty understandings of space and time in ancient physics and philosophy. He writes, 
The theological lesson to be learned here is that deism and determinism go 
together. From the point of view of natural science, what is at stake is the 
radical dualism between absolute time and space identified with the containing 
life and presence of God and relative, apparent time and space of this world, 
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Theology in Reconstruction (London: SCM, 1965). 
 188 





This thought presupposes “a necessary and timeless relation between the world and 




In addition, Torrance finds that contemporary philosophy also exercises a 
baleful influence in this regard. For example, Kantian notion of space and time as “a 
priori forms of intuition” transfers “absolute space and time from the mind of God to 
the mind of the human knower”.
46
 Owing to these improper presuppositions about 
space and time, classical dualism and determinism become generalized and prevalent 
in modern thought. 
However, in Torrance’s eyes, these presuppositions are neither justified nor in 
accordance with early Christian theology. He points out, 
Early Christian theology sought to give an account of contingent rationality in 
terms of space and time which are the bearers of all rational order within the 
universe, but which were brought into being out of nothing along with the 





This implies that the space and time system is not an outside container which 
transcends contingence; rather, it is an intrinsic feature of the contingent order. 
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Torrance insists that space and time have to be “an inescapable ingredient in the 
subject-matter of science in our attempts to grasp the vectorial character of process 
and change within the moving system of the universe, for that raises with us questions 
of ultimate origins and ultimate ends.”
48
  
Early Christian theology enables Torrance to see space and time as aspects 
rather than containers of the created world. He gladly finds that this angle is confirmed 
by Einsteinian physics. For, according to his understanding of Einstein’s development 
on the dynamic field of space-time, “time itself enters with space into the structure of 
the field” and hence radically undermines the classical notion of matter.
49
 The 
reconstruction relativizes time and causality and “deepens the concept of order in 
fundamental relationships”.
50
 From this, Torrance perceives “a finite but unbounded 
universe with open, dynamic structures grounded in a depth of objectivity and 
intelligibility which commands and transcends our comprehension.”
51
 
With the evidence of modern science, Torrance claims that we must think of 
space and time as “relations intrinsic to the on-going contingent processes of the 
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universe” instead of unvarying containers.
52
 The space-time concept itself introduces a 
continuous, dynamic, reciprocal relation between explicit occurrence and implicit 
power. This relational interpretation of space and time brings a revolutionary view of 
the world. He indicates, 
Everything changes…when space is no longer regarded as empty but filled 
with matter and energy, and when time enters effectively into the equation as 
an inalienable ingredient in the intervening relations between particles or 
events affecting their configuration…so that particles or events are to be 





It is in this sense that space and time become the medium of the God-world relation. 
For him, such a perception of space and time coheres with the perception of 
God’s constantly sustaining; but more importantly, it helps us to understand the 
incarnation event better. Since space and time mark the intrinsic openness and 
changing of the universe in which “all absolutes fall away”
54
, we should behold the 
incarnation as the ultimate proof and demonstration of the openness of the universe to 
God. Furthermore, we should also behold the incarnation as an event spatially and 
temporally extended in history. In other words, it is true and effective not merely there 
and then, but also here and now.  
5.1.3.4 The Interrelation of Communication and Reflection 
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Torrance claims that “the universe is characterized throughout not by a static but by a 
dynamic stability.”
55
 In comprehension of his thoughts above, we may see that this 
dynamic stability necessarily associates with the interrelation between God and the 
universe. In regard to the interrelation, Torrance perceives the double dynamics from 
both sides of God and the world. 
From the side of God, there is a constant communication of the sufficient 
reason to uphold contingent orderliness. Torrance points out that God sustains the not-
self-sufficient world with His own rationality; natural laws are subject not to any 
absolute logic but to the sufficient reason which God communicates to the world in 
space and time. Therefore, “in the dynamic space-time continuum, as indeed in all 
motion, we operate with the principle of sufficient reason and not with the principle of 
non-contradiction which is concerned with necessary relations.”
56
 In other words, 
there is no static and logically compelling relation between God and the world.
57
  
From the side of the world, there is a continuous reflection of God’s freedom 
and intelligibility in the contingent order. Torrance indicates,  
This has to do with the astonishing flexibility and multivariability of the 
universe arising out of the freedom which God has conferred upon it in his 
creation. Far from being incompatible with the transcendent freedom of God it 
is creatively and continuously sustained by him as a creaturely reflection of his 
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own. This correlation of the freedom of the universe with the unlimited 
freedom of the Creator enters into the very core of contingent intelligibility and 
the kind of spontaneous order that it yields in nature, which we are unable to 





Here we see that the relational dynamics not only come from God but also point back 
to God. God confers and sustains in order to be reflected. This discloses the deeper 
level of the unity between God and the world. That is to say, God not just upholds the 
world with sufficient reason; He demands the response from the world by the same 
reason, too. It is this reflection that dynamically illustrates how the God-world relation 
is a perfect unitary one. 
On the subject of this reflective relation, we have to say a bit more. Torrance 
claims that, “the reason for the creation is theologically traced back to the free, 
ungrudging will of God’s love to create a reality other than himself which he 
correlates so closely with himself that it is made to reflect and shadow forth on its 
contingent level his own inner rationality and order.”
59
 So God’s creation includes a 
purpose that God has for what He creates. The purpose is embedded within the 
creation, actively directing the proper mode of contingent existence, and constituting a 
necessary part of the unitary relation between God and the creation. The ultimate 
rationality of creation hence becomes a two-fold affair: the self-giving love from God 
to the world and the purposive reflection from the world to God. Together these 
comprise the eternal will of God to bring the world into being. This enriched 
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understanding is important, for it develops the God-world relationship from a 
sufficient-contingent one into a loving-reflecting one. Hence the world must respond 
to God even as it exists contingently in dependence upon God. In Torrance’s eyes, this 
relational understanding conforms to biblical teaching. 
The biblical tradition preferred to speak of it in terms of the creative address of 
God’s Word which summons the processes of the contingent world into 
orderly and harmonious antiphonal response. Thus there is generated 
throughout the universe under the creative power of God’s Word a creaturely 





5.1.4 The Human-world Relationship 
 
Finally, we must mention the human-world relationship in Torrance’s doctrine of 
creation. Its major theme is humanity’s priestly and redemptive role in the world. 
Although Torrance does not develop this in many places, this notion still guides us 
into a deeper layer of reflection on God’s relation to creation. It also helps us to 
perceive a precious feature of Torrance’s anthropology, i.e. a horizontal and creation-
contextualized understanding of humanity, which he does not often address. 
5.1.4.1. The Priesthood of Creation 
Torrance regards humankind as priests of creation. He writes,  
From the perspective of theology man is clearly made the focal point in the 
interrelations between God and the universe. He is given a special place within 
the creation with a ruling and a priestly function to perform toward the rest of 
created reality. All lines of rationality and order, of purpose and fulfillment in 
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In Torrance’s view, God and the natural world interrelate through human beings. To 
be the focal point is to be the middle link at the intermediary place. This place of 
humankind “has a particular importance for the whole multi-levelled structure” 
because “the universe as a whole is formed in such a way that man constitutes that 
intelligent ingredient in it through whose heuristic inquiry and creative activity the 
universe knows and unfolds itself in developing rational order and expression.”
62
 
Corresponding to the hierarchy and unitary nature of the rational relation between God 
and His creation, their priestly function suggests that human beings, as the crown of 
the intelligent creation, mediate the “higher” level (i.e. the sufficient reason of God) 
with the “lower” level (i.e. the contingent order of the world). That is why Torrance 
uses the phrase “as man of God and man of science” to summarize our priesthood.
63
 
Torrance highly values the rational and scientific mediation of humankind for 
the creation. He indicates, “Without him [i.e. humankind] the various levels of 
contingent reality in the universe would lapse back into meaninglessness and 
pointlessness, but with and through him the meaning and the purpose of the universe 
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are disclosed and effectuated.”
64
 This fact is told from another side as “the sad story of 
ecological chaos” caused by fallen humankind.
65
 Torrance emphasizes that “when man 
himself is seized of evil, and his interaction with the Creator is damaged and 
disordered, his interaction with nature becomes damaged and disordered as well.”
66
 In 
this sense, human beings sin against the integrity of the creation as they fail to mediate 
between the “higher” and “lower” levels properly. 
5.1.4.2. The Redemption of Creation 
Torrance points out that since evil irrupted into the creation and introduced disorder, 
the priestly role of humankind “must take on a redemptive form”, i.e. “to save the 
natural order through remedial and integrative activity”.
67
 This is the supposed 
relationship of us to the world now. However, we need to be saved from our own 
disordered situation firstly, if we are to save nature. “[T]he deliverance of the natural 
order from subjection to futility and corruption ultimately depends on the destiny of 
man in his relation to God.”
68
 That is to say, the redemption of creation must rely on 
the salvation of humanity in Christ. By this Torrance turns the focus on the significant 
event of incarnation. 
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In a later section, we will deal with Torrance’s teachings on the significance of 
incarnation for creation. Here, nevertheless, we take an initial step to see how he views 
the incarnation of Christ associated with the human-world relationship and humanity’s 
redemptive function in creation. Torrance asserts,  
The fact that God has taken the way of becoming man in allying himself with 
contingent existence and thereby effecting the redemption of the creation from 
within its ontological foundations, immensely reinforces the unique place of 
man in the universe. And in that it is redeemed man who is established at the 
head of the whole system of inter-level interaction throughout the created order, 
man’s priestly function in the universe now takes on the pattern of a 




For Torrance, God’s taking a human form makes the unique position of humankind 
ever clear and assured. Since Christ ontologically conquers sin and disorder within 
humanity, he restores humanity’s proper interaction with both God and the world. The 
proper mediation of humankind between the “higher” and “lower” levels becomes 
possible again. Therefore the incarnation is a movement that reconciles not only the 
God-human relationship but also the human-world relationship. In Christ humankind 
re-establishes a harmony with the rest of the creaturely world. Without this harmony, 
human beings can do nothing to save the natural world from disorder through their 
scientific involvement in it.  
For this reason, Torrance considers God’s salvation of humanity through the 
incarnation as something directly taking place “at the very heart of the creation” and 
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ultimately answering “the question of evil in the creation”.
70
 In other words, it is 
through re-ordering our existence and assuring our destiny in Christ that God calls us 
to fulfill the redemptive mission for the whole creation through our rational mediation 
in it. Torrance  sums up humanity’s redemptive vocation like this: 
It is now the role of man in union with Christ to serve the purpose of God’s 
love in the ongoing actualization of that redemption, sanctification and renewal 
within the universe…Thus man has been called to be a kind of midwife to 
creation, in assisting nature out of its divinely given abundance constantly to 
give birth to new forms of life and richer patterns of order. Indeed, as the 
covenant-partner of Jesus Christ man may be regarded as the priest of creation, 
through whose service…the marvelous rationality, symmetry, harmony and 
beauty of God’s creation are being brought to light and given expression in 






5.2 A Christocentric Understanding of Creation 
 
The significance of the incarnation for creation is an important topic for Torrance. It 
carries his quintessentially Christocentric theology into the doctrine of creation. We 
will first approach this from his critique of natural theology. 
5.2.1 The Paradox of Natural Theology 
 
In discussing how we could perceive the profound truth of the contingent creation in 
relation to God, Torrance insists upon the inadequacy of natural theology. He supports 
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this conviction through exposing the paradox of natural science: “The basic problem 
that faces us in the relations between theological science and natural science has to do 
with a deep paradox in the heart of natural science itself.”
72
  
On the one hand, Torrance acknowledges that the scientific understanding of 
the world is necessary. This is because natural laws confirm the objectivity of the 
contingent order which is conferred by God. God affirms them as real even for 
Himself in His actual relation to the universe, and He obliges us to respect them as 
upheld by His divine sanction. “[W]e cannot think of his interaction with the universe 
as in any way interfering with its laws or thereby introducing disorder into what he has 
made, but rather the reverse, as reinforcing its contingent rationality and giving 
constancy to its immanent order.”
73
 
Yet, on the other hand, Torrance insists that natural science is inadequate to 
uncover the real origin of the universe in the first place. This is because natural laws 
only apply to “those observable processes of a nature that is already in being” but not 
to “those creative processes by which what is nature came into being”.
74
  
In the prosecution of our scientific inquiries we can only move along the 
intelligible relations and their sequences latent in the world until we reach the 
boundaries where they break off, and where we find it scientifically 
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That is to say, the primary secret of creation ultimately rests beyond the created world 
in the Creator God. To this extent, a scientific knowledge of creation fundamentally 
needs the revelation from God. 
Further to the objective-yet-inadequate status of natural science, Torrance 
points to a similarly paradoxical feature of natural theology. He appeals to the dual 
conviction of Reformed theology that, “nothing can be established about contingence 
except through divine revelation (nihil constat de contingentia nisi ex revelatione), 
and, divine creation requires us to investigate the contingent world out of its own 
natural processes alone; without including God in the given (acsi deus non daretur).”
76
 
For this reason, Torrance asserts that natural theology based on natural science cannot 
stand by itself to disclose the fundamental truth of the contingent creation. We need 
the divine revelation of the Word incarnate in Christ to gain an understanding of 
creation. 
5.2.2 The Ultimate Rationality of the Word Incarnate 
 
For Torrance, the innermost secret of creation is the reason and motivation that 
explain why God creates. He indicates, “What we cannot understand is that God who 
has no need of the world should have reason to create such a rational world, yet it is 
that reason hidden deep in God that ultimately lies behind all the reasonableness of the 
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 The traditional answer to the question “had pointed to the ungrudging 
goodness of God who instead of keeping his goodness to himself framed the world in 
order that it might reflect his own goodness and order.”
78
 Torrance explains that, since 
God was free not to create, the act of creation should be understood as an act of pure 
grace dependent upon God’s beneficent will. Abiding with his understanding of God 
that “God can never be anything but love or anything but the Father,”
79
 Torrance 
believes that the motivation behind God’s creative act must be in accord with His 
fatherhood and have taken place in His out-flowing love. God’s fatherly love is the 
substance of God’s beneficent will for the creation. Hence, God the Father created the 
world in order to pour out His fatherly love onto the world so that it can share the 
loving communion of His own. Torrance draws upon the ancient Church fathers in 
stating,  
In himself, as Hilary used to say, God is not ‘solitary’, for as Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit he is an eternal communion of love and personal being in himself. 
Earlier Irenaeus had argued that although God is wholly self-sufficient in the 
inner fellowship of his being, God does not will to exist for himself alone, but 
has freely and spontaneously brought a world into existence out of non-
existence to which he has given an integrity of its own and in which he has 
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planted rational creaturely beings upon whom he may bestow his bounty and 




However, this belief cannot be proved by science. In other words, we cannot get to 
know the ultimate rationality of creation through studying the created world itself. 
Torrance insists that the ultimate rationality of creation is yet to be thoroughly 
perceived until the Word is incarnated in the world. 
Tracing the origin of creation, Torrance stresses that the universe was brought 
into being only through the Word. The concept of ex nihilo excludes any other agent 
from creation. The Word alone is “the divine agent of creation”.
81
 But he does not 
think of the Word in a pure transcendent meaning apart from the incarnation. For him, 
the Word becomes knowable only through Jesus Christ, therefore it is the Word 
centered in Christ that can provide a proper knowledge of creation.   
Torrance argues that the incarnate Word distinguishes Christianity from 
Judaism, and gives a more profound understanding of the contingent creation. 
Through relating creation to the incarnation of God’s Word in Jesus Christ, Christian 
theology radicalizes the notion of contingence and grants reality to the notion of 
contingent intelligibility. It enables us to see that the universe is endowed with not 
only “an astonishing constancy and reliability” but also a kind of “spontaneity and 
freedom which will always take us by surprise.”
82
 For Torrance, “this is what we 
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should expect of a creation called into being and sustained by the sovereign Creator 
revealed in Jesus Christ, for in Jesus Christ we discern this same astonishing 
combination of freedom and constancy, of spontaneity and reliability, of 
unpredictability [i.e. contingence] and order.”
83
 
5.2.3 The Significance of the Incarnation 
 
Torrance claims that the event in which the Creator became a creature “forced 
theology to probe more deeply into the traditional concept of creation out of nothing 
and the nature of created existence.”
84
 The incarnation is “the intersecting vertical 
dimension which gives the horizontal coordinates of the universe the integrative factor 
providing them with consistent and ultimate meaning, in a way which a merely deistic 
asymptotic relation between God and the universe could never do.”85 It proves that 
the lower level of the created world is “open at its own ‘boundary conditions’” to the 
higher level of the Creator God.
86
 The mystery of Christ is about a boundary-breaking 
secret.  He argues, 
Thus there are, it would seem, sets of circumstances or events in the life of 
Jesus, as he is presented in the Gospels, which do not seem to make sense to us 
when we regard them merely on the level of observable phenomena, for they 
conflict with the orderly way we are accustomed to interpret phenomena, but 
when we consider them in correlation with additional factors introduced from a 
higher level, they are discerned to present a profoundly intelligible pattern 
compelling the assent of our minds. That happens only in the framework 
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created by the bearing of the incarnation upon the creation which provides the 





How, then, does the incarnation make us perceive Creation in greater depth? Torrance 
answers this by illustrating the significance of the incarnation for the recreating of the 
world in a way that fulfils the ultimate rationality of creation.  
Torrance contends that the incarnation is a re-creative event. After the Fall, the 
orderly universe has become disordered under all kinds of threats including a 
complete destruction into nothingness (i.e. the annihilation of creation). In order to 
restore the order, God directly entered into the disordered condition of the world to 
correct it from within its own structure. Through this re-creative act, God’s ultimate 
love for creation becomes consummated. He writes, 
Through astonishing self-communication to the creature he [i.e. God] has 
established in the incarnation a supreme axis, as it were, for direct interaction 
with the creation within its contingent existence and structure, which is at the 
same time the pledge of his eternal faithfulness that he will never let go what 
he has made, allowing it to decay and crumble away into nothingness, but will 





Several things implied here merit further interpretation.  
First, the incarnation restores the created order through establishing a direct 
interaction of God with the world. Torrance believes that the Creator-creature 
interaction before the incarnation is indirect due to the substantial otherness of God 
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from what He created. The incarnation, however, establishes a new type of interaction, 
that is, God breaks the Creator-creature boundary and intervenes in the world in a 
direct manner.
89
 Although this direct interaction is miraculous for the world, it is 
neither the suspending nor abrogating of the contingent order but rather “the re-
creating and deepening of that order” in the face of all that threatens to break it 
down.
90
 Therefore it is the “supreme axis” above any indirect ones.
91
 
 Second, the incarnation preserves the contingent creation with an eternal 
pledge of God’s embodiment in the world. As Colyer notes, the incarnation in 
Torrance’s theology discloses “a further point about the contingent creation”, i.e. the 
creation is in such “a precarious state” that “God has to step in and save it by uniting 
creation with himself in atoning reconciliation.”
92
 Torrance believes that the creation 
out of nothing is only contingent and not stable per se. Human corruption worsens the 
situation and entangles the whole contingent being under a fatal destruction. In order 
to preserve creation from decaying back into nothingness, God embodied Himself into 
creation to sustain its existence. Therefore, the personal embodiment of God seals a 
divine and eternal pledge that the Creator will never let the creation go. For this reason 
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Torrance emphasizes that the person of Jesus Christ is the divine pledge and the 
resurrection of Christ assures us of God’s absolute power “over all being and non-
being”
93
 in particular. It is in the risen Christ that we find a firm security for the 
contingent creation.  
Third and the most important, the incarnation consummates the purpose of 
God’s rational love for creation. Torrance interprets this idea mainly from the 
perspective of revelation, i.e. the incarnation completes the revelation of God’s loving 
rationality for creation.
94
 Torrance claims that the ultimate rationality of creation is 
God’s fatherly love. This claim is only convincing if explained only by the fact that 
God has no need of the universe but nevertheless brought it into being. God indeed 
created freely and almightily in the beginning. However, the love behind the freedom 
and almightiness had not been manifested in its fullest measure until the incarnation in 
which God condescended to redeem what He created with His own passion. Torrance 
writes, “It was the manifestation of that divine love in Jesus Christ, the Logos, Mind 
or Reason of God made flesh, which made theologians realize that the universe has a 
transcendent reason for its being, grounded beyond itself in the love of the Father and 
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the Son and the Holy Spirit.”
95
 Christ shows us that God’s almightiness “conflicts with 
the ideas of limitless arbitrary power” according to our worldly experiences, but “is of 
an altogether different kind”, i.e. of passionate love.
96
 Therefore, unless we understand 
what God’s freedom and sovereignty really are in the light of what God has done in 
Jesus Christ, we cannot fully claim the great love hidden in God’s free and almighty 
act of creation.  
It is not difficult to see that Torrance’s emphasis falls upon the significance of 
the incarnation for creation’s subsistence as well as our recognition of it. On the one 
hand, the incarnation rescued the creation by embodying the eternal Word within the 
contingent order of the cosmos. The instability of creation hence becomes secured 
from destruction by God’s direct upholding of it from within the contingent order. On 
the other hand, the incarnation enables us to fully recognize creation as a loving 
project of God. We know God’s creative power as love only through the passion of 
Christ. It is the passion manifested by the incarnate God that makes us see the loving 
substance of God’s sovereign Word. Thereby we can claim the same sovereignty of 
love in God’s original creative action.  
5.2.4 The Unity of Creation and Salvation in the New Creation 
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Through unfolding the significance of the incarnation for creation, Torrance seals the 
unity of creation and salvation within the incarnate Word. He believes that this fact 
enables Christian theology to affirm “a single rational order [which] pervades all 
created existence contingent upon the transcendent rationality of God,”
97
 for all 
creation has its beginning and its new beginning in a single rational source, i.e. the 
Word of God. The singularity of the Word-based rationality marks the unity of 
creation and salvation. 
But we should remember that Torrance focuses on the Christocentric Word, i.e. 
the incarnate Word, rather than the abstract Word apart from incarnation. Therefore 
the Word-based creation must be a Christ-centred one.
98
 So we must understand the 
original creation out of nothing through Christ’s incarnation of the divine Word within 
created reality. In this sense, creation cannot stand independently from salvation but 
has to be united with(in) it.  
Therefore the unity of creation and salvation indicates the submission of 
creation to the norm of salvation, and not the other way round. For Torrance, this is 
the best way to reflect the singularity of rationality in the world as well as in God. 
That is to say: in the first place, as the intelligible origin of the world is realized 
through the subject of the incarnation, i.e. the divine Word or Son, we find a pervasive, 
                                                 
97
 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 103. 
98
 In Torrance’s eyes, the Word-centered doctrine of creation is particularly for New Testament 
teaching and Nicene theology. He claims, “Of paramount importance, of course, for 
Athanasius and all the Nicene theologians were the first chapters of St John’s Gospel and of 
the Epistles to the Colossians and the Hebrews, in which a Christ-centred and Word-centred 
doctrine of creation was presented.” (The Trinitarian Faith, 77.) 
 208 
multi-variable, unitary order or intelligibility in the universe in both the original 
creation and its re-creation through Christ’s salvation. Meanwhile, as the event of 
salvation discloses God’s heart toward the world, we perceive an identical reason and 
coherent purpose of God in both His creative and redemptive acts. Furthermore, as 
God is incarnated into the creaturely world, we realize (with surprise) the embodiment 
of creative intelligibility (i.e. the Word) in the world. Thus we see the unity of the two 
at the deepest level. These three elements comprise the main argument of Torrance’s 
opposition against all forms of pluralism and polymorphism as well as against any 
dualism between God and the world. The unitary relation is finally anchored in Christ, 
the incarnate Word, rather than in creation itself. 
The unity of creation with salvation centered in Christ consequently implies 
the superiority of the new creation achieved through Christ. In this context, Torrance 
asserts that Christ is the head of the new creation for “all creation with which God 
allied himself so inextricably in the incarnation has been set on the entirely new basis 
of his saving grace.”
99
 In this saving grace, Christ “opens the way [for the creation] 
through his resurrection into a new state of affairs far transcending the old, in which 
evil and disorder will be finally eliminated and God’s purpose of love for his creation 
will be perfectly fulfilled.”
100
 Such a new state brings a new freedom that the 
contingent creation could have never enjoyed before. That is an absolute freedom of 
being beyond any threat of instability and destruction. In other words, the new creation, 
though still contingent, becomes ever stable and indestructible. Undoubtedly, all the 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 138. 
100
 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 137. 
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newness must stand upon the new relational ground – the Creator and creature have 
become one in Christ so that “the ontological relation between the contingent universe 
and the Creator is securely anchored in God himself.”
101
 Torrance asserts that this 
pattern definitely differs from the original pattern, for the incarnation is something 




5.3 Critique – Pursuing the Integration of Different Doctrinal 
Perspectives 
 
5.3.1 Construction Contribution 
 
With respect to Torrance’s interpretation of creation, we find there some inspiring 
insights and connections. These contribute significantly to theology in general and to 
theological anthropology more specifically. 
5.3.1.1 The Dialectical Relation of Creation 
Torrance’s principal contribution is to stress the dialectical character of contingence. 
Torrance unfolds the contingence of creation as the interlocking of the dependence 
and independence of the world in relation with God. This dialectical link provides the 
key to understanding everything within and of the world as related to but distinguished 
from God, in particular, the freedom and rationality of the world. According to this 
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 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 139. 
102
 Torrance explains that “In the incarnation God was free to do something new even for 
himself, for he was not eternally incarnate, and free to move outside to himself.” (Divine and 
Contingent Order, 6, italics added.) 
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insight, we find the right way to view the God-world relationship by avoiding the 
dualism of deistic construction and the monism of pantheism.  The dialectical unitary 
relation secures the God-world relationship in a manner that does justice to both divine 
transcendence and immanence.  
This is highly significant for theological anthropology. A critical issue for 
modern theology battling against the anthropocentric tendency of post-Enlightenment 
approaches is whether we should regard God and humankind both as subject or 
prioritize God alone as the subject.
103
 In other words, should we allow a theocentric 
theology to grant to humanity the position of subject, with the result that human 
activity is prioritized. Brunner and Barth offered different responses that seem 
incompatible with one another. Torrance, with his doctrine of contingence however, 
helps us to re-conceptualize this problem. Hence, if we agree that creatio ex nihilo 
includes humankind, we need to consider the God-human relation as being included in 
the God-world relation (although they are not exactly the same) and thus sharing the 
dialectical elements of dependence and independence. As a part of the contingent 
creation, humankind is both dependent on and independent of God. God is the sole 
absolute subject on whom everything is dependent, and yet humanity is given a 
relative independence by virtue of its created rationality. These two aspects interlock 
with each other. We have maintained them both, rather than set them in a binary 
either-or disjunction. This reflects the experience of faith, and is here explained by the 
doctrine of contingence. In this sense, Torrance makes a valuable contribution in 
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enabling us to place the subjective freedom and responsibility of humankind in a 
balanced perspective. This is also reflected in his soteriology with reference to the 
dual movement in Christ, as divine and human. On the one hand, we can underline 
God’s initiative and prior action in Christ, and yet on the other hand we can make 
sense of the response of Christ as a human person to God the Father. 
5.3.1.2 The Dynamic Structure of Creation 
Another important gain in Torrance’s account of creation lies in his stress on the 
dynamic structure of creation. Torrance helps us see from a rational and scientific 
perspective that the universe is a dynamic system open to changes which are neither 
wholly determined nor completely random. This enables us better to understand 
miracles (such as incarnation and resurrection) as new and undetermined actions of 
God which nevertheless can be recognized as expressions of divine wisdom and 
rationality, as opposed to freak and random events. With this help, we need not 
“demythologize” the miracles that the Bible testifies as historically true. In other 
words, theology does not need demythologization for the sake of its communication to 
a rational audience. Whether we believe the theological truth of the divine miracles 
which happened in history depends on whether we believe the scientific truth of the 
contingent order open to the sufficient rationality.  
In addition, this dynamic structure is strengthened by the space and time 
structures of the creation. Torrance’s new spatial-temporal view makes us see that 
everything in the world takes place within the expanding dynamics of space-time. It 
not only discloses creation as an on-going system but also uncovers God’s on-going 
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preservation through the spatial-temporal medium. The constant existence of the world 
and the continuous sustaining of God can be understood more clearly from within this 
perspective. This is of significance for theological anthropology. Our salvation takes 
place through the vicarious humanity of Christ within the spatio-temporal structures of 
creation. The incarnation of Christ is not a static metaphysical event but one of 
dynamic relational significance for the whole created order. 
5.3.1.3 The Reflective Purpose of Creation 
Although not original to Torrance, his linking of creation and salvation is particularly 
effective.  The doctrine of the contingence starts from a basic conviction: God creates 
the world neither by necessity nor by accident; there must be a reason behind His 
creative act, and the world must be created in wisdom. Following the classical 
tradition of the church, Torrance sees the reason for creation (i.e. the ultimate 
rationality in Torrance’s phrase) in the overflowing love of God. Torrance integrates 
divine wisdom and love by perceiving the purpose of God to reflect back the dynamic 
rationality and relationality of God’s eternal life. So God lets His love outflow not 
because it is superfluous but because it is driven by His eternal wisdom within the life 
of the Godhead. 
 Torrance’s teaching at this point echoes and supports his anthropology. As we 
have seen, Torrance asserts the imago Dei to be a dynamic reflection rather than a 
static possession. His theology of creation enables us to situate in wider context this 
anthropological claim. As a dynamic system established by God for a purpose, the 
entire universe is the matrix for our own particular relation to God. That is why 
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Torrance regards human beings as priests (not the opponents) of creation. This world 
of space-time is our home, and is not merely a temporary staging post. Here Torrance 
provides the scope for theological anthropology to examine our relationship with the 
world, although he himself does not explore it deeply. It at least allows theology to 
consider from a positive angle who we are “in the world” alongside our relationship of 
union with Christ.  It is the incarnate Christ who assumes a created human nature and 
who enables us to fulfil our relation in and for the rest of creation. Thus the horizontal 
dimension of human life is not excluded; rather, it becomes a necessary element in the 
understanding of the imago Dei. 
5.3.2 Criticisms of Christocentrism and Rationality 
 
Torrance’s doctrine of creation integrates theological and scientific approaches to 
creation. It enables us to understand our contingence in relation to the Word which 
became incarnate. But while we find many inspiring insights here, we must also pose 
some questions about his understanding of Christocentrism and our created rationality. 
5.3.2.1 Is the Word without Incarnation Sufficient for Creation? 
In relation to the ultimate ground of creation, Torrance stresses the Christocentric 
Word, i.e. the incarnate Word.
104
 As we have observed, he underlines not only the 
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 As he claims, “the incarnate Son or Logos, through whom all things were made and in 
whom they hold together, is the central and creative source of all order and rationality within 
the created universe.” (Divine and Contingent Order, 2.) The pronoun “whom” in this 
sentence is a bit ambiguous. It can indicate the Son/Logos or the incarnate Son/Logos. 
Torrance might not mean to claim that all things were made through the incarnate Son/Logos, 
but he shows a clear inclination to assert that all things hold together in the incarnate 
Son/Logos. For Torrance, being incarnate or not does matter for it marks the difference of the 
 214 
revelatory significance but also the salvific significance of the incarnation. The 
incarnate Word not only reveals the ultimate rationality of creation but also establishes 
a new God-world relationship to save the creation from destruction. While the two 
aspects are both important, the latter particularly manifests the decisive effect of 
incarnation for the creation.  Our first question also arises here: is the Word without 
incarnation sufficient for the existence of creation? 
One of Torrance’s arguments is that the universe, as being contingent by nature, 
just cannot avoid the threat of slipping back into nothingness. Human sin only worsens 
the precarious state.
105
 Christ’s cosmic salvation indicates that the whole universe 
finally needs the incarnate Word to secure its existence. Unless the eternal Word 
becomes embodied into contingent existence, this threat cannot be removed. In other 
words, whether or not we sin, the creation seems to be threatened by nothingness in 
any case. This is only resolved by Christ’s incarnation. On account of this conviction, 
Torrance regards the incarnation as the “pledge of God’s eternal faithfulness” and the 
                                                                                                                                            
old and the new relationship between God and the world. In this sense “the Son/Logos” 
(transcendent in eternity, or, in the beginning without incarnation) and “the incarnate 
Son/Logos” are not completely identical and equivalent concepts in Torrance’s theology. Since 
he underlines the definitive significance of incarnation (i.e. the new God-world relationship 
formed by the incarnation) for the creation, we have reason to believe that in this statement of 
Torrance the pronoun “whom” indicates “the incarnate Son or Logos” more likely. 
105
 Please refer to the content related to the footnotes 91-97. For Torrance, human’s sin does 
cause disorder to nature, but there is no necessary cause-and-effect connection between the 
orderly or disorderly existence of the world and the evil of humankind. For example, he 
indicates, “It would also be true to say that in and through the profound interconnection of 
order and disorder in which man and nature share together, nature constantly reveals 
surprising new possibilities in spite of man, which can have a healing and rectifying effect on 
him, for after all it is much more in man himself than in nature that evil has lodged itself.” 
(Divine and Contingent Order, 130-131)  
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“supreme axis for God’s direct interaction” with the creation; this alone guarantees the 
safety of creation from decaying into nothingness.
106
  
Such an argument suggests a certain insufficiency of the Word without the 
incarnation for the preserving of the creation ex nihilo. That is to say, when God first 
brought the world into being out of nothing with His Word which had not become 
incarnate yet, something was still pending to “actualize” His providential will in 
creation and to guarantee the result of His creative act.
107
 Before God became flesh, 
the world was spared from nothingness by God in a kind of semi-secured or half-
provided way. The so-called sufficient rationality of God somehow was yet to be truly 
sufficient for preserving the created being and order until it became incarnate. This is 
probably the real implication of Torrance’s statement that the incarnation event 
“forced theology to probe more deeply into the traditional concept of creation out of 
nothing and the nature of created existence.”
108
 
Here we find again that in Torrance’s theology Christocentrism is not merely 
an epistemological conviction but ultimately an ontological conviction.
109
 The crux 
falls upon the event of incarnation which he regards as the all-decisive foundation not 
only for the salvation but also for the creation. Therefore our question actually 
concerns what is God’s original will in the act of creatio ex nihilo. In other words, it is 
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 See again footnote 88.  
107
 Torrance clearly states, “The incarnation is to be interpreted as the alliance of the Creator 
with his creation in actualization of his will to make himself responsible for its preservation 
and salvation.” (Divine and Contingent Order, 135, italics added.) 
108
 See again footnote 84.  
109
 We have mentioned this Christocentric character in Torrance’s doctrine of the Trinity in the 
previous chapter. 
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beyond the epistemological issue and points to the ontological issue about God and 
creation per se.
110
 At the very least, there seems to be an aporia in Torrance’s writing 
at this point.  One might speak of the original act of creation as having the incarnation 
in view, and therefore of God’s sustaining of the universe in a way that proleptically 
anticipates the incarnation.  Alternatively, one might reflect upon the incarnation and 
resurrection as pronouncing decisively that what God created as good is always to be 
maintained and upheld by God’s love.  The incarnation thus guarantees for all eternity 
the reality of the creation from out of nothing. 
5.3.2.2 What Is the Role of Rationality in Our Reflection of God? 
What is the role of rationality for our reflection of God? Torrance’s doctrine of 
creation highly values the rationality that God gives to what He created. He illustrates 
the dialectical character of contingence mainly through exposing the close relationship 
between the uncreated rationality of God and the created rationality of the world. He 
emphasizes that the latter is not only grounded in but also reflects the former. 
Humankind, as the culmination of the rational creation, has a mediatory position 
between the two rationalities in particular. Their scientific activity significantly 
matters for the reflection of God in creation. That is why the imago Dei has a general 
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 We have no question about the epistemological dimension of Torrance Christocentrism, i.e. 
how can we know the ultimate rationality of God in His original creation.  
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significance for the whole universe and a particular one for the human being.
111
 
Rationality is given a central role in this picture.  
However, we do not find much continuity of expression in this regard in 
Torrance’s anthropology. The value of rationality disappears from his interpretation of 
humanity as the reflection of God. As we see in Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, Torrance 
finally abandons any identification of a rational element with the imago Dei.
112
 There 
is neither connection between the scientific study of nature and the knowledge of God 
nor connection between faith in God’s Word and the rational capacity of human 
beings. His high view of the rational bond between God and the world and humankind 
in some places becomes a very low view in other places. The role of rationality in the 
reflection of God finally disappears from view in his more detailed anthropological 
analysis. 
This is principally explained by the radical effect of sin. But Torrance further 
explains that humanity should be defined not by its relation to the world but by its 
relation to God.
113
 This principle is not wrong. Nevertheless, his teaching about 
humankind’s position in creation interweaves these two relations. We cannot talk 
                                                 
111
 In Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, the concept of the imago Dei has already been understood in a 
dynamic sense, i.e. the reflection of God, rather than the static sense, i.e. the portrait or 
likeness of God.  
112
 That is what we have discussed in his Barthian interpretation of Calvin and his response to 
the Brunner-Barth controversy. In Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, he started with the rationality-
related imago Dei in humanity (which Calvin and Brunner acknowledge), but finally 
abandoned it from the definition of the imago Dei (in conformity with Barth).  
113
 Torrance asserts that “Man cannot be understood by his relation to the world. It is not from 
below man that man can be understood but from above man [i.e. God].” (Calvin’s Doctrine of 
Man, 23.) Also refer to section 2.2.2.3 of this thesis. 
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about our imago-relation to God without reference to our relation to the world in 
which we mediate the universal imago Dei. Torrance himself has pointed this out in 
his doctrine of creation: 
We are concerned not just with relations between man and God but with the 
relationship of man in the universe to God the Creator of the universe, so that 
our understanding of the on-going universe itself cannot but enter into the 
coefficients of our theological statements, e.g. in their empirical correlates, not 
only when we are concerned specifically with creation and incarnation but also 
with every aspect of a theological account of God’s interaction with us in the 
world where time and space constitute the orderly medium for divine 




This statement shows that Torrance is aware of the necessary context of creation for 
the God-human relationship. Such an awareness could have led him to a more rounded 
theological anthropology which examines humanity not exclusively in its vertical 
connection with God through the supernatural event of incarnation, but also in the 
horizontal connection with the world through our empirical life. This does not entail 
returning to an anthropocentric theology without a proper focus on God or a natural 
theology that is set apart from the revelation.  As long as space and time are not static 
containers but the dynamic relations through which God interacts with us, to explore 
such the spatial-temporal creation is to explore a necessary part of the God-human 
relationship. It by no means violates the proper approach that he sets down for 
anthropology. Rather it coheres with his relational perspective for theology. 
Unfortunately, Torrance’s insight into “the relationship of man in the universe to God 
the Creator” only sparks in his doctrine of creation; it does not shine out in his 
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anthropology. This generates a gap between two doctrines in his theology. And this 
gap produces some discontinuity in his attitude to the role of rationality in the imago 
Dei (i.e. the reflection of God). 
5.3.3 Potential Complement – in Comparison with Moltmann 
 
We cannot avoid the two questions raised above as long as we consider humankind as 
a part of creation. Torrance does not address this matter in sufficient detail. Here we 
might again seek some help from other theologians. Jürgen Moltmann is one of those 
whom we might turn to in this context. In his theology, Moltmann employs a 
perspective of the cosmic Trinity to interpret God’s creative act and God’s unitary 
relation with the world. It does not necessarily stand opposed to Torrance’s teaching, 
but provides some further insights which might complement Torrance’s Christocentric 
approach. In what follows, we shall take a brief glance at Moltmann’s God in Creation 
and see how it may help with these two questions. Through such comparative 
observation, we can reach a deeper and more critical comprehension of Torrance’s 
Christocentric theology with respect to human identity in relation to both God and the 
world. 
5.3.3.1 Moltmann’s God in Creation 
Moltmann names his God In Creation “an ecological doctrine of creation”.
115
 This 
book explores “the participation of the triune God through the Spirit’s active presence 
within the world” and calls for our “respect for the created earth through an adoration 
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 Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation (London: SCM, 
1985). 
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of the triune God.”
116
 What drives this ecological doctrine of creation is Moltmann’s 
insistence upon the intimate relationship between the pneumatic triune God and the 
creation. He claims that God “through his cosmic Spirit…is present in each of his 
creatures and in the fellowship of creation which they share” so that the universe may 
“become the home and dwelling place of God’s glory”.
117
 The perichoresis of the 
Trinity is the archetype of the interpenetration of God and the world. The whole 
creation story involves the determination of the Creator Father, the sustaining 
indwelling of the life-Giver Spirit, and the perfecting salvation of the Messiah Son.
118
 
It tells the history of God with us leading to the Sabbath. By these ideas, Moltmann 
consciously avoids two trends of the orthodox understanding of creation in 
contemporary Reformed theology. One is the monotheistic emphasis on God as the 
one absolute subject over above the world; another is the Christological interpretation 
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 Moltmann made this clear in the “Preface” with a statement that “I have dropped the earlier 
divisions of theology, which followed the pattern of the three articles of the Apostles’ Creed. 
Instead I have interwoven these three articles together in a Trinitarian sense so that I was able 
to develop a pneumatological doctrine of creation.” (God in Creation, xii.)  
119
 The reasons why he intends to do so can be found in the beginning of this book. In the 
“Preface” he writes, “In the 1930s, the problem of the doctrine of creation was knowledge of 
God. Today the problem of the doctrine of God is knowledge of creation…Fifty years ago, 
discernment of the triune God revealed in Christ brought the church the assurance of faith; and 
today, in the same way, discernment of the God who is present in creation through his Holy 
Spirit can bring men and women to reconciliation and peace with nature. The salutary 
‘Christological concentration’ in Protestant theology then, must be matched today by an 
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Moltmann calls our attention to an important truth that creation is a resolve of 
God for Himself.
120
 The freely-willed act of bringing the world into being does not 
merely attest God’s liberty and almightiness; more profoundly it attests a self-
designation and self-identification of God, i.e. God determines for Himself to be the 
Creator and commits Himself to create. In order ‘to let be’ the world which is distinct 
from Him by its created nature, God withdraws Himself to make room for it. 
Moltmann emphasizes that it is God’s self-withdrawing (rather than self-pouring or 
out-flowing) that initiates the creation.
121
 Such a kenotic decision and action tells that 




Moltmann also reminds us that God makes the world for His glory and 
commits Himself in the relationship with the world for this goal. Beneath the 
creaturely appearance of the world there is always a divine purpose which involves 
God Himself. The creation is never isolated or self-closed but always supported by 
                                                                                                                                            
extension of theology’s horizon to cosmic breadth, so that it takes in the whole of God’s 
creation.” (God in Creation, xi-xii.) In the start of the first chapter he states, “As long as God 
was thought of as the absolute subject, the world had to be viewed as the object of his creation, 
preservation and redemption…Through the monotheism of the absolute subject, God was 
increasingly stripped of his connection with the world, and the world was increasingly 
secularized.” (God in Creation, 1.) 
120
 Moltmann emphasizes, “In a resolve, the author of the resolve acts on himself first of all. 
He resolves ‘for himself’ before he acts on anyone or anything else.” (God in Creation: An 
Ecological Doctrine of Creation, 217) 
121
 For Moltmann, it “points to a necessary correction in the interpretation of creation: God 
does not create merely by calling something into existence, or by setting something afoot. In a 
more profound sense he ‘creates’ by letting-be, by making room, and by withdrawing 
himself.” See God in Creation, 88. 
122
 Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation (London: SCM, 
1985), 88. 
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God and open to God. Its existence is oriented and driven by the consummation of 
God’s glory in it. How does this happen? Moltmann points out that, “God the Spirit is 
also the Spirit of the universe, its total cohesion, its structure, its information, its 
energy.”
123
 Even after the Fall, the Spirit still indwells the creation to maintain its 
existence.
124
 Despite the radical result of sin, the Spirit “turns creation’s history of 
suffering into a history of hope.”
125
 This transformation is presented in Scripture as the 
history of God’s promise.
126
 Events and experiences in this promissory history are 
determined by what happens from God’s side. “Whatever happens from God’s side 
has a certain direction, pointing from creation at the beginning to the eternal 
kingdom.”
127
 The indwelling of the Spirit in creation signifies the immanent presence 
of God as well as the self-transcending motion of creation toward the eternal 
kingdom.
128
 In this double sense, “the universe cannot be viewed as a closed 
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 Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation (London: SCM, 
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 Moltmann argues that, “If the world were completely and wholly godless and forsaken by 
the Spirit, it would have become nothing (Ps. 104.29); it would have ceased to exist. But the 
world does exist, even if it is not in a condition that could be said to be in accordance with 
God. So in the suffering history of the world of nature and human being, we have to discern 
the inexpressible sighings of the indwelling Spirit, and the suffering presence of God.” (God 
in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation, 102) 
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 Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation (London: SCM, 
1985), 102. 
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 Here Moltmann also brings out a new concept of time. Rather than a linear, temporal 
continuum, “time” is “the repetition of eternity” about what God has willed and promised. See 
God in Creation, 124-132. 
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 Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation (London: SCM, 
1985), 124.  
128
 The synchronization of the historical time and natural time is another insight projected by 
Moltmann in his ecological doctrine of creation. See God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine 
of Creation, 137-139. Some points will be involved in later part of this essay. 
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system…[but] as a system that is open – open for God and for his future.”
129
 The 
comprehension of creation comes from the whole story that integrates the beginning 
and the end. 
In this story, the most distinctive part is God’s making humankind in the imago 
Dei. Moltmann points out that God creates humankind with a self-exhortation.
130
 
Before bringing humankind into being, God resolves for Himself in eternity that His 
own image will be manifested within these creaturely beings. By such a special 
resolve, God puts Himself in a particular relationship with humankind in all its human 
existence. It implies that “[God] himself is drawn into the history of these creatures of 
his.”
131
 To understand humanity as the imago Dei also requires that we integrate its 
origin with its destiny through the history of God with human beings. This particularly 
means that “although we shall begin with a theological exposition of the Old 
Testament’s creation accounts, we shall illuminate this interpretation from the 
messianic gospel of Christ, and shall therefore relate the original designation of human 
beings to their final glorification in the kingdom of God.”
132
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 See Genesis 1.26: “Then God said, ‘Let us make humankind in our image, according to our 
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Moltmann stresses that God is always Trinitarian and pneumatic. Regarding 
the whole vision of creation directed towards the consummation of God’s glory in it, 
he states: in the operation of the Spirit, “the creation of the Father through the Son and 
the reconciliation of the world with God through Christ arrive at their goal.”
133
 For 
Moltmann, the creation must be rooted in the cosmic Trinity. The Trinitarian efficacy 
includes the first creating action of the Father, the constant indwelling of the Spirit and 
the eschatological redemption of the Son. Moreover, the cosmic Spirit establishes a 
unitary relationship between God and the world. While the world is virtually distinct 
from God, it is united with God at the same time.  By the power of the Spirit, God 
dwells in the creation and the creation exists in God. Moltmann describes this as a 
“mutual interpenetration” which is analogous to the relations within the Trinity.
134
 
Under the mutual interpenetration principle, the God-world relationship reflects the 
Trinitarian perichoresis in the cosmological domain. 
5.3.3.2 How Moltmann May Complement Torrance 
Comparing Moltmann with Torrance, we see some similar insights – for instance, the 
creative love of God, the openness of the creation, the unitary relation of God and the 
world, although these are expounded in a different way. The similarity in difference 
shows that Moltmann’s Trinitarian perspective is distinct from yet nonetheless 
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 Moltmann indicates, “all relationships which are analogous to God reflect the primal, 
reciprocal indwelling and mutual interpenetration of the Trinitarian perichoresis: God in the 
world and the world in God; heaven and earth in the kingdom of God, pervaded by his glory; 
soul and body united in the life-giving Spirit to a human whole; woman and man in the 
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beings.” See God in Creation, 17. 
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harmonious with Torrance’s Christocentric perspective. From the Trinitarian 
perspective, Moltmann perceives an open creation in unitary relation to a loving God 
without attaching too much weight at this point to the significance of incarnation. It 
suggests a resolution of the difficulty that we find in the Christocentric doctrine of 
creation, i.e. unless the incarnation takes place, God’s love in creation and His unitary 
relation with the creation cannot be recognized and secured.  
Moltmann emphasizes in the same breath the creative resolve of God (the 
Father), the immanent presence of the Spirit and the incarnational salvation of Christ 
(the Son). For him, everything about creation is fundamentally rooted in God’s 
creative resolve made in eternity. As the world is created to Himself and for His glory, 
God unfalteringly puts Himself in a unitary relationship with what He creates through 
the cosmic Spirit. To a considerable extent, Moltmann puts away the idea that 
incarnation is the moment of God’s breaking into the world and history.
135
 Instead, 
God is ever immanently indwelling in the world and directly involved in history since 
the beginning. His stronger pneumatological account of creation enables a more 
explicit affirmation of God’s presence in and commitment to created reality in all of 
its diverse manifestations. The bond between God and the world is never indirect but 
always direct and intrinsic. In this sense, the incarnation does not mean a completely 
new relationship of the God-world unity by which the contingent world finally is 
secured from annihilation. It is rather a new appearance and the climax of the God-
                                                 
135
 As we have seen in Torrance’s Christology, incarnation is emphasized to be a completely 
new event that God breaks into the human existence and history. God stays in a kind of 
indirect bond with the world till the incarnation. 
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world unity which has been always there sustaining contingent being. Before the 
incarnation, creation has been under sufficient providence and security from the loving 
God who determines to humble Himself and commit in relation with the world. It is 
God’s self-resolve in eternity and His self-involvement ever since the beginning that 
give the ultimate explanation and security to the existence of the world. But this does 
not diminish the significance of the Christ event. For Moltmann, the original creation 
necessarily and already points to the ultimate glorification of God on earth, which is 
eschatologically prefigured in Christ. The intrinsic connection between God’s creation 
and God’s glory affirms the significance of Christ’s cosmic salvation in the whole 
creation story. Moltmann acknowledges it, nevertheless, not so much in terms of 




This chapter has pointed to the rich implications of Torrance’s doctrine of creation for 
his understanding of theological anthropology. We have seen how his description of 
contingent reality in relation to God serves to identify ways in which the human 
creature can be considered both primarily dependent upon God but also in a secondary 
sense independent of God. This dialectic of dependence and independence, which 
characterizes the created world as a whole, is reflected particularly in human identity 
and provides scope for responsible creaturely activity in response to God. Moreover, 
the purpose of creation as the reflection of God’s primary wisdom and love is of 
anthropological significance with respect to our role as ‘priests of creation’. Although 
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this idea is not fully developed by Torrance, it appears to be integral to his doctrine of 
creation and full of possibility for further exploration. Finally, the Christocentric Word 
in whom the true image of God is expressed is also the Word and Wisdom by which 
the world was created. Christ himself assumes our creaturely condition. This is 
significant for understanding redemption not as a separation or escape from creation 
but as its renewal in Christ. Here the creation is eternally affirmed against forces of sin 
and nothingness. While not all of these points are fully developed by Torrance, they 
indicate some positive directions for contemporary theological anthropology. These 
can be fruitfully developed in conversation with the more pneumatological and 






Thomas F. Torrance is a theologian engaged with both the old orthodoxy and the new 
orthodoxy in theology. He draws upon the rich heritage of the Church fathers and 
Calvin. But he also reveals the strong influence of Karl Barth. Doing theology in the 
twentieth century, he is aware that “We live in an era of sharp theological conflict and 
yet of genuine advance.”
1
 And he believes that “we (can) actually engage in a critical 
and scientific approach to the basic forms of theological thinking and are ready for 
positive reconstruction in accordance with them.”
2
 For him, the critical and scientific 
approach is the Christocentrism of Barth but understood in conversation with the 
Church fathers and the Reformers, especially John Calvin. Therefore, what he intends 
is a reconstruction of traditional theology but through a more developed modern 
epistemology. His anthropology reflects and demonstrates this effort at reconstruction. 
Although he has never summarized his anthropology, we will attempt a brief summary 
before offering a final critical assessment.  
 
6.1 A Summary of Torrance’s Anthropology 
 
                                                 
1
 Thomas F. Torrance, Theology In Reconstruction (London: SCM Press, 1965), 10. 
2
 Thomas F. Torrance, Theology In Reconstruction (London: SCM Press, 1965), 10. 
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There are three important things to represent in Torrance’s anthropology. First, his 
anthropology is set in the relational framework of a God-human unity in Christ. 
Torrance firmly rejects dualism.
3
 He emphasizes the incarnation as God’s embracing 
of humankind into a unity with Him. It manifests the supreme unitary relation between 
God and humankind. This relation is established by the act of God in His grace. The 
initiative comes from God’s side. Nevertheless, our human subjectivity is also 
affirmed in this movement of God towards us. The incarnation affirms our humanity 
and discloses its true identity. For Torrance, this relationship cannot be a one-way 
connection but must contain bidirectional dynamics between two active subjects, i.e. 
God and humankind. His relational framework therefore differs from the “subject God 
vs. object humankind” type. It established the human being as a subject, albeit in a 
secondary mode, under God and within the God-human unity. 
Second, Torrance’s anthropology radiates from his consistent concentration on 
the person of Christ. For Torrance, Christ not only reveals the authentic knowledge of 
God in his oneness with the Father, but also discloses an authentic knowledge of 
human nature in his vicarious humanity. Moreover, Christ embodies in his person the 
unitary relation between God and humankind. His hypostatic union is the source of 
our knowledge of the God-human relationship. These three aspects together form 
                                                 
3
 With respect to the God-human relationship, his criticism of modern theology since the 18
th
 
century often targets the God-world dualism as it was influenced by ancient philosophy. But 
this does not mean that theology before the 18
th
 century was monolithically dualist. 
Nevertheless, under the influence of Platonic philosophy, dualist emphases are often found in 
theology before the modern age, namely, the ontological division between the Deity of 
substance and the world of phenomena, and consequently between mind and body or spirit and 
material etcetera. Much of Torrance’s suspicion of Augustine is attributable to a perceived 
dualism in this thought. 
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Torrance’s anthropological vision. It is in Christ that he sees the connection between 
knowing God and being human, the confirmation of the God-human unity, and the 
regeneration of humanity. Apart from Christ, these pillars of his anthropology would 
collapse. 
Third, Torrance’s anthropology is ultimately rooted in what Christ reveals 
about the Trinity. Torrance believes that our self-knowledge is reflexive of our God-
knowledge. The Trinitarian being of God is the source that provides norms and 
principles to describe the human being. He perceives in the Trinity the archetype of 
being in relations, the reciprocal dynamics of perichoresis, and the imageless image. 
His doctrine of the Trinity actually provides the rationale that he applies to 
anthropology. Furthermore, he singles out the Father-Son relationship as the 
controlling index for theology and identifies God always as Father rather than Creator. 
It is finally the doctrine of the Trinity rather than the doctrine of creation that shapes 
his anthropology. 
In short, Torrance presents a Christocentric anthropology which makes all 
knowledge of humankind derivative from the revelation of Christ and anchored in the 
person of Christ. It regards humanity as the image of God. To be God’s image means 
that humanity dynamically reflects (the glory of) God through active obedience to God 
in the unitary God-human relationship established by Jesus Christ, with the goal of our 




6.2 A Critical Assessment of Torrance’s Anthropology 
 
The most appropriate way to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Torrance’s 
anthropology is to situate it in the broader context of the writings of the Church fathers, 
Calvin and Barth. In this way, we can view its development of key anthropological 
insights from the patristic and Reformed traditions, as well as its adjustments of these. 
Unless we can see what he has done in this historical context, we cannot see clearly 
the repair work he intended. So also, unless we see the inevitable struggles and 
tensions of his work in this context, we cannot understand the unfinished business 
remaining within his theological anthropology. 
6.2.1 Strengths 
 
We find the strengths of Torrance’s anthropology on two fronts. On the one side, 
Torrance’s anthropology gathers the best of the theologies of the Fathers, Calvin and 
Barth and makes some insightful developments of these.  
First, Torrance comprehends patristic Christology and excavates its meaning 
for anthropology through exploring the significance of Christ’s humanity. Christ’s 
identity, i.e. the two natures in one person, is the marrow of patristic theology. When 
the Church fathers fought against heretical interpretations of Christ, their main focus 
fell upon understanding Christ as the incarnate God. Torrance fully comprehends this 
incarnational basis of Christian theology. As he inherits the patristic teaching, he 
further identifies Christ as the vicarious human being. That is to say, Jesus Christ is 
not only the God who became a real man, but also the man who stands in the place of 
 232 
all human beings. This provides the direct foundation for examining the nature of our 
humanity according to the act and being of God Himself. The patristic concepts of 
homoousion, hypostatic union, anhypostasia and enhypostasia together disclose the 
whole new relationship between God and humankind established in the person of 
Christ. Moreover, besides the redemptive death of Christ, the life of this vicarious 
human being is also salvific in terms of its correcting and regenerating humanity 
ontologically. To this extent, Torrance’s development of patristic Christology is 
anthropologically freighted with meaning.  
Second, Torrance advances Calvin’s idea of understanding humanity always in 
relation to our knowledge of God. This is presented dynamically in terms of reflecting 
God in every sphere of human life and activity. In Calvin’s theology, we find a 
relational and dynamic angle that distinguishes humanity by its unique reflection of 
God’s glory. However, Calvin does not offer much illustration of what this entails. 
Torrance, however, offers some development of the notion. He not only highlights the 
relational connection between God-knowledge and self-knowledge, he also uncovers 
the dynamic content of human reflection of God’s image, through the Reformed 
teaching on Christ’s active obedience. Christ’s disclosure of our human identity, and 
therefore of the divine image, resides in his actively obeying God. In this way, the 
notion of the reflection of God’s glory is Christologically inflected in Torrance. This 
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represents an important step forward in Reformed anthropology, although Torrance 
tends to present it primarily from a soteriological perspective.
4
   
Third, Torrance absorbs Barth’s Christocentrism for knowing God and 
promotes its significance for knowing humankind. Barth insightfully perceives the 
special revelation of God Himself in Christ and asserts its unique validity for 
anchoring the knowledge of God. Torrance well understands the value of Barth’s 
Christocentrism and uses it to anchor the knowledge of humanity as well. Torrance’s 
Christocentric anthropology is not explained by the solidarity theory and model theory, 
i.e. Christ is in solidarity with us and so gives us a perfect model. Rather profoundly, it 
is explained by the fact that all of humanity really is embodied in the vicarious person 
of Christ through his life, death and resurrection. This fact is the cornerstone of the 
objective knowledge of humankind, for instance, the objective condemnation of sin in 
flesh and the objective reconciliation of humanity to God. To this extent, we must 
recognize that Torrance extended Barthian epistemology into the realm of 
anthropology, perhaps even more so than Barth himself.  
On the other side, Torrance’s anthropology avoids some shortcomings in the 
theologies of the Fathers, Calvin and Barth. To a certain extent, it offers some 
meaningful correction of the defects in their anthropology. 
First, Torrance amends the static understanding of humanity that prevails in 
patristic theology. The static interpretation of the imago Dei leans upon the 
                                                 
4
 What this comment means will be clarified more clearly in the last section as we review 
some of the shortcomings in Torrance’s anthropology. 
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endowment of reason in the human mind. Its shortcoming is mainly reflected by the 
dualistic understanding of body and soul.
5
 Torrance recognizes the dualistic hazard 
and rejects dualism clearly. His interpretation of the imago Dei as the human’s 
dynamic reflection of God abandons the earlier focus on a substantial and static 
property. Instead, it regards the human being, as Jesus Christ manifests himself, as a 
living integrity of body and soul in a dynamic relationship to God. To focus on the 
dynamic relation rather than a static substance, Torrance eliminates the influence of 
Hellenistic ontology in traditional Christian anthropology and supports an advanced 
anthropology which views the human being as a psychosomatic whole. In this sense, 
he makes a significant correction to patristic theology in accordance with the holism of 
much modern theological anthropology.  
Second, Torrance avoids the inconsistent depiction of humanity that appears in 
Calvin’s theology. Calvin has both static and dynamic perspectives so that he talks of 
the rational endowment in our creaturely status as well as our inevitable alienation 
from God after the Fall. The former corresponds to the knowledge of God in the 
creation story and the latter corresponds to the knowledge of God in the salvation 
story.
6
 Torrance is convinced that the two stories are one in Christ, therefore he 
                                                 
5
 Under Hellenistic influence, the ancient fathers incline towards an ontology of substance 
with dualist implications.. In order to define humanity as the imago Dei, it has to identify 
some substance within or identical to the human being that is alike to God. Reason hence is 
singled out and affirmed as the peculiar possession of human nature in the likeness of God, i.e. 
the imago Dei intrinsically and substantially imprinted in human being. However, this way of 
interpreting humanity hardly resists the temptation to divinize human reason and exalt the 
human soul, which is “the seat of reason”, as immortal. It consequently introduces a dualist 
split between the physical body and the intellectual soul. 
6
 To be fair to Calvin, the inconsistent depiction of humanity in the Institutes is not a 
fundamental self-contradiction but a difficulty in harmonizing the two perspectives of creation 
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consciously picks the latter to establish his anthropology. In other words, he chooses 
the dynamic perspective as the dominant angle to view humanity and puts down the 
static perspective without canceling it.
7
 In so doing, Torrance acknowledges Calvin’s 
double teaching on humanity, but he also prioritizes one to avoid any competition by 
setting them in a simple juxtaposition. 
Third, Torrance attempts to offset the repression of human subjectivity in 
Barth’s theology. Barth’s theology plays a significant role in correcting 
anthropocentric theology. However, when defending God’s absolute subjectivity in 
relation to humankind, it arguably constrains the space in which we can talk more 
positively about human subjectivity and activity.
8
 Torrance covers this lacuna with his 
                                                                                                                                            
and salvation. That is why Mary Potter Engel uses the word “perspectival” to illustrate 
Calvin’s anthropology. See refer to Edward Dowey Jr., The Knowledge of God in Calvin’s 
Theology (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1952), and Mary Potter Engel, John Calvin’s 
Perspectival Anthropology (Atlanta: Scholars, 1988). 
7
 As we see in Calvin’s Doctrine of Man, Torrance, in the opening three chapters, 
acknowledges humankind as the particular imago Dei with a unique responsibility to God 
through the power of intelligence. This intelligence-based imago Dei is affirmed in the context 
of God’s creation. From Chapter 4 onwards, nevertheless, he shifts to the other side, i.e. 
humankind’s alienation from God and Christ’s reparation of human nature. The remaining 
chapters are orientated towards this setting. While he does not ignore Calvin’s teaching on 
humanity in creation, his principal effort is to interpret Calvin’s anthropology from the 
perspective of salvation. 
8
 As McGrath outlines, for Barth, humanity is only in the position of object while God remains 
subject. This is to be explained by the revolt against liberal theology. Barth’s fierce 
disagreement with Brunner actually relates to this issue of human subjectivity, for Brunner 
affirms humanity as a subject, too, although God is affirmed as subject in advance. See to 
Alister E. McGrath, The Making of Modern German Christology: From the Enlightenment to 
Pannenberg (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 105-106. On the other hand, more recent 
readings of Barth have stressed the extent to which he sees ethical action as a proper human 
response to God. See John Webster, Barth’s Ethics of Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University, 1995). McGrath’s criticism now seems in need of qualification at the very least. 
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emphasis on the active obedience of Christ in his vicarious human life.
9
 This emphasis 
gives a bold assertion to the subjective responsibility from the human side, while 
maintaining God’s initiative and ultimate position as subject.
10
 It enriches our 
understanding of humanity according to God’s own will, grace and action. In other 
words, the vicarious human being is God Himself; it is God Himself who personally 
reveals and affirms the subjectivity of humanity. This anthropological dimension in 
Christ’s special revelation is arguably neglected by Barth. Torrance, nonetheless, 
brings it out, particularly in his sacramental theology. To this extent, this anthropology 
is positioned rather differently and more positively than that of Barth in key respects. 
6.2.2 Weaknesses 
 
Alongside all the strengths mentioned above, we also find some weak points in 
Torrance’s anthropology. 
Generally speaking, Torrance’s anthropology is over-layered by Christological 
themes, particularly when he discusses our knowledge of God. This constrains the 
scope for theological anthropology to address more adequately the complexity of 
humankind. It also creates difficulties for those seeking communicating the Christian 
                                                 
9
 For Torrance, this constitutes a necessary part of Christ’s salvific ministry which is always 
vicarious and directed towards others. 
10
 Due to its vicarious nature, Christ’s humanity is always active for our sake. Yet this in no 
way derogates from the priority of God’s subjectivity, particularly when we consider the 
importance of the anhypostasia for Torrance. We cannot talk of human subjectivity except 
with reference to the vicarious humanity in Christ.  
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Furthermore, Torrance’s anthropology raises various questions and issues 
which need further clarification. First of all, theosis or deification of humanity is often 
leveled as a criticism of his strong notion of our soteriological union with Christ. As 
Torrance subsumes talk of humanity under his account of Christ the incarnate Son, he 
appears thereby to have transposed the relationship between God and humankind to 
the same relational level as that between the Father and the Son. In this situation, 
humanity still could be deified by making the God-human relation ultimately equal to 
the God-God relation, despite his refusal to equate human and divine being. 
Second, reason and conscience are remain unresolved issues in Torrance’s 
anthropology. As Torrance criticizes any static account of what makes us human, he 
also tends to surrender the traditional affirmation of reason and conscience which have 
a positive significance for human identity even after the Fall. In his theology, Torrance 
omits the topic of conscience, but he talks about reason a good deal. However, his 
arguments about reason have a gap to fill. On the one side, he claims that God is 
rational and that the Spirit is the source of all rationality. Created reason is grounded 
in and reflects the uncreated reason (i.e. the divine reason). On the other side, he 
asserts that reason has nothing to do with the reception of God’s revelation. There is 
                                                 
11
 For example, traditional Chinese culture has a profound understanding of human nature 
although it has no concept of “Christ”. To initiate a dialogue which introduces a Christian 
understanding of humanity to Chinese culture, we cannot employ Torrance’s anthropology in a 
ready or straightforward manner. As Christology is totally foreign to them, the dialogue needs 
some preparative themes other than Christ – for instance, the value and limit of human reason 
– to establish a conversation. 
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no “point of contact” between the human and the divine. Whether reason endows us 
with particular spiritual capacities seems ambiguous at this point. This does not mean 
that Torrance is wrong in describing the perverted function of reason after the Fall, but 
he requires to offer further clarification of the relation between reason and the action 
of the Spirit in his anthropology.  
Third, the horizontal dimension of human life is rather muted, if not absent, in 
Torrance’s anthropology. Focusing on the God-human relationship in Christ, Torrance 
mainly examines humanity in a vertical dimension, i.e. in our responding to God. He 
rarely talks about the interpersonal relationship between human fellows or expounds 
the horizontal dimension of human life in society, e.g. in the context of social justice. 
As for the relationship between humankind and the vast created world, Torrance has 
the idea that human beings are priests of creation, but he does not give this important 
notion the development it requires.
12
 This weakens the power of his anthropology to 
contribute to significant ethical and ecological issues. 
These weak points, missing elements and unanswered questions ultimately 
derive from a fundamental problem which afflicts Christian theology more broadly, 
that is, how to correlate accounts of creation and salvation. For the Church fathers and 
Calvin, these are parallel but not separated, and together they depict the God-human 
relationship. For Barth, they are integrated by a subordinated relationship in which 
salvation subdues creation and dominates the whole narrative of the God-human 
                                                 
12
 The horizontal dimension matters significantly in the whole story of God’s relation with 
humankind, as we see in the Bible. It should be considered also as a determining factor in any 
consideration of what is meant by the image of God. 
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relationship. Epistemologically, Torrance sympathizes with Barth; but doctrinally, he 
values those teachings on humanity which the Church fathers and Calvin expressed in 
the context of creation. Therefore, he compresses anthropology into Christology and 
promotes the dynamic perspective only. The method itself has reflected his effort at 
finding a way through patterns of traditional and modern thinking in theology.  
In conclusion, Torrance’s anthropology is like the gold hidden in the rich ore. 
It needs to be unearthed and grasped from a study of his wider theology in which he 
integrates patristic, Reformed and Barthian approaches. The main contribution of his 
anthropology resides in its stress upon a dynamic interpretation of humanity in a 
relationship of correspondence to God. By such a dynamic and relational vision, 
Torrance helps us see that the imago Dei is not a property we can take for granted; 
rather, it is the life that we should live out in response to the love of God in Christ. 
Although there are defects in this kind of interpretation of humanity, we can 
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